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Preface
It was with great pleasure that I welcomed the participants to the
Conference on “Local Heritage in the Changing Tropics,” as I do
now the readers of these proceedings. The conference and the pro
ceedings are products of our School, and they exemplify our mission
and our commitment to pursuing it.
The theme and composition of the conference are explicitly
interdisciplinary, reflecting the central theme of the Yale School of
Forestry and Environmental Studies. Today’s natural resource chal
lenges demand an interdisciplinary approach. A full understanding
of the issues can be derived only through an exploration of the
ecological, socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions of the
problem. In our School, we view natural resource problems as hu
man problems. Our students are trained that way, giving them the
interdisciplinary framework for professional effectiveness.
“Local Heritage in the Changing Tropics” is the most recent in a
series of conferences organized by our student chapter of the ISTF.
This series represents a highly valued tradition, in which our stu
dents develop the conference’s theme, identify and engage speakers,
make all arrangements, raise funds, hold the conference and help
produce the proceedings. The students do everything with no more
than seed funding and cheerleading from the faculty. The results
underscore the quality, professionalism and enthusiasm of our
excellent students. I warmly congratulate them on a job very well
done.
These proceedings are being published as part of the School’s
renewed Bulletin series, which has recorded and disseminated
projects of special interest generated by faculty or students in the
School on an occasional basis for nearly a century. I am pleased to
note the reactivation of the series, which is a particularly appropriate
outlet for these proceedings.
Jared L. Cohon, Dean
Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies

  

      
Foreword
I was directed by the President of the International Society of
Tropical Foresters, Dr. Warren Doolittle, to let the ISTF Student
Chapter Members know that we appreciate the work that goes into
the several activities that have been accomplished by the Yale Chap
ter. The recent conferences, including the conference on Timber
Certification held last year and this conference on Local Heritage,
are areas that need discussion and are fora to help industry, environ
mental groups, and government employees more fully understand
the issues and activities taking place in tropical forests.
We compliment the Yale Student Chapter for undertaking and
carrying out these activities.
RECENT ACTIVITIES OF THE ISTF
We have invested in computer capability to help keep member
ship records more current and to help us lower the costs of publish
ing the three versions of the ISTF News.
We are developing a new consultants roster for ISTF members.
ISTF had this service for members several years ago; however, it
became too cumbersome to maintain the records by hand. The
computer capability will allow us to maintain the roster and make
rapid searches when requests for consultants are received.
Late last year ISTF and SAF entered into an agreement with the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to estab
lish a center in Bethesda, Maryland to print and distribute FAO’s
Forests, Trees, and People Project (FTPP) Newsletter in North
America and the English-speaking portion of the Caribbean. The
center is called NACARCE — North American and Caribbean Re
gional Center, English.
Another big undertaking is the Secretariat responsibilities for the
International Union of Societies of Foresters (IUSF). This Secretariat
was transferred to the United States from Australia. It will be located
at the Society of American Foresters (SAF) headquarters for the next
five years. ISTF is deeply involved with this activity along with SAF.
You may know that one of your professors — Dr. John Gordon —
was elected President of IUSF at the world meeting held in Anchor
age, Alaska last September. The organization is made up of Forestry
Society members from around the world.
We at ISTF hope this conference will set the stage for integration
of information developed into future tropical forest management
discussions.
Rodney F. Young
ISTF Volunteer

 

Introduction
Tropical ecosystems are today burdened by human activity as
never before. Centuries of accelerating exploitation have led to the
current situation in which natural areas shrink daily in the face of
changing human populations, shifting political structures, and
increasing resource use. As these areas are consumed by uncon
trolled change, so too are destroyed cultures and resource use prac
tices that have often been in place for millennia.
In recent years, international concern has mounted in response
to the destruction of cultures and associated natural resource use
systems at the economic frontier between the global economy and
traditional societies. Local peoples’ groups have forged new alliances
amongst themselves and with global partners to assert customary
resource control. Constructive alternatives to the victimization of
market newcomers as well as the amelioration of long standing
inequities faced by “traditional” resource users are being developed
in diverse settings by indigenous groups, labor organizations, non
governmental organizations (NGOs), research institutions, govern
ments, and other entities.
In February 1995, the Yale F&ES Student Chapter of the Interna
tional Society of Tropical Foresters brought together 150 students,
professionals, community leaders, and academics from diverse fields
related to tropical natural resource use and rights for a conference
entitled “Local Heritage in the Changing Tropics: Innovative Strate
gies for Natural Resource Management and Control.” By drawing
conference speakers and participants from all levels of this process
and from all parts of the globe, we hoped to chart a broad vision for
the future of our biological and cultural heritage and to foster com
munication among workers from various fields and regions.
The conference provided an opportunity for speakers to share
their work with others, and the working groups that followed each
presentation provided a forum for a lively and constructive explora
tion of the issues. Though each participant brought a different set of
viewpoints and experiences to these meetings, several overarching
themes emerged.
During the course of the weekend, many grappled with trying to
come up with an operational definition of “Local.” It was, and re
mains, a problematic word because we were using it as a euphe
mism: when we said “Local,” we were often speaking of spatially
small communities — of remote villages held together by tight
familial, cultural, and occupational ties. Nevertheless, it was not
readily apparent what constitutes “Localness.” As the weekend pro
gressed, it became clear that “Localness” is not merely an issue of
spatial scale. We often spoke of “Indigenous” groups, but in the
context of tropical natural resource users, this too tells only half the story.

  

      
Throughout the weekend, we had been discussing issues of
space. We quickly went beyond physical space to examine political,
cultural, economic, institutional, and even cyber spaces. The parts of
these various species of space that we were interested in were the
edges: the frontiers or borders. This is obvious in the case of the
auto-lideración in Venezuela that Peter Poole is assisting — but it is
equally the case in, for example, the defense of market spaces against
multinationals pushing their way in under the WTO that John
Friede chronicles. In every presentation, the collective discourse
concerned the demarcation and defense of the space (in all senses)
that is today inhabited by some of the last remaining guilds of
people directly and immediately connected to their resource bases.
This of course begs the question: why are these frontiers threat
ened? The answer is that since the maturation of industrial culture,
there has been a steady increase in the space demanded and held
exclusively by this culture. This has always been at the expense of
those who do not have the industrial wedge driven between them
and their environment. It has been an inexorable process, and the
activities that we discussed all seek to moderate the process of the
growth of industrial culture. I use the word “moderate” rather than
“stop” because much of what we discussed concerned helping
groups occupy spaces in terms that industrial culture will respect —
essentially such projects bring groups inside industrial space, but on
their own terms. Examples include George Appell’s cogent critique
of the common property concept, Sharon Flynn’s rigorous market
ing approach, Peter Poole’s geomatic work, and, in particular, Mac
Chapin’s mapping projects, which translate information into codes
understood and accepted by industrial culture.
By adopting roles of advocacy or proactive outreach to those on
the other side of the econotone, these people are helping to mitigate
situations that have, traditionally, ended in what can only be de
scribed as crimes against humanity. As inextricable members of
industrial culture, doing nothing is complicity.
This defense of space — these border wars — are everywhere,
and exist in all sorts of different spaces. When we discussed
“Localness,” we were talking about spaces, physical and figurative,
that have not been wholly consumed by industrial culture.
An encouraging new trend was evident throughout the confer
ence weekend. In cases where Indigenous and other local groups are
able to assert political power, they are moving into a position to
contract advisory services from outside experts — having occupied
their space they are now dealing with what to do with it. This was
exemplified by Chico Ginú’s initiatives with the Alto Juruá Extrac
tive Reserve as well Sebastián Poot’s experience with the Yum Balam
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Protected Area, both of which represent the fruition of this phe
nomenon. And it is ongoing. As Steve Schwartzman relates, the
Panará are now beginning to move into this phase, and, as Ted
Macdonald explains, indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon
have been moving toward it for some time. Nevertheless, George
Appell reminds us, this development is largely limited to Latin
America and the self-determination of marginalized peoples around
the world remains a struggle for survival.
Another important theme that emerged from the discussions was
the crucial role played by knowledge and information. While the
endemic knowledge of many groups is clearly comprehensive and
important, they are often ill-equipped to interact with entities from
industrial culture because of a lack of information about this realm.
This theme came up frequently, and was a major component of the
discussions led by Terry Turner, Beto Borges, and Richard Labelle.
Providing such information-based services can help to make dealing
as equals a reality for marginalized groups while at the same time
making available the resources for informed self-determination. As
Sebastián Poot pointed out, this sort of information and technical
assistance is a crucial ingredient in the political legitimization of
traditional natural resource management regimes.
Although it is true that I found out about Richard Labelle’s work
by surfing the Internet, his point that Computer Mediated Commu
nications are simply a tool was an excellent one — the communica
tions I had with him were qualitatively the same as my inviting
Sharon Flynn to this conference while we were in the back of a
bouncing pickup truck in the Petén. Networking and communica
tion is what makes a community. We can see this clearly in Beto
Borges’ work in Brazil, and, even, in the activities that took place in
New Haven during the conference weekend. We were, and continue
to be, operating as a community.
Throughout the weekend, the discussion returned again and
again to the tension between “Little” and “Big” Conservation
broached by Janis Alcorn in the keynote address. The many ex
amples of dedicated and participatory work brought forth during
the conference demonstrated that this tension need not be the un
doing of the promising partnership between indigenous knowledge
systems and western notions of natural resource “conservation.” By
helping marginalized natural resource users to gain control of their
natural heritage, we are helping to make the world a livable place for
all of humanity.
These proceedings are organized along the same lines as the
conference weekend itself. Following this introductory section,
which includes the keynote address, the text is divided into three

By helping marginalized natural re
source users to gain control of their
natural heritage, we are helping to
make the world a livable place.

  

      
thematic sections. Section I deals with problems in codifying tradi
tional land and resource rights into national law and the concomi
tant problems in transforming ill-defined “groups” into legal
entities. Section II examines market participation as a means to
exercise local control of natural resources by constructively channelling market penetration toward goals of improved standards of
living, political empowerment, cultural preservation, and the con
servation of biodiversity. Section III explores ways that marginalized
people are using geomatic and communication technologies to press
claims and to conserve customary knowledge.
It is our hope that the readers of these Proceedings will find
them informative and useful and that, in some way, our collective
endeavor will contribute to a humane and sustainable future.
Greg Dicum, Editor
New Haven, Connecticut

 

Keynote Address
Big Conservation and Little Conservation: Collaboration in
Managing Global and Local Heritage
Janis B. Alcorn
Biodiversity Support Program
World Wildlife Fund
ABSTRACT
Conservation initiatives around the world are separated into two distinct scales: Big Conservation, of the sort practiced
by big international NGOs, and Little Conservation, the type undertaken by millions of anonymous local people. Big
Conservation tends to ignore the efforts of Little Conservation, but, ultimately, it is Little Conservation that makes the
long-term difference. If conservation in general is to be successful, then the two branches must learn to work together
— to marry the money and technical knowledge of Big Conservation with the commitment and traditional knowledge
of Little Conservation. This will require a fundamental change in the way Big Conservation operates, since it must give
up a measure of control over the conservation process to local people.

The topic of this conference — Innovative Strategies for Natural
Resource Management and Control — is a primary concern to
many of us working in conservation outside academia. The confer
ence focuses on three themes: legal recognition of group rights and
ownership; management of market forces; and information tech
nologies in service of communities. These three themes surface
around the globe when conservationists and resource managers
discuss “integrated conservation and development” projects. But
these themes surface less often in mainstream conservation discus
sions.
Recently there have been efforts to reform conservation; these
efforts spring from a spectrum of critiques. On one side are those
who are trying to get conservationists to question whether the end
justifies the means in their work, and to recognize and alter the
human rights abuses and other imperialistic aspects of conservation.
In the middle are those who seek to integrate sustainable develop
ment with conservation, such as IUCN’s Strategy for Caring for the
Earth. Others in the middle are working to join the interests of the
state and local people to work on specific management problems,
such as the new Joint Forest Management strategies in India and
other countries. At the other end of the spectrum, there is a re
trenchment of standard approaches — led by traditionalist biologycentric conservationists, with the most radical of them calling for
creation of a UN Nature Keeping Force modeled after the UN Peace
Keeping Force. Under this proposal, biologists would monitor park
management globally, and, if national governments failed to protect
parks, the biologists would call in the UN forces to keep people out
of those parks. As you discuss the three themes of focus in your

  

      
conference, I would like for you to keep this bigger picture in mind
as a context for your discussions over the next two days.
Your conference focuses on local heritage. Global heritage is the
most familiar buzzword today. All heritage is ultimately local, how
ever. The popular cry is “think globally, act locally,” but the catch is
that in order to act locally, you have to think locally.
We who think globally are what Raymond Dasmann has called
“Biosphere People.” We Biosphere People seldom know much about
the rivers, forests, hills and grasslands in whose midst we live. We
locate ourselves in grids on paper maps or round metal globes. We
don’t know the names of the plants around us. We don’t know their
natural rhythms. We don’t know the history of the places where we
walk. Land and resources are viewed as commodities. We extract
resources from around the world; we wear shirts from Bangladesh,
jeans from Burma, belts from Guatemala, and shoes from China.
We eat grapes from Chile, pineapples from Sri Lanka, and oranges
from Brazil. Our companies extract oil from Papua New Guinea and
Ecuador, and gold from Indonesia. Profits made on our stock mar
ket come in from points all around the world. And we talk about
our global heritage. The environmental and social impacts of our
use of these resources is invisible to us. There is no feedback that
affects our immediate lives. We are the elite, we live in the “North,”
and in the capital cities of every country in the world. We are not
well-informed for thinking locally, or well-organized for acting
locally — particularly in someone else’s locale.
Dasmann contrasted Biosphere People with “Ecosystem People.”
Ecosystem People know and depend on their local place — their
livelihood and well-being depends on their immediate environment.
Their identity and their history are part of the landscape. They lo
cate themselves in relation to natural features in the landscape and
the history associated with those features. Feedback from overuse of
the resource base is seen and felt in the immediate environment.
Ecosystem People think locally, and they are well-informed to think
locally. Indigenous peoples are Ecosystem People. Ecosystem People
are often invisible to Biosphere People.
Ecosystem People are now being recognized as “stakeholders.”
But as one of the conferences speakers, Peter Poole, once joked to
me: a stakeholder is anyone who shows up carrying a T-Bone steak
in each hand. In other words, anyone who is powerful enough to
claim rights can be a stakeholder. The critical point is that Ecosys
tem People are stakeholders with prior rights to the resource in which
others are claiming a stake. Biosphere People, however, generally
ignore that issue. When they do invite Ecosystem People to the
table, too often it is to extract their local knowledge to be used for
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decision-making by Biosphere interests. Certainly this division into
two groups is an oversimplification of a complex set of relationships.
But the contrast is heuristically useful for defining the problem and
the ends of the spectrum.
Let me turn now to a related contrasting pair — what I’m calling
Big Conservation and Little Conservation. But before I talk about
what’s big and what’s little, let me quickly define what I mean by
conservation. Conservation is a social and political process by which
natural resources, including forests, are managed to maintain
biodiversity. Biological information and socio-political information
are both important for conservation decision-making. Most of this
information is held by local Ecosystem People. This is not to say that
all information is held locally; it isn’t.
BIG CONSERVATION
What is Big Conservation? Big Conservation is global. It is big
organizations and big institutions located in big office buildings in
capital cities: the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the
World Wildlife Fund, Conservation International, IUCN, the Asian
Wetland Bureau, and the African Wildlife Foundation, for example.
Big Conservation is the concern of BINGOS — Big International
NGOs — and their local partner NGOs. Big Conservation is the
concern of Government Forest Ministries and Park Departments.
Big Conservation is big money. And Big Conservation is powerful. It
is funded by multilateral development banks, bilateral donors, and
wealthy foundations. Big Conservation is dominated by biologists
with interests in global heritage. Big Conservation works for the
“preservation” of habitats and ecosystems in areas distant from the
homes of Big Conservationists. Big Conservation depends on fund
ing and political commitment from bureaucracies and foreign inter
ests distant from the field sites where projects, and biodiversity, are
located. Big Conservation is what most people think of when they
think of conservation.
The primary strategy of traditional Big Conservation is park and
forest reserve systems, where areas are managed under plans drawn
up by foreign consultants and nationals from capital cities. Some
have referred to this as the “bullets and barbed wire” approach to
conservation. Some elements inside Big Conservation have em
braced efforts to develop a less combative relationship with people
who live in or near parks and reserves, but the government agencies
that carry out Big Conservation generally tend to view local people
as their primary enemy, because they define local people as the
major cause of park degradation.

  

      
Big Conservation’s discourse and fund raising focuses on large,
attractive animals: the panda, the tiger, the elephant, and the jaguar.
The vision of Big Conservation does not include local people, and
only peripherally any people at all — usually only the biologist/
discoverer who interprets the scenery for us as he/she passes through
it. Photographs and discussions focus on wild forests or beautiful
reefs with no people in the picture — that is the desired goal of
conservation. In Big Conservation discourse, local citizens are gen
erally ignored, or called “populations” that threaten the “carrying
capacity” of an ecosystem — in language derived from animal popu
lation biology. The organizations and institutions of local people are
invisible to Big Conservation. Local people are viewed as a threat;
they are the poachers, the slash and burners, the interlopers, and the
squatters who must be removed from biodiverse areas.
The standard political modus operandus of Big Conservation has
been to ignore local rights and claim the priority of global or na
tional interests as moral vindication for their actions. Big Conserva
tionists also claim the high ground, because they claim they are not
representing themselves but rather speaking on behalf of
biodiversity, representing the interests of wild animals who have no
voice. Increased international funding for Big Conservation is being
used to increase the area under Parks and Protected Areas — prima
rily in areas occupied, used and claimed by Indigenous peoples. In
this context, Big Conservation has been criticized for legitimizing
states’ use of military force against Indigenous minorities. Conserva
tionists are providing arms to governments and backing the states’
moral rights to seize lands and punish those who resist their will. By
supporting the consolidation of state control over natural resources,
Big Conservation may very well be undermining its own interests,
given the other interests of state-linked elites who have logged and
mined biodiverse areas for profits.
Environmentalists in the South have accused Big Conservation
of turning the chicken-coop over to the foxes. They question
whether Northern Big Conservation’s action is simply done in igno
rance, or is another extractive activity by the North. But this NorthSouth discourse has generally ignored Little Conservation, and has
instead focused on the faults of Big Conservation.
LITTLE CONSERVATION
What is Little Conservation? Little Conservation occurs as indi
viduals make choices in their day-to-day lives. On the one hand,
those decisions depend on an individual’s ecological knowledge and
his or her skills in applying the patterns established by traditional
resource management systems. On the other hand, the decisions are
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made within the opportunities and constraints imposed by the
communities’ tenurial institutions — the rules that control resource
access and use. Traditional farming is often viewed as requiring
limited skill or controls. This is far from true. Traditional systems of
slash and burn agriculture manage ecological processes through
institutions with rituals, rules about allocation of lands, time-limits
on land use, and a focus on maintaining proper social relationships
within the community.
Little Conservation is a largely invisible influence on those who
carry it out. It is embedded in local dress and metaphors, in the
“right way” to do agriculture, and in ethical relationships with an
cestors. It is passed on to children in songs, dances, and histories; it
is part of local cultural heritage.
Little Conservation is visible in the community near Madang,
Papua New Guinea, where people hand-feed rare, endemic fish in a
bend in the river and limit their offtake to a few individuals for a
once-a-year ritual. Little Conservation is the community that is
petitioning the government to give it “conservation area” status so
their forest won’t be logged under the concession granted by the
government to an outside logging company. It’s the local farmer or
housewife who takes an interest in trees or herbs that are becoming
rare and take it upon themselves to maintain these species on their
property or to argue in community meetings that everyone needs to
spare them when they plan agricultural clearings. Little Conserva
tion is at work in the traditional fishing ban following a reef owner’s
death in the South Pacific nations and in the mangrove harvest ban
applied when a community recognizes that overharvesting has oc
curred. It’s in the Thai Karen admonition that if you can hear a
monkey’s call echo when you are in your field, you have cleared too
much forest. It’s the decision made by the forest farmer to spare a
rare tree and avoid steep slopes and greenbelts along waterways as
he selects a field site to initiate a traditional agroforestry system.
Little Conservation operates when village elders restrict access to
certain forests or decide to allow agricultural land to return to forest
when it’s clear that forests have shrunk too small.
Little Conservation is seen in the Bushmen’s managed burns
used to maintain a patchwork of wild resources. Locally the burns
are small but together they spread across the breadth of the Kalahari
Desert. Little Conservation is seen in the managed forests that
Chuck Peters has been studying in Borneo. Such biodiverse man
aged forests are found across the expanse of Borneo in mosaics with
patches of communities’ natural forest reserves.
The small acts of individuals and communities guided by Little
Conservation add up to big, geographically visible patterns. Little
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Conservation operates in perhaps 85% of the world’s high
biodiversity areas, including the areas where Protected Areas overlap
with the territories of Indigenous Peoples. Big Conservation, in
contrast, is carried out in a much, much smaller area. Little Conser
vation, then, is geographically bigger than Big Conservation.
So why have I called it Little Conservation? It is little, because
globally it has been invisible, and because it is done by politically
weak groups. The institutions that support Little Conservation have
no office buildings, no named organizations. For example, village
organizations meet under trees to make decisions. When no one is
meeting, there is no visible sign of the organization — just a spot
under a tree, or empty stools or mats in the corner of a communal
house. They don’t look important, and it’s easy for outsiders to miss
their presence. The institutions that support Little Conservation
spread across national boundaries, but they aren’t recognized by any
international or national body, and they have seldom been studied
by outsiders.
Little Conservation is little because its budget is tiny. It is a non
entity on the global donor scene. There is virtually no funding for
Little Conservation. The World Bank’s leaders have never heard of
it, and those who practice Little Conservation have often never
heard of The World Bank. Little Conservation doesn’t require large
sums of money; it is locally supported by cultural values, commu
nity-based institutions, and traditional resource management sys
tems adapted to local conditions. At the national level, it is
supported by appropriate policies that enable the local support
mechanisms to continue to function under changing circumstances.
Finally, Little Conservation is little because Little Conservation is
local. Its vision is limited to the local situation, a small area. There
are no grand designs for, or assessments of, others’ situations. Strat
egies and methods do not reflect an appreciation for regional or
global trends, and they rarely foresee the impacts of “moderniza
tion” before they happen.
Little Conservation traditions are faced with many, many stresses
and threats including: escalating pressure from outsiders who are
logging, extracting other resources, or settling on community lands;
state expropriation of lands and resources; demographic changes;
cultural change; failure to educate young people in traditional eco
logical knowledge; missionaries; community institutions that are
unable to interface effectively with outsiders; technological changes;
and crop changes.
They are also threatened by Big Conservation which has, with all
good intentions for saving global heritage, contributed to the de
struction of Little Conservation by ejecting local peoples from areas

 

 
that were rightfully theirs. Big Conservationists have made enemies
of those who could be their allies. Instead of making allies with those
who face off against loggers to defend their community forests, Big
Conservation has instead too often sided with elites who share inter
ests with loggers and other resource miners.
COLLABORATION IN CONSERVATION
Over the past decade, Little Conservation has become more
visible on the world stage. Community groups have increasingly
joined together in federations, unions, and other “peoples’ organiza
tions” to assert their rights. They have come to Big Conservation to
seek assistance on what they see to be a common agenda. For ex
ample, in Northern Thailand, a group of villages have fought to
protect their watershed forests from local logging interests. They
were successful in that local fight, but then the government declared
their forests part of a new national park. The village-based organiza
tion then sought help from a Bangkok-based environmental NGO.
The Bangkok-based national NGO assisted them, but the interna
tional NGOs backed the park’s creation. Big Conservationists often
question local motivations, while at the same time they overlook the
motivations driving the state. The biology-centric elements of Big
Conservation deny the existence of Little Conservation and com
plain about others’ blind belief in the Noble Savage, yet they do not
critically evaluate their own beliefs in the Noble State.
There is, as I mentioned earlier, a movement within Big Conser
vation to “involve local people” in conservation, although this in
volvement often does not build on Little Conservation practices or
beliefs. There are, however, two levels of potentially synergistic
collaboration between Big and Little Conservation: site specific
collaboration, and policy level collaboration. Site specific collabora
tion includes a variety of possibilities including integrated conserva
tion and development projects (ICADs), co-management, and
technical assistance. Let me briefly discuss each one.
ICADs are based on the premise that unless people affected by
the establishment of protected areas feel that they are benefiting in
some way from protected areas, they will not be deterred from
unsustainable resource extraction in those protected areas. Most
ICADs are very local and seek to find the one or two incentives that
will keep people out of the park; or to find cash replacements for the
resources people have lost to the park.
Park managers often allow residents from outside the park to
benefit by harvesting specific resources. For example, residents
outside several protected areas in India and Nepal are allowed to cut
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grass inside the protected area for a short period each year. In addi
tion, the park offers tree seedlings for planting on private land to
replace wood lost when villagers were denied access to firewood
gathering inside the park. ICADs aim to provide development ben
efits to people who have been removed from a park or who live next
to a park in exchange for agreements that residents will not clear
agricultural lands inside the protected areas. ICADs promote cottage
industries such as beekeeping, distribute hybrid seeds, improve
water supplies, and initiate ecotourism to generate local revenue.
One of your conference themes involves market development for
local products. This strategy is usually, but not always, implemented
in association with ICAD projects.
The general consensus is that existing ICADs have seldom been
successful, however. Analysts have concluded that the primary rea
son for their limited success is that ICADs have not achieved true
participation. Rather, they involve people as passive recipients or
implementors of projects, not as active partners in design or evalua
tion of those projects. Hence, they seldom build on Little Conserva
tion practices and traditions.
A second area for local collaboration is co-management. Some
level of co-management is occurring in some protected areas today.
This decision to work with local people generally depends on deci
sions by individual park or reserve managers who see the value of
recognizing the rights of local, traditional owners of the resources,
and are committed to develop ways to integrate them into park
management decision-making. These are generally ad hoc local
efforts that are not officially, or legally, recognized as policy. For
example, in Indonesia, WWF is working with government agencies
and park residents in East Kalimantan to use participatory mapping
so that local people can identify their traditional resource zones for
designation as the park’s multiple use areas, and designate the areas
they would like to see remain “core areas” untouched by outsiders
or themselves.
Thirdly, at the local site level, Big Conservationists offer techni
cal assistance. Technical assistance can strengthen local people’s
capacity to monitor and manage the biodiversity on their lands. For
example, the Xavante in Brazil requested that WWF assist them to
develop ways to survey and monitor game populations. In the
Yukon, wildlife department researchers gather information from
communities on the status of fur-bearing wildlife in each area, ana
lyze regional patterns, and then provide advice on management
based on trends they find in the data. In these cases, native commu
nities are not forced to follow the advice; the decision is left in their
court. Technical assistance may also be provided in terms of legal

 

 
assistance to fight illegal logging or encroachment on Indigenous
territories. This may take the form of direct legal assistance, back
ground legal research or acquisition of satellite imagery as evidence.
STRENGTHENING CONSERVATION
How can Big Conservation use its power in the policy arena to
support Little Conservation to reach their common objectives? I’ve
identified five areas where policy reform could strengthen conserva
tion: a) tenurial rights b) border defense c) true co-management
d) land use planning and e) educational rights. Many strategies are
used in each of these five areas. All five make use of mapping and
other information management technologies — one of the themes
of your conference.
The first is tenure. Tenure is often discussed in these types of
fora as an incentive for investment in long-term resource manage
ment. Community-based tenure and group ownership is more than
an incentive, however. I think one of the best ways to conceptualize
the important role of tenure is to think of property rights systems as
“shells” in the computer jargon sense. Tenurial shells provide the
superstructure within which activities are developed and operate —
a sort of inner environment within the larger world. The tenurial
shell is a constraining and enabling structure linked in very specific
ways to the larger “operating system” in which the shell is embed
ded. Local ecosystems and societies have survived and flourished
within the protective, enabling shells of community-based tenurial
systems. Communities are not homogeneous, happy, harmonious
entities. Tenurial shells form crucibles within which local conflict
and differing strategies can bubble together in the context of local
cultural and ecological factors, without being destabilized by exter
nal factors.
External recognition and legal protection of community-based
property rights regimes strengthens the protective border. In many
cases, if the protective tenurial shell were removed, individuals and
institutions in the outer milieu would destabilize and destroy the
community-based organizations, their institutions, and their re
sources inside the shell.
Second, border defense is supported by community-based tenur
ial systems and community-based border surveillance, as well as by
policies that commit the power of the state to defend the borders of
indigenous peoples’ territories.
Third, national-level policies that legitimize and support true comanagement are critical tools whereby states can reach conservation
objectives through partnerships with communities. Co-management
policies enable the state to maintain a certain degree of control over
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resource management decisions on private lands.
What is true co-management? It ranges from direct co-manage
ment of specific protected areas by joint boards to situations where
government’s role is simply recognition of local community-based
organizations or indigenous peoples’ rights to make their own man
agement decisions. In most spheres, this falls within specific geo
graphic areas variously known as semi-autonomous regions,
campesino ecological reserves, comarcas, Indigenous reserves, etc.
In the latter cases, the state is not directly co-managing, but indi
rectly co-managing through regulations that govern such entities
and supporting those entities by defending their rights and borders.
Examples of direct co-management can be found in Australia
and England. In Australia, Aboriginal land owners and the ANPWS
run parks through a joint management arrangement. Aborigines
serve on Management Boards and Consultative Committees which
prepare long-term plans, as well as participate in day-to-day deci
sion-making. In England, parks are planned around residents’ liveli
hood activities and residents participate in park management
decisions. Most British parks are under private ownership and the
National Park Authority must cooperate with landowners to achieve
its goals. Management Agreements establish Farm Conservation
Plans, and provide financial incentives and compensation for
agreed-upon management practices.
Outside of protected areas, co-management of a nation’s re
sources can take all sorts of innovative forms. For example, appro
priate subsidies for crops traditionally grown in biodiverse systems,
such as rubber, “rustic” coffee and rattan gardens, can assist subsis
tence farmers to keep biodiversity in the landscape. Local communi
ties need the biodiverse structure for the foods, medicines, craft
materials, and other benefits provided by the multiple species sys
tems in the short term; and the nation needs the biodiverse land
scape for the storage of genetic resources and provision of ecosystem
services for the long-term.
True co-management means recognizing the authority and
institutions of peoples that do not share the urban-based culture of
Biosphere People. It means surrendering dominance over interac
tion between our cultures to a process where our goals are put at
risk by entering dialogue and collaboration. The direction and out
come is not foregone, and this frightens Big Conservation. There
fore, most co-management is not true co-management, but some
sort of arrangement that yields no decision-making authority. For
example, people are threatened with eviction if they do not sign
compacts under terms dictated by Big Conservation, and this is
called “co-management.”

 

 
Fourth, policy changes that enable local land use planning are
critically important, especially in places where tenurial rights are
claimed by a state that is not likely to give up those rights to com
munities. Land use planning should be done in a way that focuses
on making evident the existing plans that local people have for their
lands and resources. Government often assumes that people have no
plans and uses poor data to make broad land use decisions that are
imposed on people, or are used to separate the people from their
resources.
Lastly, but equally important, are education rights. In most
countries, current national policy actively supports efforts to “main
stream” Indigenous cultures, thereby destroying their cultures and
identity, and their Little Conservation traditions. The Karen whose
homes and forests have been enclosed by the Thung Yai Wildlife
Sanctuary in Thailand, for example, are seeking assistance in devel
oping a program to educate their children in traditional knowledge
and beliefs so they will be able to continue to take proper care of the
forest left to them by their ancestors. But it is likely they will instead
be resettled away from their forest homeland under a pending GEF
project.

It is prudent to assume that, if wild
species are observed in the vicinity of
peoples’ homes and fields ... then those
people are in some way responsible
for the presence of those species.

FINDING LITTLE CONSERVATION
If Little Conservation is so pervasive, why has it been so seldom
documented? There are several reasons: government agency workers
are educated to ignore it; urban-based researchers have been oblivi
ous to it — it was not part of their upbringing, and it has not been
something they were looking for. Biologists have sought information
about specific species preferably as far away from people as possible,
and anthropologists have focused on social behavior and rituals, but
generally ignored their impact on the natural environment. Never
theless, whenever researchers have looked for it, they have found
Little Conservation all around the world.
It is prudent to assume that, if wild species are observed in the
vicinity of peoples’ homes and fields — whether you are looking at
primarily agricultural landscapes with trees and other wild species
on its edges, or at situations in the rainforest where farmers’ fields
are interspersed with large areas of wild resources in primary and
secondary forests — then those people are in some way responsible
for the presence of those species. This is rather like being presumed
innocent unless proven guilty. Currently, researchers take the oppo
site view; they blame the people they see in the immediate environ
ment for what is absent, when in fact the primary blame should
often be placed at the door of policies and actions of distant elites.
As is true of most things deeply embedded in a peoples’ way of

  

      
life, to discover Little Conservation, the researcher can’t just ask “do
you do conservation?” The answer would probably be “no.” As a
Karen headman asked me as we discussed conservation, “Why do
you people put things in boxes? Taking care of the forest is part of
our way of living, it isn’t something we do separately.” When re
searchers carry out Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs), they
often get hints of Little Conservation, but because PRAs rarely focus
on wild species, these aspects of resource management are seldom
discussed. Participatory mapping and Land Use Planning exercises,
and investigations into land use decision-making, are most likely to
yield clues leading to the discovery of Little Conservation activities
and the stresses faced by Little Conservation.
There are ways to discover Little Conservation, and if govern
ment agencies really wanted to survey and map it, they could. But it
is highly unlikely this will happen, especially given the fact that in
many countries governments refuse to acknowledge even the pres
ence of indigenous peoples in forested areas.
When local people are engaged in conservation projects, it is
possible to discover where Little Conservation is working in that
particular ecosystem, where its vestiges linger, and where it isn’t
operating at all. Discovery does not mean that outsiders should
document completely the knowledge and functioning of Little Con
servation. This would be a waste of time and a misdirection of re
sources, because the operation of Little Conservation does not
depend on documenting the tradition. The continued functioning of
Little Conservation depends on external support for the institutions
and local organizations through which Little Conservation func
tions. This is where the investment of time and effort should be
made.
Every day, local organizations and individuals are making deci
sions about resource use and resource management. Their decisions
impact local and global heritage. Those local decisions will continue
to be made regardless of the declarations and plans made by Bio
sphere People at national and international levels. If Little Conserva
tion dies out as a guiding force in local decision making, then we all
lose. Therefore, regardless of the conservation tactic of choice, it is a
tactical error to deny local decision-making organizations participa
tion at the conservation decision-making table. Some would argue
that in the end, when conservationists play the role of gatekeepers,
they are involved in a charade because the only decisions that really
matter in the long run are those that are made by local people who
live in the midst of biodiversity.
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BROTHERS AND SISTERS
Allow me to end with a metaphorical summary. Big Conserva
tion is like a big brother, sure that he knows what needs to be done
and eager to get others to do it. He isn’t eager to listen to his sib
lings’ points of view. A big brother is physically more powerful and
has access to greater resources than his younger siblings. Little Con
servation is like little brothers and sisters; they have many different
points of view and ideas, are less powerful and have fewer resources
to assert them. They have a hard time getting a word in edgewise
when their big brother is talking. In the end, though, there are many
more younger brothers and sisters, so they are the ones who make
most of the day-to-day decisions out of view of their big brother.
To carry the analogy to its conclusion: if families act on their
common interests, they prosper. If Big and Little Conservation can
work together, if Big Conservation makes its resources available to
Little Conservation — teaching mapping, wildlife monitoring,
population biology surveys, and other technical skills — and if Big
Conservationists will listen to the concerns of Little Conservation
ists, if the “conservation community” formed by Big Conservation
groups will accept those who practice Little Conservation as mem
bers of their community, and listen to their voices, then there is a
better chance that local heritage will be there for the future children
of both Biosphere People and Ecosystem People. The cases you will
be discussing during this conference, and this conference itself, are
evidence that steps are being taken to bring Little and Big Conserva
tion together to tackle the local and global problems presented by
failure to manage resources for the future.
As those of you in the audience carry out work for Big Conserva
tion at the Forest Service or at Washington-based think tanks, or
consult for the World Bank and other big agencies, you will be faced
with the challenge of finding ways to strengthen Little Conservation
and ways to avoid destroying it under the momentum of Big Con
servation. This is very difficult, because by acting within the struc
tures created by the dominant paradigm of Big Conservation, your
choices for action will be limited. I urge you to do your best to de
velop innovative strategies by remembering Little Conservation and
Local Heritage as you sit around decision-making tables, as you
design plans for massive resource management projects, as you
engage in policy debates, and as you negotiate international agree
ments on behalf of those with interests in global heritage. Thank
you.

  

      
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q:
To what extent do you think that the history of conservation
here in the United States is influencing the focus on Big Con
servation in the international arena?
JA:
Well, I think it is a great deal, even though the situations can
be completely different. For example, I remember one person
from Thailand who went to Idaho to be trained in park man
agement. He found that the month-long course was totally
irrelevant to his situation. He said that they didn’t even talk
about the problems that he faced at home. At the same time,
you can go back to Thailand, to the person who is the head of
the park department, and he will say “Well, we want to do
things like you do in your country — you have national parks,
you have Indigenous reservations — we want to take the
people and stick them in reservations, like you do, and we want
to have national parks with no people in them, like you do.”
Part of it is also because of status. Modern, western behav
ior has high status — it is not considered high status to have
some weeds growing in your garden that happen to be useful.
It’s a whole way of looking at the world. I’ve often heard it
mentioned in the African context, where you have people who
come from a background that includes these Little Conserva
tion measures, yet they are trained as scientists to look at the
world in a way that does not allow them to integrate their
experience.
Q:
Working in the Biodiversity Support Program at the World
Wildlife Fund, you are embedded in Big Conservation, and
I’d like to know how successful you have been in bringing
these concerns into the decision making process at the WWF.
Also, have you seen a change within the institution?
JA:
Yes, that’s right, WWF is right in the middle of Big Conserva
tion, but, I would add, WWF has one of the better records in
terms of paying attention to local people. Once you’re actually
doing a project, you realize that you have to deal with the
people who live there — you can’t avoid it. You have to un
derstand that WWF is the world’s largest conservation organi
zation and it contains all of these different points of view. Of
course there is some strain within WWF — right now a re
trenchment of the biology-centric point of view is taking
place. Many people feel it went too far; towards thinking
about only people and not thinking about conservation. As an
individual it’s hard to do anything, but if you are part of a
critical group within an organization, you can make some
changes.

 

 
Q:

JA:
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JA:

Q:

In light of what Big Conservation has accomplished, and the
factors that influenced it in its beginnings, don’t you think
you are being a little hard on it?
Well, in the European, and in particular in the English tradi
tion, it was the King’s or the government’s role to undertake
these measures. This was extended to the colonies, and it has a
political heritage that extends beyond the biologists — it was
the milieu in which they were operating. Nevertheless, I think
most of Big Conservation still holds this idea about the role of
local people in conservation. I’m pointing out that if they
don’t perceive their situation, they will lose the initiative and
fail to reach their goals, even though it’s so incredibly messy
to work with people.
How can you reconcile conservation in an area when this
means foregoing a lot of valuable resources? How can you
foster Little Conservation when exploitation can produce a lot
of cash in the short term?
Well, for example, in Papua New Guinea, the Global Environ
mental Fund is undertaking a big program to create conserva
tion areas that incorporate alternative sources of income for
people. There, only 3% of the land belongs to the government
— the rest belongs to the clans — so they have to come up
with some alternatives. The problem is there aren’t a lot of
things to offer people in the short term. There’s been talk of
conservation packages whereby if the world wants Papua New
Guinea to conserve its forests, it is going to have to pay.
It depends on the case. When ICAD siting is being dis
cussed, one of the problems has been that they aren’t always
located in the most biodiverse places. They’ve been attacked
because they have gone after places where people are already
interested in conservation, regardless of what they have to
conserve. Should Big Conservation be investing in these cases,
or should they be looking for cases where more biodiversity is
at stake? For example, the Karen — they want to stay where
they are, they want to conserve their forests, and they have a
lot of diversity. It has to do with searching for sites on the one
hand, but there are also policy level actions that can make a
lot of difference. In Mexico, for example, the subsidy to coffee
led directly to the loss of a lot of forest.
How do you see conservation initiatives developing in the
context of the conflict between local groups and the dominant
structures that see community organization as a threat in their
programs to control ethnic minorities — the Karen being
opposed by Burmese military groups, for example?

  

      
JA:

Q:

JA:

Q:
JA:

You can’t predict what can happen. You can’t count on any
country in this world being here for very long, and that’s why
I think Little Conservation is so important. As governments
come and go and borders change, unless Little Conservation
is still hanging in there, there are no parks. Look what hap
pened in Rwanda — early on the ruling group put anti-per
sonnel mines around the edges of the parks and then sent
their logging companies in to take the trees down. They were
the only ones who could do the logging because they knew
where they had put their mines.
In South East Asia, the environment is a democracy issue. It
is around environmental issues that democracy is often hap
pening. It can be a threat to the state, but it varies. In Zimba
bwe, for example, they’ve bought into Little Conservation.
In the Karen case, they are likely to stay there because they
are very good friends with the Thai military, unusual as it
sounds. The thing is, you live in this time, and you have to act
in this time. You’re not living a hundred years from now, so
you have a choice. If you think the situation is hopeless and
you don’t do anything, then you have to live with the fact that
you didn’t do anything.
I think part of the cause of the conflict between Big Conserva
tion and Little Conservation is that Little Conservation some
times fails to conserve. How do you see Little Conservation
working in the many situations of overuse and degradation?
Well, Big Conservation has failed, big time, as well. You can’t
forget that — the Rwanda case is a big time failure. Both sides
fail sometimes, but it’s a continuous thing — it happens daily.
Conservation is never done. It’s part of making a living; it
resides in the choices you make every day. You need to re
spond to what’s going on around you — things go bad; things
get better. That’s one reason why protected areas that are comanaged are usually in areas where there aren’t a lot of
people. That makes it possible to figure out ways to work with
those people. It’s not necessary to remove them and create
enemies who will move back in as soon as the government
changes.
What specific structures can help co-management succeed?
I think you can only decide that locally. If you know what’s
going on at a lot of different sites in a country, then you can
start to come up with some policy solutions. The main one is
tenure. If you give people the right to defend their territory,
though, they can make decisions that you may not like. Some
places they will and some places they won’t — you can’t
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JA:

predict for sure what will happen in any case.
When you’re talking about implementing co-management,
you also need to realize that the parties that you are asking to
work together have often been antagonists. In India, for ex
ample, where the idea of Joint Forest Management is starting
to be recognized by the government — now they’re even
talking about Joint Protected Areas Management — there is a
situation where a trained paramilitary force has created a
situation where the local people are their enemies; people
have been killed in boundary fights. An effort has to be made
to change that situation through retraining and figure out
local ways to effect conflict resolution. You need to regain
some kind of trust between the parties to make it work.
A lot of this talk has focused on the World Wildlife Fund,
which seems to be pretty advanced in this area. Other large
conservation organizations, like The Nature Conservancy,
Conservation International, and the Wildlife Society very
rarely work at the local level…
I won’t say in which organization this took place, and they all
have their bad GEF projects, but in this particular one, this
NGO was defending its GEF project that involved working
with local people, and I asked “How did you know what you
needed to do to work with the local people?” He said “I
didn’t do any surveys, I didn’t do any kind of program to find
this out — I have lived there for five years, and I just know
what they need.” The biologists need to work with social
scientists. So, how many social scientists are there at WWF?
Two, maybe three. If you want to look at where they’re really
taking it seriously, you need to look at where they hire people
who know something about the social sciences, and there
aren’t many.
The other part of it is they can’t raise money that way. They
raise money with big, pretty animals. It’s too complicated to
explain to the average American why they should contribute
money to Little Conservation.
Little Conservation doesn’t need money as much as it needs
time— time to develop its goals and objectives. It needs some
kind of a shell that protects it from the forces that are pushing
it in various directions while the community discusses and
figures out what it wants.
Big Conservation and Little Conservation have a lot more
in common than they realize, and there’s a lot of opportunity
for them to work together, but often they don’t because Big
Conservation sides with the state and brings in the guards.
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JA:

How do you think the actions of multinational corporations
and their support of trade liberalization interact with Big
Conservation, particularly at the crossroads where a lot of
these companies sit on the boards of organizations like WWF?
As someone trying to move forward, how can these organiza
tions use this situation to, in turn, influence the behavior of
the corporations?
It’s very hard to make those changes. For example, with
NAFTA, there was a strong feeling of support within WWF,
but WWF Mexico was strongly against it. Those political
decisions are made beyond our ability to influence. They are
compromised to some degree by their funding sources. On
the other hand, as you say, they could be able to influence
them. WWF is working with Chevron in Papua New Guinea
and Greenpeace has raised a lot of questions about that. Chev
ron is expecting that if there is a major oil spill in those
swamps, then they will have some cover. On the other hand,
Chevron has hired anthropologists and has gone way out of
their way to do a lot — it’s quite incredible what they’ve
invested in conservation and in working with local people
there. Nevertheless, I don’t think that conservation organiza
tions have the kind of clout necessary to create broad changes
in multinational behavior.
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ABSTRACT
Historically, western colonizers have engaged indigenous lands as though they were open access resources. This
misconception has persisted in the concept of the commons, which has been used to explain natural resource degrada
tion in many parts of the world. In many cases, however, degradation has taken place as the result of inappropriate
attempts to devolve jointly held rights into individually held private property. Examples from Borneo illustrate several
cases in which various forms of jural aggregates have responded to changes in resource use. Reinterpreted through the
concept of emergent structuralism, such cases serve as useful lessons for future Indigenous land management initiatives,
and suggest some remedies for current problems.

HISTORICAL CONFUSION AND HEGEMONIC
DISCOURSE: THE CONTAMINATED CONCEPTS OF
COMMON PROPERTY AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
Western thought since the time of Aristotle has been muddled by
the lack of conceptual clarity over the ownership of land and pro
ductive resources. It has tended to focus on the false contrast be
tween private property and common property, without clearly
distinguishing what either of these mean.
The term common property in everyday usage has been histori
cally applied to two different property regimes: res nullis, resources
that are open access and are not encumbered by any property rights,
and resources that have multiple users. This term contrasted with
private property, which sometimes referred to a resource held by an
individual and at other times referred to property that was not state
owned. The term common property as res nullis was applied to
Indigenous populations by explorers and colonists, who did not
bother to determine what native rights over property existed. Its
usage signaled that the resource was open for the taking by the in
truders. This misconception and confusion has continued to this
day.
An anonymous author reporting on his 1496 voyage to America
wrote that the Indians owned everything in common (see Arber
1885; also see Zolla 1973). James Hall, writing in 1835, used the
same discourse: the Indians “must, indeed, be tutored into a sense of
private property, for... the insecurity of property, or rather the entire

 

 
absence of all ideas of property, is the chief cause of their barbar
isms” (Pearce 1988, 72). Thus, these folk categories of common and
private property carry with them an unexamined load of assump
tions and ideological contaminants which make them useless for
understanding property relations in other societies (for example see
Johannes 1977, 121).
Peters (1987) reports that in southern Africa these colonial mod
els of preferred land tenure have permeated the debate in Botswana,
distorting the actual incidents of local ownership:
“The belief that certain collective or corporate forms of
social organization and property relations stifled initiative
and/or encouraged lackadaisical and careless use of resources
was generally held by colonial officers, missionaries, and
traders. It was embedded in an ideology that regarded private
ownership as the superior opposite of communal forms, and
whose premises were based on a long history of Western
thought. It was through this lens that problems were diag
nosed... Through that same lens, prescriptions for change
were conceived and announced: the introduction of new
forms of exclusive land tenure and the private ownership of
wells. With hindsight, one can see that these were construc
tions of a reality projected by the colonialists themselves,
who persistently tried to squeeze African landholding sys
tems into a model that set private and individual in opposi
tion to communal and group.” (Peters 1987, 179)

Categories of common and private
property carry with them an
unexamined load of assumptions and
ideological contaminants which make
them useless for understanding prop
erty relations in other societies.

Claims of the efficiencies of private property over what was
called “communal” or “common property” are still part of the dis
course of neocolonial elites in Third World countries who want to
rationalize, on their terms, the economies of peripheral peoples.
This universally occurs without sufficient knowledge of the periph
eral property systems or their relationship to environmental pro
cesses. These are self-serving claims by the new elites of former
colonies who want to privatize land tenure systems for the benefit of
themselves and other members of the economic and political centers
who have the cash to invest in former tribal lands. This has contrib
uted to a growth of landlessness, and repeats what happened to the
Indians of North America (see Appell 1985a, 1991b).

  

      
HARDIN AND HIS CRITICS
In 1968 Hardin changed the focus of the debate claiming that the
“commons” as a form of property ownership resulted in environ
mental destruction and degradation. Although Hardin’s article was
conceptually flawed and empirically wrong, it provided the impetus
for refocusing the age-old arguments about what modality of prop
erty ownership, on the one hand, would provide the most efficient
use of a resource with the least externalities and, on the other, what
modality promoted the most desirable forms of liberty and social
justice. The concern over efficiency was now shifted to how property
modalities contribute to environmental degradation and the social
costs of previously unexamined externalities to open access re
sources such as air and water.
Hardin’s critics (Appell 1993; Berkes 1989; Berkes, Feeny,
McCay, and Acheson 1989; Bromley and Cernea 1989; Feeny,
Berkes, McCay, and Acheson 1990; McCay and Acheson 1987; Na
tional Resource Council 1986) have shown that Hardin’s argument
was historically uninformed, sociologically naïve, economically
simplistic, and just plain wrong. They have also provided important
case studies showing the value of Indigenous knowledge of resource
utilization and that traditional forms of ownership have efficiencies
which in many cases are more productive and suitable to the local
environment than planned development interventions (see also
Johannes 1977; McKean 1986; Berkes 1985).
Neither Hardin nor his critics have yet to develop the observa
tional procedures to identify precisely either the jural status of the
property right owners or the nature of the rights held. The issue that
I will address here is the fundamental logical flaw that occurs in
Hardin’s argument as well as in the rebuttals of his critics. That is, if
a form of property ownership affects the productivity and conserva
tion of a resource, then it is critical to identify precisely the property
modality involved and specifically the locus of ownership before
assessing its contribution to productivity and sustainability.
ANALYTICAL CRITIQUE OF THE DEFINITIONS OF
“COMMON PROPERTY”
Let us now briefly analyze the recent usages of the term “com
mon property” by Hardin’s critics, a discourse that has been confus
ing, hardly useful, and jurally uninformed.
Berkes, Feeny, McCay, and Acheson (1989; expanded in Feeny,
Berkes, McCay, and Acheson 1990) define common property re
sources as a class of resources for which exclusion of potential users
is difficult and costly and joint use involves subtractability in that
each user is capable of subtracting from the welfare of others. The
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term common property resources is an oxymoron as resources and
property are concepts of a different order, and, furthermore, the
authors have included under this concept property modalities other
than common property. Thus, their taxonomy of four basic prop
erty right modalities for common property resources includes: pri
vate property, a resource held by an individual or corporation;
communal property, a resource held by an identifiable community
of users; state property; and open access, a resource without welldefined property rights so that access is free and open to all. Al
though classed as property, open access turns out not to be property
at all.
Bromley and Cernea (1989) also use the oxymoron of common
property resources in their analysis of the problems of managing
such resources and the failure of Hardin’s logic. However, they,
Hardin, and others (e.g. McCay and Acheson 1987) have frequently
confused open access with “common property” modalities. They
also distinguish four possible resource regimes: state property, pri
vate property, common property, and non-property, or open access.
Note that Bromley and Cernea contrast private property with
common property. Yet they write (1989, 14): “Common property is
in essence ‘private’ property for the group and in that sense it is a
group decision regarding who shall be excluded.”
These definitions of property modalities fail not only because
they are contradictory and confusing, but largely because they do
not distinguish whether the rights are held by individuals, as a jural
aggregate or jural collectivity — as I shall explain — or held by a
corporation, or by a corporate group. And they do not distinguish
the types of rights held. Yet these distinctions are critical to the
ultimate goal: the understanding of management forms and how
they affect productivity and resource degradation.
Thus, these classifications need to be revised, as we shall now do,
first looking at types of rights and then the nature of jural entities.

The term common property resources
is an oxymoron as resources and prop
erty are concepts of a different order,
and, furthermore, they have included
under this concept property modali
ties other than common property.

FRAGMENTED OWNERSHIP: FORMS OF RIGHTS AND
OBJECTS OF OWNERSHIP
The concept of common property (when it does not refer to
open access) is a form of multiple ownership. But how do we distin
guish between the various forms of multiple ownership and deter
mine the relationship between right holders? I propose a conceptual
scheme that is universally applicable and forms a critical part of the
observational procedures to determine the nature of property own
ership.
When there are multiple interests of any kind in a property
object, I refer to this as co-ownership. In co-ownership there is the

  

      

Figure 1: Forms of Ownership

issue of whether each of the co-owners individually owns a right in
the object or benefit stream from the object, or whether the co-owners
share a single right. A shared right involves the ownership by all of a
single right, as in partnerships (Salmond 1957, 306) and joint rights.
Let’s look at the Diagrams, in this case Co-ownership Form 1. And
as we discuss these diagrams, I would appreciate it if any of you

 

 
would indicate which one diagrams the structure of a common
property regime.
Please note two things. First, a shared right may occur in all the
various forms, but I have not indicated it for purposes of simplicity.
Second, jural entities holding rights may be individuals, corporate
groups, or corporations. This variation has important implications
for the management of the resources owned. But again for simplic
ity, I have not added this variable to the diagrams, which are only
focusing on the various types and levels of rights in situations of coownership. We will discuss the various jural forms shortly.
When multiple rights exist in an object or benefit stream, two
types may occur which I have termed parallel rights and stratified
rights. The term parallel rights refers to the situation in which the
co-owners hold identical interests. Such “co-owners have simulta
neous interests in every portion of the thing, but no separate interest
in any particular portion of it” (Cribbet 1975, 94). This is referred to
as having an interest in undivided shares of the object.
In the instance of stratified rights, two or more jural entities hold
interests of a different order in the same object. This is the case with
villages in Borneo, where it is common for a village practicing
swidden cultivation to hold residual rights to a distinct village re
serve as a corporate group. Only the members of that village may cut
their swiddens in that territory. The right to cut swiddens is a paral
lel right held in some Borneo societies by the individual members
and in others by domestic families as corporate groups. The use
rights over the area cut may be held only temporarily, lasting only
until the last crops of that year are removed, or they may be durable
in that they may be devised on other generations or held theoreti
cally in perpetuity by the corporate domestic family.
Another example of both parallel and stratified rights is provided
by interests among the Rungus of Borneo over those types of fruit
trees that require care and cultivation. In this case the rights are held
by individuals as a jural collectivity. All descendants of the original
planter have parallel rights to collect the fruit. The descendant living
closest to the tree takes care of it and has the prior rights to the first
fruits in exchange for his care before he calls the other right holders
to participate in collecting the fruit. These rights to fruit are conse
quently stratified. Parallel interests and stratified interests are thus
not mutually exclusive. Each type of stratified interests over an
object may also have co-owners who hold parallel rights or even a
shared right. We shall discuss these cases in detail shortly.

  

      

J U RA L E N T I T I E S
Distinctions
made by GNA

Ethnographic
examples:

Natural Persons
Corporations

Traditional
distinctions:
Exists in
perpetuity

Jural
collectivities a

Jural
aggregateb

General Electric

Iban bilek;
Descent group
with undivided
rights over
property

Descent group
with rights held
by members

Descent group
with rights held
by members

Corporation
incorporated for
limited life

Rungus
domestic
family c

Limited life
property-focused
social isolate

Limited life
property-focused
social isolate

Exists in
perpetuity

Limited life

Corporate
social
groupings

Corporations d

Limited life

Natural Persons

Table 1: Comparison of Theoretical Distinctions When Applied to the Analysis of a Jural System

a

Jural Collectivity: a social grouping in which interests are held in severalty by the individual members but whose social existence is recognized
by the jural system in which it is lodged. The jural system thus allows a member of the social grouping to sue on behalf of the other members
while still denying the group a separate jural status, a distinct jural personality.

b

Jural Aggregate: a social grouping in which interests are held in severalty by the individual members whose social existence is not recognized
by the jural system.

c

The Rungus domestic family has a limited life but is a jural isolate in the Rungus jural system.

d

Under the class of jural entities the two distinctions made by Appell, “corporations” and “corporate descent groups,” may include entities that
exist in perpetuity as well as those that have a limited life. These features of duration of existence are not class-determining but are lowerlevel attributes that must nevertheless be included in the ethnographic description.

 

 
FORMS OF JURAL ENTITIES: THE LOCI OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Let us briefly review. We have seen that the discourse that in
cludes terms such as “common property” and “private property” is
neither analytical nor scientific. It does not identify the types of
rights nor the loci of rights. Instead this type of discourse is
hegemonic and culture-bound to a particular ideological system of
the West. As a result it distorts Indigenous systems of property. To
prevent this we have presented a cross-culturally applicable grid of
the various forms of ownership that gets to the meat of property
relations.
I will now present an analytical grid of jural entities that is also
cross-culturally applicable, and with this I hope we can put the
coffin lid on the concepts of common and private property as useful
for scientific discourse.
A jural entity, or jural isolate, is a social form that has the capac
ity to enter into jural relations, and thereby own property. The sum
total of these capacities is referred to as the jural personality of that
social form (Durham 1958). I have identified three universal forms:
the individual, the corporate group, and the corporation (Appell
1974, 1976b, 1983, 1984; see Table One).
A corporate group is composed of a social grouping of natural
persons that holds interests as an entity and not in severalty. A cor
porate group contrasts with a corporation in that a corporation is an
artificial jural entity without a social counterpart. Neither the offic
ers, nor the board of directors, nor the stockholders are the corpora
tion.
Corporate groups must also be distinguished from those social
groupings or other social forms in which rights to property are held
by the individual members rather than by the group itself. Two types
may occur: a jural aggregate or a jural collectivity. A jural aggregate
is a social form in which the individual members hold the interests
in severalty. It has no jural existence above and beyond its individual
members; it cannot enter into jural relations. A jural collectivity is a
social grouping in which interests are also held in severalty by the
individual members, but it differs from a jural aggregate in that its
sociality is recognized by the jural system in which it is lodged. Thus,
the jural system permits a member of that social form to sue on
behalf of the other members to facilitate jural actions while still
denying the grouping a separate jural status; a distinct jural person
ality (see Appell 1976a, 1976b, 1983, 1984, 1991a, 1993).

The discourse that includes terms such
as common property and private prop
erty is neither analytical nor scientific.
It does not identify the types of rights
nor the loci of rights. Instead this type
of discourse is hegemonic and culturebound to a particular ideological sys
tem of the West.

  

      

Figure 2: The Structure of Property Relations

JURAL AGGREGATES AND JURAL COLLECTIVITIES
Ethnographic materials from Borneo help to explicate the analy
sis presented to this point.
We will first look at jural aggregates and jural collectivities
among the Rungus of northern Borneo (Appell 1971, 1974, 1976b),
the members of which hold rights in severalty over fruit trees. This
creates a jural form that I have called a tree-focused structural iso
late (Appell 1983, 1984).
Rights to certain fruit trees are held individually by all the de
scendants of the original planter, as we have noted. I have referred to
the rights in this system of co-ownership as parallel rights.
Those holding these rights are allowed to harvest fruit from the
trees planted by an ancestor. This structural entity, composed of the
co-right holders, forms a jural aggregate, for each of the right hold
ers has to take jural action on his own to receive compensation if the
fruit tree is destroyed.
There are other fruit trees with more valuable fruit that require
guarding and cultivation both to ensure a good harvest and to pre
vent others than the descendants of the original planter from pick
ing the fruit. The descendant living closest to the trees has the
obligation to care for and guard these trees. In return he has the
right to pick the first fruit, after which he must inform the other
right holders to come, if they want, to take their share. The indi
vidual who guards the tree also has the obligation to bring a jural
action for compensation if the tree is destroyed. He initiates this
action on behalf of the other right holders, but they must be present
at the time of the moot in order to be able to receive a proportion of

 

 
the settlement. This is a jural collectivity as one person can take jural
action on behalf of the other members. But it is not a corporate
group, for the group as an entity does not receive the compensation,
only those members of the collectivity who are present at the settle
ment.
THE RUNGUS VILLAGE AS A CORPORATE GROUP:
CIRCULATING USUFRUCT
We will now look at two types of land tenure in Borneo. There
are a number of other types, but time requires our inquiry to focus
only on two (but see Appell 1992).
The Rungus village holds residual rights over a clearly demar
cated area, which I have called the village reserve. The village as a
corporate entity is found universally among the Indigenous swidden
cultivators in Borneo (see Appell 1986, 1992). Cultivation rights are
limited to resident villagers. No permanent use rights, that is,
devolvable use rights, may be created by cutting a section of the
forest reserve for a swidden. Thus, any member family of the village
may cut any part of the forest in the village reserve without seeking
the permission of the prior cultivator of the area. These rights over
an area exist until all the produce from the swidden has been har
vested. I have termed this form circulating usufruct. The structure of
this system fits Form Four in Figure 1.
If a family, for a variety of reasons, finds one village not to its
liking, or cannot find a good place to make a swidden, it may leave
and enter another village without any disabilities. Rights to entrance
are not based on kinship; only the headman’s approval is needed to
enter.
EMERGING NATURE OF THE JURAL PERSONALITY OF
THE RUNGUS VILLAGE
We must now introduce an additional set of theoretical con
structs on the developmental nature of property relations, one that I
have termed “emergent structuralism.” No society is frozen in time.
There is constant social change and self-transformation. If we con
ceive of a social system as consisting of the jural order, then by
definition there is an opportunity structure. The jural structure not
only defines the opportunities that it is permissible to exploit, but
also provides the decision paths and techniques that lead to antiso
cial behavior in what I have termed the contrastructure. Decision
making and transactions in the opportunity structure do not gener
ate social forms, however. New social forms are the product of a
second level order of events, a reflexive event by the members of the

  

      
society scanning their own opportunity structure for those changes
in the activation of this order. This includes the pileup of decisions
in one sector or the other and the differential exploitation of re
sources that threaten the society’s conceptions of equity. These new
shifts in the opportunity structure are then encoded into the jural
order by a legitimizing act or relegated to the contrastructure as
deviant by a representative body of members. Thus, the forms of
social systems are constantly emerging.
The problem of scarcity of land for the Rungus was not an issue
until colonial government intervention. The British government
took tracts of Rungus land for plantations, with the result that
Rungus villages or their members had to relocate to other village
areas. Then the government opened up the region to Chinese settle
ment, again with the loss of Rungus lands. This, along with popula
tion increase, put pressure on the land/population balance.
At some time after the British arrived, the Rungus response to
growing scarcity of land was to make boundaries between villages
more firm and explicit. In one case nonresidents who cut swiddens
in the reserve of another village had their swiddens fired in secret by
the headman of that village prior to their drying out, thus ruining
them for farming. Finally, village headmen got together and decided
that if any farming was done by nonresidents without permission,
the village headman had the right to sue for a gong. Thus, growing
pressure resulted in the elaboration of the jural personality of the
village (see Appell 1985b, 1988).
Also about this time three villages whose territories backed up on
a mountain decided to keep this area in primary forest and not cut it
for swiddens. It provided needed raw materials for housing, grana
ries, etc. It furthermore protected the watershed of streams and
rivers from which these villages got their water, which was critical as
the Rungus area experiences a difficult dry season each year. Thus,
what once was open access was turned into interests held corpo
rately by each village over that section of the primary forest that
backed up each village’s territory.
However, the policing of this reserve became difficult. When
relatives of key men in the village cut the primary forest for
swiddens in this reserve, it was difficult to prosecute them. At this
point the Rungus took advantage of the plural legal system provided
by the British. They had instituted new laws governing forest use
while leaving certain disputes to be settled at the village level under
the old customary laws. The Rungus arranged for this area of pri
mary forest to be gazetted as a forest reserve so that the policing of it
was turned over to the Forest Department.
After the creation of Malaysia and the departure of the British

 

 
colonial government, the new state government illegally gave this
area out to Chinese for timber cutting, it is rumored, on the basis of
a payoff to certain government officials. This produced an aggressive
reaction by the Rungus in which the Chinese and the politicians
involved were threatened. Cutting was stopped but only after much
of this former reserve was destroyed.
At this point a division of opinion grew in the community: some
wanted to let the cutting go on so that they would get the royalties;
some wanted money to meet the schooling costs of their children;
others wanted to use it for new consumables. However, a more
influential section of the community resisted this, arguing that the
loss to the environment was greater than the rewards that the indi
vidual families would obtain.
THE EROSION OF THE JURAL PERSONALITY
OF THE VILLAGE
During the period of British colonialism, the Rungus land tenure
system was disrupted by the view that the Rungus territory was
underutilized, and this view was carried on by the succeeding postcolonial government. The British essentially viewed Rungus forested
territory as res nullis — open access. In 1961 a British District Of
ficer walked through the Rungus territory, along with a Chinese
entrepreneur, and found what he thought was unoccupied forest.
He was not able to read the forest cover to ascertain that what he
saw was secondary forest recovering from prior swidden cultivation.
And he did not realize that every inch of the territory was divided up
between the various Rungus villages which had clear and distinct
boundaries and which owned their reserves corporately. The British
officer, furthermore, did not recognize the use rights of village
members. As with the British government as a whole, his conceptual
bias did not allow him to conceive of anything but individual title to
land, and so pressure was put on the Rungus to apply to the govern
ment for individually titled and owned tracts of land in their village
reserve. Neither the British government nor its post-colonial succes
sor recognized the complex social system of the Rungus or their
agroecology as stabilizing forces (Appell 1992). As a result of this,
the jural personality of the village as a corporate land-holding entity
has been diminished, which has also eroded the authority of the
village headmen and the village moot. This has led to dispute over
the uses of village forest reserves. Furthermore, when individuals
obtain title to land, they sometimes sell their title to wealthy outsid
ers from the city who have sufficient cash reserves. This has now
produced Rungus villages that no longer have their cultural integ
rity. As a result, there is a certain amount of tension between
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Rungus residents and outsiders and a growing disparity in owner
ship of land — the beginnings of a landless peasantry.
The failure of the British to recognize the Rungus system of land
tenure has also led to environmental degradation. The Rungus had
sacred groves around wet places and stream banks which were in
habited by potentially dangerous forest spirits. If the forest homes of
these spirits were cut down, they would vent their anger on the
intruder by causing him to become ill. With Christianization, this
sanction was no longer viable. At the same time the British did not
realize that these sacred groves existed so that in the surveying for
land ownership the groves ended up in the individually held land
lots. Since the groves formed a less immediately productive part of
such land, many of them were cut down to plant permanent tree
crops or vegetable gardens. As a result, the hydrological cycle of the
region has been interrupted both by this and the intrusion into the
forest reserve so that the usual dry season has been markedly ex
tended. There are now major water shortages in the region (Appell ).
At the same time a variety of birds and animals formerly inhabiting
the village reserves have disappeared and a number of tree and plant
species can no longer be found. The failure to recognize the Indig
enous system of land tenure and agroecology has not only resulted
in jural and social disorganization but also environmental degrada
tion.
If the present government would recognize the corporateness of
the village, allowing no land to be sold to non-village members, the
rapidly growing social disorganization, landlessness, and environ
mental degradation could be ameliorated.
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
I have presented a conceptual framework to determine the na
ture of rights and their locus in Appell (1971). Let me briefly men
tion the three most important discovery procedures for filling the
conceptual scheme with ethnographic content: the analysis of cases
of conflicts; case materials on the transactions of rights; and the
identification of what social entity has created the right and if not
for himself or herself, for whom. Case materials must be collected
on any conflict over rights or any jural actions taken to obtain in
demnification for loss of rights on the destruction of property. Also,
cases on the transactions of rights by sale, loan, or inheritance pro
vide critical data. If an individual creates a right, for example,
through his own work in planting fruit trees, one must determine
whether he or she did this on behalf of the group of which he or she
was a member (i.e. the family), or for himself or herself alone. This
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can be determined by following who gets rights if the individual’s
spouse dies, or if there is a divorce and a remarriage occurs involv
ing additional children.
THE KANTU’ DAYAK CASE
The final example shows the adaptive responses to challenges of
growing scarcity in the village reserve, which illustrates nicely the
usefulness of the theory of emergent structuralism.
Dove (1985) provides the history of land tenure changes among
the Kantu’ Dayak. In the beginning, the land tenure system was that
of circulating usufruct similar to that of the Rungus. That is, each
resident domestic family had the right to cultivate a swidden in any
part of the forest in the village reserve that was unused, and the
cutting of such a swidden did not establish permanent usufruct
rights. The Kantu’ stated that as long as there was chronic warfare,
rights over secondary forest were of little value. There was an adap
tive value in the village being relatively mobile and able to advance
or retreat as conditions warranted it. And because of warfare it was
important that all the households farm near one another with their
swiddens in a cluster. Finally, the exigencies of warfare placed a
premium on primary forest, because primary forest swiddens mini
mized the need for weeding, which in turn lessened the defensive
burden for the men and heightened their offensive capabilities.
The first modification of this system produced extended usu
fruct. If an omen was observed during the planting of a primary
forest swidden, the household making the swidden was required to
make an offering of one or more pigs. This then gave the household
the prior right to farm that particular section of land once more at a
time of its own choosing before the land reverted to the village
reserve.
With the cessation of warfare, the next stage involved the devel
opment of devolvable usufruct in which households were able to
claim permanent use rights to forest areas that they had cleared of
primary forest. This developed for two reasons. First, the cessation
of warfare and the removal of pressures against a more sedentary
existence enabled the Kantu’ to start planting rubber groves. Second,
the Kantu’ were surrounded on three sides by the Iban, who recog
nized such devolvable rights, and the Kantu’ followed suit so as not
to be disadvantaged in any land disputes with the Iban.
Eventually, the population grew, putting additional pressures on
the land. The Kantu’ land tenure system further developed in re
sponse to this. One change was the new customary law that any
household on leaving a village had to forfeit their devolvable rights

  

      
to secondary forest. Such vacated areas reverted to the status of
primary forest. Devolvable rights could be reestablished by the
household that first recut the forest. Any household that announced
their intention to move was from that time on forbidden to sell its
land rights.
But as land became more scarce this procedure led to many
disputes among the households. As a result, the longhouse headmen
began to take all such rights themselves and enjoyed them person
ally. Eventually the longhouse members began to resent the selfserving actions of the headmen. Customary law was again changed
so that devolvable rights to land abandoned by a departing house
hold reverted to the village reserve which household members could
farm in rotation as circulating usufruct.
It is important to note that growing population pressure and
outside markets did not lead to a shift toward individual ownership
of land. Instead, the legal personality of the Kantu’ household, a
corporate jural isolate, became stronger with the assumption of
devolvable use rights. Also note that these rights are held by the
household corporately, not by individuals, so that in this instance of
divided title both use rights and the residuary rights of the village are
held by jurally corporate groups. This suggests that many cases of
the alleged “privatization” of land tenure may in fact be similar to
this, but as interpreted through Western eyes, appear as a growth in
individual ownership.
CONCLUSIONS
The ethnographic data from Borneo illustrate that the analytical
concepts used in discussion of common property have to be revised
so that they map accurately the local contours of property systems.
For, as Netting writes, “A lack of understanding of the conceptions
and operations of property systems in other societies is a frequent
cause of conflict, injustice, and exploitation.” (Netting 1982, 451)
To provide this understanding I have presented cross-culturally
applicable analytical techniques that enable identification of the
jural entities that hold rights, the structure of those rights, and how
they may be divided. And this has resulted in a conceptual frame
work that more adequately reflects Indigenous systems of property
relations.
Furthermore, the Borneo data suggest that there is no necessary
unilinear movement under scarcity from co-ownership to individual
ownership. In the Kantu’ case the jural personality of the domestic
unit as a corporately jural grouping has grown in response to scar
city and new markets.
But wherever there are multiple users of common pool re-
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with the assumption of devolvable use
rights.

 
sources, some sort of control, or as Hunt (1990) has termed it, inter
nal jurality, develops. This occurs even in situations of open access,
as for example the rules of the Buffalo hunt that emerged among the
Metís of Canada (Purich 1988). Sometimes the development of
internal jurality is more successful than at other times, but it is
always the natural product of group interactions, contrary to
Hardin’s sociologically naïve claim. The problem is to determine the
conditions under which internal jurality flourishes to provide the
most efficient, sustaining use of common pool resources.
Thus, the ethnographic materials from Borneo illustrate that,
with unimpeded opportunity, Indigenous societies, like most societ
ies, have the capacity to respond to challenge. The Bornean societies
we have discussed have tried to conserve their valuable resources
and have adapted their jural systems to the new contingencies of the
growing scarcity of resources and the development of outside mar
kets. They can respond adaptively, unless they are overwhelmed by
the demands for coping by imposed social change, or unless the
external rules under which they must operate are so changed by the
sociopolitical centers that the society’s adaptive capacities are over
whelmed.
The real tragedy occurs when outside interests attempt to ratio
nalize the use of resources from their own self-centered, cultural
perspective, ignoring the local jural system and ecological con
straints. This results in the breakdown of the internal jurality, allow
ing major depletion and destruction of resources before any internal
jurality has a chance to develop (see Bromley and Cernea 1989;
Berkes 1986; Runge 1986; and Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson
1990 for examples). This produces a growing social disorganization,
with its concomitant social ills.
It is better to build on what is already there than to assume noth
ing exists.

Sometimes the development of inter
nal jurality is more successful than at
other times, but it is always the natu
ral product of group interactions, con
trary to Hardin’s sociologically naïve
claim.

QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q: I’d like to ask you to elaborate about how the jural entities you
described change over time in response to scarcity.
GA: Before the British arrived there was sufficient land, so the territo
rial boundaries between villages were not policed. Generally they
were based around watersheds. Then, in the village where I work,
the village from the other side of the watershed boundary came
over and started cutting their swiddens in the customary land of
this village. This had never been done before, so they didn’t
know what to do, so at night one of the headmen went up and
set fire to a swidden and wrecked it. This brought the thing to a
head, and the headmen from the various villages sat down and

  

      

Q:
GA:

decided that no one could go over and cut in someone else’s
territory without prior permission from the headmen. If they
did, they’d be sued for a gong. Further rights of the villages were
developed as a result of this, including ritual boundaries and so
forth.
What do you think the possibilities are for transferring or recog
nizing traditional legal processes by a national legal system?
My experience is limited to Borneo, but I think some of the
problems there are symptomatic of some more general difficul
ties. We train these elites, and they go out there, usually from the
department of economics, and they have no idea what is going
on at the village level. For example, I’m dealing with a guy who is
native — he represents a native party — and he has no idea of
the land tenure system of his own people. So he walks right in
and develops projects that take over the land of villages and
moves people in there, and puts up plantations and so on, and
violates the village corporateness, which then leads to intrusion.
There’s a pileup of capital in the centers — there’s cash — so
they can come out to the peripheries and buy the land. This
process slowly turns independent agriculturalists into landless
wage laborers.
This happens only because the guys don’t know what’s going
on, but they have a degree from Harvard, or Tufts — they have
all the answers. For example, where I work they have beautiful
basketry, yet this fellow brought in people from Thailand to
teach them how to make basketry.
So, when governments are run by westernized elites who
don’t know what’s going on at the bottom — in fact, they don’t
want to know, because they’re on their way up the social scale —
I just don’t know how you do it. It’s frustrating.
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George Appell Working Group
The discussion in this group was wide-ranging and participatory.
The following summary presents the topics covered and some rel
evant excerpts:
Could you clarify your critique of common prop
erty? It seems that this term can still be useful, for example in the
case of a public highway that everyone uses but no one indi
vidual can claim to own.

Jake Kosek, Yale F&ES:

Well, let’s unpack the rights surrounding the highway.
First there’s the state, which has certain residual rights over it.
There are a whole bunch of people who have use rights, but these
are varied. A regular motorist and a trucker, for example, have
different use rights over the highway. Furthermore, in the case of
an interstate, a federal road, it goes through counties, which also
have certain rights. So it builds and builds and you can see that it
gets really complex. Thinking of it as a common property re
source actually hides what’s going on and the decisions that are
being made. Calling something common property leaves it open
to all sorts of misinterpretations and confusion — it doesn’t
really tell you anything.
The term “common property” has been used for centuries
to take away property from Indigenous groups, regardless of how
this property was actually administered. Furthermore, the ideas
of property are always in conflict. Private property versus what?
What is private property? We don’t really know what it means,
so we stay away from “private property” because it is such a
loaded term.

George Appell:

The term “common property” has been
used for centuries to take away prop
erty from Indigenous groups, regard
less of how this property was actually
administered.

pointed out that the implications of
having two separate terms is a complication of the debate because
each “side” does not recognize the terms of the other.
Appell responded that if no one knows or agrees on the meaning
of terms, then they do not tell us anything. Lowe pointed out that
common property is often used by elites to legitimize actions. Appell
added that common property has been used for many years to take
away native property. Many people know the terms are out there
and can be used to advantage and it is difficult to take that away
from them.
Wyatt Latimer, University of North Carolina, asked Appell how he per
ceived traditional common lands in Europe. Appell said he thought
that they were really owned by someone or collectively, they are
Celia Lowe, Yale Anthropology,

  

      
administered by a set of rights. Latimer reflected on experience in
Germany and in the southern United States with allotment of rights,
in particular with hunting rights structures in which the hunter
must ask for permission to hunt on another’s land, but the owner
must give it.
In reference to your diagrams, it
seems that your construct is based on English common law. In
Figure 1, for example, you talk about unstratified jural rights
with little dots signifying social relations. It seems to me that
property regimes arise out of social relations, not out of the
objects of concern, yet your construct seems to flip this around.
Appell: Yes, a lot of this stuff comes from Western (not necessarily
European) jurisprudence. What you have raised is a major issue
in the analysis of property relations. Everyone says that property
relations have nothing to do with the commons; it has to do with
social relations. But if you go to someone who happens to be
carrying a knife in the commons — that’s his, and there’s a
direct relationship between that object and the individual. So
there’s a psychological relationship to objects, and when the
jurists say that the relationship is only between people, and that
the object should be played down, I’m uncomfortable with that,
and I don’t know which way to go. It’s frankly an unresolved
issue. Jurists say that people don’t own things, they own rights.
Amity Doolittle, Yale F&ES: I think it’s neither one nor the other, but
rather it’s a continuum. In different situations the relationships
may be the primary force, while in others it may be the objects,
but they’re always both involved to some extent.
Jonathan Scheuer, Moderator, Yale F&ES:

Jake Kosek said that common property is in a larger category be
cause states need to simplify things in order to maintain control —
and this is what makes it a political issue. He further wondered if the
state would ever recognize the corporateness of the village. He
thought that there exist so many rights that the state cannot deal
with all of them.
There was a discussion of the treatment of the history of these
rights in which Appell noted that guilt is wonderful way of creating
change. Kosek said that we must go back to Bentham and define
property rights; that we should look at historical context instead of
generalities. Appell said we often forget that dealing with power and
greed has been a major force in the history of property rights.
Sudah Vasan, Yale F&ES, wondered how the local property rights
structure fits into capitalist society and what the connections are.
Appell said he wasn’t sure they did, but there was an opportunity to

 

 
build on previous structures. Mathilde Snel, Clark University Geography,
asked how one would go about creating these rights. Can we go into
these communities and delineate their rights? A major recurring
question was “How far back into history should we go?”
Appell responded that one should document as much as possible
and go back as far as possible. He said that how the ritual realm fits
into the property realm is often closely related. Kosek noted that we
should listen to the different histories in different contexts.
MS:

The problem is that you can take it back as far as you want, and
that’s great for documentation, but that’s not today’s reality.
Taking historic things into the realm of policy and decision
making can be inappropriate. Often, taking things back to his
torical systems means relying on colonial records, which are
often misconstructions.

Jonathan Scheuer pointed out that you can document everything
but eventually you have to choose a perspective to offer and make
statements of a certain point of view. He also said that how far back
you go is a supreme political question, and Appell added that if
anthropologists and other academics don’t decide, then politicians
will.
GA:

Let’s take the case of the Kayan land tenure in Borneo. They took
over some Kayan land and they were going to pay them repara
tions. Now, under the Kayan land tenure system, there are vil
lage-owned residual rights, and corporately owned family use
rights, and these use rights endure. That is, a family that estab
lishes a swidden in an area of primary forest can continue to use
this parcel and to pass it on to succeeding generations. But when
the government paid reparations, they gave them to the indi
vidual leaders of the families. These families are corporate. It
would be more appropriate to put these reparations in trust so
the family could get an income from the money, just like they
got an income from the land. That’s one use of figuring out the
property relations before going in and imposing policies.
It would be absolutely better, of course, if the jural rights of
the community could be simply recognized by the government
so that these groups could continue to live on their land unmo
lested. Since 1959 I’ve talked about the corporate rights of vil
lages in Borneo to government officials, and they just look at you
— they don’t want to hear about it. In Costa Rica and elsewhere
in Latin America this is happening, but not in Borneo — I wish

  

      

JK:

GA:

the Rungus were able to clearly establish their rights in the na
tional legal context. What’s happening in South America blows
those of us who work in South East Asia away.
That’s where environmental groups and so on come in —
groups from the outside that can help legitimize rights to the
resources. They can help establish the power to engage in nego
tiations.
One of the things that surprises me is that in South America you
have these people organizing and taking steps based on their
native cultures. In Borneo, everyone who’s organized is so far
removed from the bottom level that they can’t even begin to
perceive what they should do.

Finally, Lisa Beaudoin, Worldview Ltd., mentioned that the growing
power and rights of multinational corporations over individuals is
shocking and frightening and deserves more attention in this con
text, since corporations are often acting in place of governments in
these areas.

 

 

The Area de Protección de Fauna y Flora Yum Balam: The Initiation and Challenges
of a Development Program for the Communities and the Environment in the
Maya Zone of Northern Quintana Roo
Ing. Sebastián Poot Balam
La Asociación Civíl Yum Balam
ABSTRACT
In 1994, after five years of struggle to establish local, Indigenous control over the natural resource base in an area of
northern Quintana Roo, the Area de Protección de Fauna y Flora Yum Balam was established. Under the guidance of a
locally directed Committee and in consultation with the local people and a Consultative Council of scientists, Yum
Balam is striving to establish a sustainable society, based on traditional Maya practices but also taking advantage of new
opportunities to strengthen their self-sufficiency and economic autonomy. In so doing, they are at once revitalizing their
ancient cultural heritage and protecting a valuable natural area.

INTRODUCTION
Although the Maya area of northern Quintana Roo is very close
to the resort city of Cancún, it is one of the poorest regions in
Mexico. Our strategy for improving this situation is based on the
joint effort of communities, traditional authorities, the region’s
college of agronomy, and Yum Balam, a local environmental organi
zation. We have analyzed the problems, expectations, natural re
sources, and alternatives that we, the communities, believe can be
the solution to our problems.
Our município comprises an area of 3,881 square kilometers and
a population of 15,967. Sixty-nine percent of the inhabitants are of
Maya origin and in many cases speak only our language. The alarm
ing economic situation in our region is forcing many of our young
people to move to the nearby tourist zones to seek work. The Yum
Balam Civil Association is made up of technicians, farmers, fisher
men, and scientists. Working with the Supreme Maya Council in
northern Quintana Roo and various NGOs, we are coming up with
development alternatives that are culturally, ecologically, economi
cally, and technically feasible for the region.
These alternatives focus on reinforcing the cultural identity of
the Maya people in the face of tremendous external acculturating
forces and improving the income and employment levels of the
communities, so as to be able to live in health and dignity. These

Hunab-ku bóhtik tu lakal a
lalahk’abehesh, huayaneu ta
huetelekshé tiah cáh tzicbatohon
le meyah kmetic yetal cajalohon.
[Thank you for your welcome, I am grateful to
you all. We are here with you to share an
experience of community development.]

  

      
goals are interrelated, because we believe that the process of taking
control of our natural resources will help us to retain our culture,
while at the same time, our traditional knowledge will enable us to
manage our area sustainably.
To fulfill these objectives, it is necessary to take advantage of the
possibilities offered by controlled logging, game management, fish
ing, ecotourism, and crop production techniques that are less dam
aging to the environment. For this, we need to rescue and use the
knowledge that we have about the forest. The project seeks to estab
lish conditions in which we can overcome this preposterous situa
tion: extreme poverty in the midst of natural riches. To do this, we
need to overcome our marginalization and seek social justice and
harmonize our production by always following our traditional forms
of social organization and work, as well as the knowledge that can
help us achieve ecological harmony.
Another of Yum Balam’s objectives is to promote the exchange
of ideas and experiences among Indigenous leaders and with the
people of the United States, so as to gain support for local self-deter
mination and to help promote traditional natural resource uses.
Our next step is to propose the creation of a Mexican sustainable
development association. We are also proposing a change in Federal
Law to include a new category of protected area: a conservation area
that preserves the cultural and natural heritage of Indigenous
people. Here, I would like to present our experience in one of our
programs: the Yum Balam Protected Area.
THE YUM BALAM PROTECTED AREA
Usually, when protected areas are established, the people who
live in and around them are not consulted. Some of the best pre
served areas contain and are surrounded by Indigenous peoples who
depend on these areas’ resources, yet these people are often seen as a
threat to the biological resources of these areas. The exclusion of
local people from protected areas not only weakens their material
welfare, but also weakens their chances for cultural survival. This
situation leads to conflicts between local people and conservation
ists, and often creates conditions that are worse for both the people
and the wildlife.
Two key natural events and a change in government policy made
action necessary for us. In 1988 Hurricane Gilbert devastated large
areas all along the northern part of the Yucatán. It tore up many
thousands of trees and left the region leafless and without fruit — a
destruction of habitat that led to a 40% decrease in wildlife in the
area. Then, in 1989, we had a drought that led to large wildfires

 

The project seeks to establish condi
tions in which we can overcome this
preposterous situation: extreme pov
erty in the midst of natural riches.

 
throughout the area — 30,000 hectares of forest were consumed by
the flames. The last straw came in 1991, when the fishery was
opened to groups other than the fishing cooperatives, including to
foreign fleets. We realized that our patrimony was in grave danger,
and we had to defend Yum Balam, our Jungle Lord, the God of
Nature, from destruction, for our benefit and that of our sons and
daughters.
After centuries of “development” at the hands of outsiders, the
Yucatán Peninsula has a shrinking natural resource base. The very

Figure 1: Locator Map of the Area de Protección de Fauna y Flora Yum Balam

  

      
natural heritage upon which our culture depends, and therefore our
culture, was in danger of disappearing. For this reason we decided
upon pursuing the creation of this preserve, but with a difference:
we sought a reserve in which we would be able to participate fully,
from inception to management.
After five years of deliberations and discussions between govern
ment authorities and the local people, the Yum Balam Protected
Area (Area de Protección de Fauna y Flora Yum Balam) was officially
declared on June 5, 1994. The process of formation of this area was
slow and detailed, and included participation from the rural com
munities both inside and adjacent to this zone, as well as a critical
component of consultation with sympathetic bureaucrats, scientists,
and technicians. The agreement that was signed on June 5 was be
tween the federal, state, and municipal authorities and organized
civil and cultural groups, fishermen, farmers, and tourist guides, and
laid out the compromises and agreements to support the operation,
management, and administration of the area.
The reserve is located in the northeastern corner of Quintana
Roo and is inhabited mainly by Mayan people. Covering an area of
154,000 hectares, it includes a variety of ecosystems: deciduous
tropical forest, flooded forests, mangroves, lakes, wetlands, a marine
bay, a barrier island, coastal dunes, and coastal waters. The area also
contains numerous ruins left by our ancestors, and is contiguous
with the Rio Lagartos Biosphere Reserve, an area of similar ecosys
tems.
GOALS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE
Among our objectives are to:

•
•
•
•
•

protect the Maya historical and cultural heritage
safeguard biological diversity across all of the ecosystems,
many of which contain endangered or endemic species,
including some large mammals, such as manatees
provide natural resources to the area’s inhabitants in the
form of fisheries, game animals, building materials, and
alternatives for the future
protect the aquifers critical to the area’s water supply
preserve the potential for scientific investigation and eco
logically sound recreation

At present, the Committee is working and is having meetings
each month in which different social and environmental problems
are addressed in order to come up with solutions for garbage han

 

 
dling, mosquito control, fishing, tourism, forestry, medicinal plant
use, handicrafts, nature guides, and so on. We already have many
proposals and projects and we are always looking for new ideas in
cultural, social, and ecological matters. To assure the sustainability
of our plans, we have established a Consultative Council, composed
of the scientists who have been supporting us. This Council reviews
the technical aspects of our plans and is conducting ongoing investi
gations of the resource base and our use of it. We have also estab
lished a series of workshops to foster an ongoing participatory
analysis of our relations as a society with the environment and our
future.
Yum Balam’s major focus is to protect simultaneously local
communities and the ecosystems in which they live. Traditional land
uses are respected, and decisions are made based on scientific inves
tigation, but always in consultation with the local people. This entire
process of establishment and management is overseen by a commit
tee of government authorities and local groups in coordination with
research institutions and NGOs. Because there is no existing model
for this alternative in Mexico, we are in the process of creating one.
One of our challenges in the future will be to multiply this experi
ence and help other Indigenous communities in Mexico to take
control of their destinies as well.
In the end, we who live in the area must take responsibility for
both objectives: improving our quality of life and protecting the
reserve’s species and ecosystems. By taking into account the needs of
the local communities, both material and spiritual, the reserve is a
trustworthy custodian of the area. If we can take advantage of our
knowledge, with technical and government help, and if the laws are
sufficiently adapted, we can manage our natural resources to pro
vide us with the basis for a sustainable society.
Let us be the authors and actors in our own destiny. The Maya
world is distinct. We have our language and our customs, but we
want to share them with the entire world. We don’t want to live on
this planet separately — we are not a different world; we are a dis
tinct world.

In the end, we who live in the area
must take responsibility for both ob
jectives: improving our quality of life
and protecting the reserve’s species
and ecosystems. By taking into account
the needs of the local communities,
both material and spiritual, the reserve
is a trustworthy custodian of the area.

Kíhmak in wolah uch a úhyikenehesh, in jajal puksik’ah
haik tenéh, yank náhatikabaou.
[I feel happy to have been listened to with such attention, and with all my heart I hope
that we will go on to exchange many ideas.]

  

      
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q:
What are the most serious problems your community faces at
present?
SP:
The biggest problem is the lack of support for traditional
practices. Since 1970 the government has been putting a lot of
money into the area for “development,” but in fact the ap
proach they have taken has benefited very few people because
they have not given the people the opportunity to decide how
to improve the region — rather they just did whatever they
wanted to.
Q:
How do you see the situation in Chiapas with the Zapatistas
affecting Yum Balam?
SP:
I want to answer this question by saying first that the Indig
enous communities see the ongoing struggle of our Maya
brothers in Chiapas as a positive development. We in the Civil
Associations are with them. But, for us it is a double benefit.
We have encountered sensibility, we have encountered accep
tance, and because of the initiatives we have brought forth the
authorities are now beginning to give people the opportunity
to decide what they want. So, one of the benefits that is com
ing out of the war in the southeast is that they have to take us
and our plans seriously. I believe that this is a moment that we
have to take advantage of.
As Ted Macdonald mentioned, groups like ours now have
the political wherewithal to collaborate with scientists and
technicians to our benefit, and we don’t have to take direc
tions from anyone anymore, because we know what we want.

Yum Balam invites all interested people and
groups to participate in their struggle to
attain a sustainable society for their people.
They can be contacted through:
Agronomic Engineer Sebastián Poot Balam
(Area Committee Coordinator) 403 A. Lopez
Mateos St, Kantunilkin, Quintana Roo, Mexico.
Telephone and fax 91-988-4-68-61 ext 110
DVM Jose Francisco Remolina Suarez
(Consultative Council Coordinator) 12 Rojo
Gomez Av. Puerto Morelos, Quintana Roo,
Mexico
Telephone and fax 91-987-1-01-60

S EBASTIÁN P OOT B ALAM
Ing. Poot is an Agronomist, with a specialty in animal science. Currently he is president of the Yum Balam Asociación
Civíl and General Coordinator of Area de Protección de Flora y Fauna Yum Balam. Yum Balam is located in the north of
the state of Quintana Roo. Ing. Poot is also Coordinator of the National Commission of Justice and Social Development
for the Indigenous Towns in the Municipality of Lazaro Cardenas. In addition he is a professor at the Centro de
Bachillerato Tecnológico Agropecuário of Kantunilkín Quintana Roo.

 

 

Sebastián Poot Working Group
The workshop began with an overview of the history of the Yum
Balam Civil Association. The group was initiated after two events in
1989 and 1990, the most significant of which was a fire that de
stroyed a large area of forest. People from the community began
working with various organizations, including governmental and
international groups. They began to form their own group with the
intention of conserving all aspects of the remaining natural re
sources. Although the ideas and models for organization came from
other groups, Ing. Poot emphasized that it is the Indigenous people
who make all the decisions in their group. The group is trying to
encourage education, technical expertise, and diversification of
production so as to become sustainably self-sufficient.
The next major topic concerned the economic basis of Yum
Balam. Ing. Poot emphasized the importance of diversity in com
munity economic development. He spoke about the traditional
agriculture of the Maya people, centered around maize, as ex
plained in the Popul Vuh, the spiritual scripture of the Maya. It also
features a diversity of other crops. Agriculture is only one part of
their economic activity which also includes deer breeding, arts,
crafts, fishing, domestication of plants, and tourism. The goal is to
bring all of this together as a coherent basis for resource use. While
the nearby tourist pole of Cancún makes ecotourism an important
part of the strategy, it should not affect in any way the traditional
diversified agricultural basis. Ecotourism must be undertaken with
care, because it contains the seeds of its own destruction, at least in
Mexico, where success is almost defined as exceeding the carrying
capacity of the region.
The workshop participants also discussed the effect NAFTA
might have on groups such as Yum Balam and the Mexican ejidos.
Opinions were mixed, but the predominant opinion is embodied in
this comment: “There is no such thing as an ejido which can live
independently of the national and international system of pricing.”
Most, if not all, Mexican communities deal at least partially in the
cash economy. Ing. Poot’s community is trying to create a
microeconomy alongside international market structures by finding
“niche markets;” markets which remain outside world-wide com
petition. One example from Ing. Poot’s community is the manufac
ture of railroad ties. Currently they have an exclusive market
because Mexican law prohibits the government from buying this
product from international suppliers.

Ecotourism must be undertaken with
care, because it contains the seeds of
its own destruction.

  

      
Lastly, the discussion centered around the Indigenous movement
of which Ing. Poot is a member. It was pointed out that this interna
tional Indigenous movement gives them leverage within Mexico.
Leverage and political pressure is very important for the success of
community movements such as Yum Balam because it creates a
political challenge to existing political structures.
The following excerpts expand on some of these issues:
Our organization was established in 1989. I want to
give you an idea of the two key events that led to the birth of the
Yum Balam Civil Association (La Asociación Civíl Yum Balam).
In 1988 Hurricane Gilbert destroyed the coast of northern
Quintana Roo. Then, in 1990 a wildfire destroyed 30,000 hect
ares of forest in the region.
Together, these disasters killed maybe 40% of the animals in
the forest — tepescuintles (agoutis), wild pigs, spider monkeys
and so on. We started to work with ProFauna, an organization
based in Baldillo. They realized that the majority of the surviving
animals had moved into the remaining forest, which surrounded
our município, and they decided that they had to protect this area.
When we started this organization, we also had other things
in mind, not just flora and fauna. We had to consider all of the
resources that exist in the area — wells, ancient ruins, and other
things. We intended to work toward conserving not just the
plants and animals, but also the broad natural resource base that
our lives depend upon. At first we were going to use ProFauna as
a model for our own organization, but we decided that we
wanted our group to be more independent. So we started to
work with technicians and scientists from various institutions
who were working in the area on coastal turtles and botany. We
started talking to these people and became friends, and they
helped us to establish our own projects.
At present, the government, including the State Governor
and the Municipal President, are very supportive.
Nevertheless, even though we have all of this advice and
support, the Indigenous people of Yum Balam remain in the
decision-making capacity. We are the ones who make all of the
decisions, based on the advice and support that we can gather.

Sebastián Poot:

Q:

What is the economic basis of the community development? Is
the idea to make it viable through ecotourism, or through tradi
tional swidden agriculture, or some modified systems? How do
you plan to maintain economic sustainability?

 

We intended to work towards con
serving not just the plants and ani
mals, but also the broad natural re
source base that our lives depend upon.

 
The agricultural system is basically sustainable by itself — we
will always be self-sufficient, at least as far as food is concerned.
Naturally, it’s based on maize, in the traditional fashion, with
about 20 other main crops, and this is perfectly compatible with
our conservation objectives. However, we’re encouraging a
diversification in order to make our economy more robust. We
are trying to diversify our sources of income by promoting
projects to produce handicrafts such as hammocks, as well as
deer breeding and fishing and orchid and other plant domestica
tion. Ecotourism is obviously an important part of this strategy,
but we will not allow it to affect in any way the traditional, diver
sified basis for our livelihoods. Hopefully this will keep our
community reasonably resilient to turmoil elsewhere in the
Mexican and global economies and sustainable in the long-term.
Jim Spencer, Moderator, Yale F&ES: How will NAFTA change the relation
ship between the local community and the government?
SP: We are trying to work within the government, using the local
planning apparatus as a way to get control of government funds
to promote regional development. Through these programs we
are able to supply products such as railway ties that have pro
tected markets within the country. To the extent that we can, we
try to remain outside the markets that experience a great deal of
international competition.
We are also a part of a national Indigenous movement in
Mexico that is an attempt to create an independent political
power. This group, the Asociación Mexicana Indígena para
Desarollo Sonstenible (AMINDES), promotes cooperation among
Indigenous groups in Mexico and seeks international support to
help us advance our struggle. This gives us some greater bargain
ing power to create these protected areas.
SP:

  

      

The Panará: Indigenous Territory and Environmental Protection in the Amazon
Stephan Schwartzman
Anthropologist
Environmental Defense Fund
ABSTRACT
The Panará Indians of northern Mato Grosso and southern Pará have endured in this century decimation and diaspora.
After decades of avoiding contact with Brazilian society, their territory became so diminished and the frontier so
inexorable, that they were finally contacted and moved to Xingú Indigenous Park. There, they recovered from the brink
of extinction and put in motion the process to reclaim the remaining parts of their traditional territories. Now, in 1995,
they are in the process of returning. The struggle of the Panara exemplifies an ecologically and culturally viable alterna
tive for the development of the region and for sustainable co-existence with intact natural areas.

INTRODUCTION
The Panará, or Krenakore, Indians of northern Mato Grosso and
southern Pará states in the Brazilian Amazon, were in the late 1960s
and early 1970s all but exterminated when the federal government
opened a road through the middle of their territory. They became
paradigmatic “victims of the miracle” (Davis 1977; Shelton 1977) —
victims of the so-called economic miracle of Brazil’s military, which
pushed roads through the rainforest and sponsored pharonic megainfrastructure works across the country. Now, twenty years after this
contact, the Panará are returning to their traditional lands to halt the
expansion of the predatory development frontier.
When part of the Trans-Amazon network, the Cuiabá-Santarém
highway, was opened through the Panará territory in 1968 and 1973,
as much as 80% of their population died of diseases and epidemics
brought into the area. Of some 9 villages in the area with a popula
tion of between 350 and 600 people, the majority had died within
two years of the official contact.
The survivors were then relocated to the Xingú Indigenous Park,
250 kilometers away in a different ecosystem and a different social
universe of 16 other Indigenous groups with whom they had had no
previous peaceful contact. They have spent the last 20 years in the
Xingú.
Now, in 1995, the Panará are going back to their traditional land.
In 1991, when a group of Panará made the first trip back to their
territory since the group was transferred, they identified part of their
land still unoccupied and forested, and devised a plan to reoccupy
and defend the area.
They also verified that there are now three towns and extensive
gold mining operations in the Peixoto de Azevedo river, the center
of their traditional land. Most of the superficial gold deposits have

 

 
run out, leaving much of the watershed seriously polluted and de
graded, and large scale mahogany extraction is poised to expand
with the decline of gold mining. In addition, the Panará determined
that a process of land fraud (grilagem) was beginning in the unoccu
pied part of their territory.
In 1994, the Panará filed two lawsuits against the government in
federal court, seeking official recognition of their traditional land
rights and indemnification for losses incurred during the contact.
They have now established a presence in the remaining part of their
territory with a village and gardens. On December 14, the National
Indian Foundation (FUNAI), Brazil’s Indian agency, published the
official identification in the federal register. The first step of legal
recognition of this area, identification recognized their rights to an
area of 488,000 hectares in northern Mato Grosso and southern
Pará. These measures have served to interrupt the land fraud opera
tion under way in the area, which can be definitively halted by full
legal recognition of the Panará land rights (demarcation) and con
tinuing attention from the relevant government agencies.
The Panará have achieved this much through creating alliances
with other Indigenous groups in the Xingú and elsewhere as well as
with various environmental and Indigenous rights groups. This is
only one instance in which collaboration between Indigenous (and
other forest based) groups and environmental NGOs has shown
benefits for both environmental protection and Indigenous rights.
This initiative has used innovative legal strategies and new technolo
gies — geographic information systems and analysis of satellite
images — to make it possible for the Panará to press an effective
claim for recognition of their land rights, and ultimately to defend a
substantial area of pristine tropical forest.
What is at stake for the Panará is the control of their own des
tiny. For 20 years they have been struggling to reconstitute a society
that was essentially destroyed during contact, and, to a remarkable
extent, they have succeeded. However, what is also at stake is the
possibility of preservation of a very substantial area of extremely rich
tropical forest that is, in addition, a critical upper watershed for a
much larger protected area right next door to it — the Mekragnoti
Kayapo area.
In environmental terms, the immediate options are clear: either
the Panará will reoccupy this area or it will be occupied by ranchers,
loggers and colonists and become very seriously degraded. The long
term management of the area is an important challenge, since the
Panará traditionally occupied a region perhaps four times greater
than the identified area, surrounded by a still greater region into
which the frontier had barely penetrated. They hunted with bows

For 20 years [the Panará] have been
struggling to reconstitute a society that
was essentially destroyed in the con
tact, and, to a remarkable extent, they
have succeeded. However, what is also
at stake is the possibility of preserva
tion of a very substantial area of ex
tremely rich tropical forest.

  

      
and arrows and clubs, and had no connection to the money
economy. All of these conditions have changed irreversibly. The
long-term sustainability of the area will depend on how these reali
ties are addressed. But the more immediate question for this area,
on which the possibility of the future conservation of the
biodiversity of the region depends, is “Who will control the area?”
In the following discussion I suggest that while the Panará initia
tive is the result of particular historical circumstances — the his
tory of the Panará and their contact with the national society — it
is also paradigmatic of the process of frontier expansion in the Ama
zon, and so demonstrates critical elements of an alternative ap
proach to development for the region.
THE HISTORY OF THE PANARÁ OF THE PEIXOTO DE
AZEVEDO AND UPPER IRIRI
An important part of the history of the Panará was unknown
when Indian agents Claudio and Orlando Villas Boas set out to
contact them in 1968, and has been definitively established only in
the last few years. Adrian Cowell, who documented the contacting
expedition in The Tribe that Hides from Man (1973), surmised that
the Panará might be descendents of Timbira groups that had fled the
cattle ranching frontier in Maranhão, and so shunned contact with
the Villas Boas expedition because of ancient memories of war with
the Brazilians. Cowell was not far off. The Panará speak a language
of the Northern Gê sub-family of the Gê language family. Other
Northern Gê languages include Kayapo, Suya, Apinage and the
Timbira languages. Recent ethnohistorical and linguistic research
has demonstrated that the Panará are in fact the last descendants of
another group in this language sub-family, a people known in the
historical annals of Brazil as the “Southern Cayapo” (Giraldin 1994;
Dourado and Rodrigues 1993), at times incorrectly confused with
the Northern Kayapo, and thought to have become extinct in the
first decades of this century. Giraldin’s analysis, and the subsequent
comparison of Alexandre de Souza Barros, Auguste St. Hilaire
(1975), and Johann Pohl’s (1976) historic word lists with contempo
rary Panará by linguists Luciana Dourado and Aryon Rodrigues
(1993) leave no doubt that Panará and Southern Cayapo are the
same language. The Cayapo’s name for themselves, for example, was
“Panará.” Panará oral traditions say that the Panará moved west
wards in the distant past, away from the whites and their guns, from
a region of savannah to a forested area where there were no whites.
The present day Panará are then the survivors of a much larger
people — the Southern Cayapo — who in 1720 occupied an enor
mous expanse of territory, from the Parnaíba River in São Paulo to

 

 
the southern part of Goias, from the “Minas Gerais Triangle” to
eastern Mato Grosso and eastern Mato Grosso do Sul. Historian
John Hemming (1978) estimates that there may have been 25,000
Southern Cayapo in 1500. Starting in 1723, with the discovery of
gold in Goias, and subsequently in Cuiabá, Mato Grosso, they
fought the Portuguese ferociously but suffered massacres and nu
merous slaving raids. In 1751 they attacked the City of Goias, the
capital of the province. Various bandeiras (private militias) were
contracted to fight and enslave the Cayapo, and eventually some
groups accepted contact and were settled in government
aldeamentos (villages), where St. Hilaire and Pohl visited them in the
1850s and 1860s and from which they were subsequently assimilated
into the regional society or died out. Other groups, however, with
drew westwards before the frontier into the remote forests of Mato
Grosso and southern Pará. The reason that the Panará fled contact,
as Cowell intuited, is that their traditions held outsiders, “whites” in
particular, to be savage and dangerous enemies.
By 1920 the Panará had various villages in the region of the
Peixoto de Azevedo and Upper Iriri basins, and in a chance encoun
ter on the Iriri Novo River, began the war with the Kayapo that
would continue until 1967. When Claudio and Orlando Villas Boas
opened and built the airstrip at Cachimbo, in 1951 (which subse
quently became a Brazilian Air Force base), they noted the presence
of the Panará.

The Kayapo attack began a process
of successive withdrawals, as the Panará
moved from one village to another,
seeking to avoid first the airplanes that
Claudio Villas Boas flew over their vil
lages, then the approaching contact
ing expedition.

CONTACT WITH THE PANARA
The events of the unsuccessful Villas Boas expedition to contact
the Panará had enormous repercussions among the Panará. The
permanent contact of the Panará with Brazilian society in this cen
tury began with the Mekragnoti Kayapo raid of 1967. The Kayapo
had raided the Panará with guns before, but in 1967, for the first
time, they obtained a large quantity of ammunition from the mis
sionary living with them. They killed some 26 people in the village of
Sonkànasã on a small southeastern tributary of the Upper Iriri River,
at the time the northernmost Panará village. The Kayapo burned the
village, and the surviving Panará fled. By the time the survivors
regrouped in a nearby village, the Kayapo war party had left, and
retribution was impossible.
The Kayapo attack began a process of successive withdrawals, as
the Panará moved from one village to another, seeking to avoid first
the airplanes that Claudio Villas Boas flew over their villages, then
the approaching contacting expedition. The arrival of the airplanes,
which dropped trade goods — machetes, beads, and so on — into
the Panará villages, provoked a discussion among the Panará that

  

      
would continue until the contact. The elders — the only ones who
had seen Brazilians, in sporadic encounters with rubber tappers or
skin hunters — held that the whites were “wild” (asàr) and danger
ous, and that, as of old, they had come to kill the Panará. However,
based on the palpable proof of machetes, knives, beads and axes, the
young men argued that the whites had come to bring them things;
that they were not wild. The traditional authority of the elders was
decisive throughout the period described in The Tribe that Hides
from Man, and the Panará fled. As the airplanes found more and
more villages, and as the expedition reached the easternmost village
(Sonsenasã), the Panará abandoned village after village, and with
them, gardens planted to support the ever more concentrated popu
lation.
In 1969, government funds were cut off and the first Villas Boas
expedition to the Panará halted. It returned only when the situation
had reached crisis proportions. Surveyors were laying the course for
the Cuiabá-Santarém road when Claudio Villas Boas set out again,
from the air base at Cachimbo. Advance crews for the road had
already reached Panará territory when the contacting expedition set
out again, in 1972. The Panará were by this time almost all concen
trated in two villages — a village called Pà’sûpàri on the Nhandu
River, and a new village called Topayurõ, on the Braco Norte.
Claudio paralleled the surveyors opening the trails for the road
crews to follow, moving south from Cachimbo toward the Peixoto
de Azevedo, leaving machetes, pots and pans, beads, and axes for the
Panará. The Panará took goods from Claudio’s group on numerous
occasions, and finally, in February of 1973, entered Claudio’s camp
on the Braco Norte River (a small northern tributary of the Peixoto
de Azevedo). By then, the group had largely moved across the
Peixoto de Azevedo to the sole remaining village that the contacting
expedition had not discovered by air, Yopûyûpaw.
It was here, shortly after the initial contact, that the first epidem
ics began. When the first epidemic struck (probably influenza),
those who could still move decided to go back to Topayurõ, and
many died on the trail.
Between 1973 and 1975, when the surviving Panará were trans
ferred to the Xingú National Park, at least 178 men, women, and
children died of white peoples’ diseases, out of a previous popula
tion of at least 320.
The Panará recount horrifying episodes from this period. In the
first wave of epidemics, so many people died, and the survivors were
so sick and weakened, that the living were too few and too debili
tated to bury the dead. Vultures and turtles ate the corpses. Nursing
infants and children died of starvation when their mothers died.

 

In the first wave of epidemics, so many
people died, and the survivors were so
sick and weakened, that the living were
too few and too debilitated to bury the
dead. Vultures and turtles ate the
corpses.

 
Since serious illness or death except by accidental causes or violence
was in traditional terms explained as Panará witchcraft, many
Panará were executed as witches as a result of the epidemics. Epi
demics resulting from the contact have undoubtedly had similar
consequences in many other lowland South American Indigenous
groups, since notions of witchcraft and sorcery as the cause of dis
ease are widespread. The anthropological literature on violence in
the lowlands has largely ignored this until recently.
After the first wave of epidemics, the main body of Panará re
turned to the village of Topayurõ, near Claudio’s encampment, and
regular contact was established. Disputes over whether the whites
were “wild” or not continued. On several occasions, elders proposed
or attempted to attack the contacting expedition, only to be dis
suaded by the junior men. The Villas Boas brothers left the front,
and were replaced by a succession of FUNAI staff. A small area had
been set aside for the Panará during the contact, but this did not
even include all of the villages known at the time of the contact or
shortly thereafter.
Road construction was already underway when the Villas Boas
brothers left, and the Panará became fascinated with the road crews,
building a village a few kilometers from the road. When the road
opened in December, the Panará were photographed begging by the
side of the road. Reports appeared in the press of Army Engineers
giving them liquor and prostituting the women. The President of
FUNAI decided, with the support of the Villas Boas, to remove the
surviving Panará to the Xingú Park. Two senior men, Watuya and
Kreko, were sent in advance to see the Xingú.
The two spent two days in the Xingú, and on their return the
Panará asked them what they had seen, and if there were people
(panará) in the Xingú. They replied that they had seen a big river,
and fish in it, and that perhaps there were “people” there. The Indi
ans of the Xingú also painted over their eyes with red body paint
(urucum), like the Panará.

When the road opened in December,
the Panará were photographed beg
ging by the side of the road. Reports
appeared in the press of Army Engi
neers giving them liquor and prostitut
ing the women.

RELOCATION: THE XINGÚ
In January of 1975, the 79 surviving Panará were removed from
the airstrip at the junction of the BR-80 and BR-163 roads in two
Air Force cargo planes and taken to the FUNAI post Diauarum in
the Xingú Indigenous Park. The Panará diaspora had begun. The
Panará arrived hungry, anemic, infested with malaria and parasites
and with no women pregnant. They were dispatched to the Kajabi
village of Prepuri, where five more people died within the first two
months.
The Panará, deeply dispirited, began to talk of returning to their

  

      
land in the Peixoto de Azevedo. Park authorities and the Kayapo
chief, Rauni, however, moved the Panará to the Kayapo village of
Kretire in March of that year. The Panará were thus delivered to
their traditional enemies. The Kayapo followed a policy of aggressive
acculturation, initiating Panará boys into Kayapo men’s societies
and marrying Panará girls to Kayapo men. Further epidemics killed
another five Panará, and it was probably this medical emergency
that allowed the new Park director, Olimpio Serra, to negotiate their
removal in October of 1975. After medical treatment at Diauarum,
the group moved to the village of the Suya. Health conditions im
proved, and the Suya did not attempt to assimilate the Panará. The
Panará began to recover. They planted their own garden and began
to perform traditional rituals, songs, and dances again. In 1976 they
identified a site for a village of their own, and they moved there at
the end of the year.
By 1980, when I first met the Panará, they were living in their
own village, feeding themselves from their own abundant gardens,
and fishing successfully from their own canoes, which they had
learned how to build in the previous few years. Their population was
increasing, as it had been since they founded their own village.
Nonetheless, they talked constantly about their land. They com
pared their traditional area, rich in game and good land for gardens,
with its abundant forest resources, including Brazil nuts, the açaí
palm, and wild cacau, with the Xingú where game was scarce, the
land was poor, and many forest resources were absent or rare. In
every moment of crisis, the idea of returning surfaced, in spite of
being informed each time that the Peixoto was overrun by whites
and devastated.
Illness and the lack of good land for gardens compelled the
Panará to move seven times within the Xingú. In 1983, after several
epidemics brought population growth to a standstill, the Panará
moved to a new village on the Xingú downriver from the BR-80
road. After a few years, when land for gardens became scarce, the
Panará began to seek another new village site. After several people,
including Tenko, the adult son of the principal Panará chief, Akà,
died in the new village, the group moved in 1990 to the western
limit of the Xingú Park, at the confluence of the Arraias and
Manitsuá-Missu Rivers. The Panará began to hunt and fish outside
the park, in uncleared lands belonging to ranchers, an area ecologically
similar to their traditional lands. In 1991, a group of Panará fishing
outside the reserve killed a ranch hand in a dispute. The group contin
ued to grow in the new location, but their extensive forays outside the
Park, and the potential for conflict these implied, suggested that this
location as well was still another way station in the Panará diaspora.

 

The Panará began to recover. They
planted their own garden and began
to perform traditional rituals, songs,
and dances again.

 
THE PANARÁ RETURN
While the Panará never ceased discussing the fate of their tradi
tional land, their conception of this land changed substantially
between 1983 and 1991. In 1983 the Panará talked of various loca
tions in their traditional territory (Sonkànasãri, Pà’sûpàriri,
Pesôturi, “the Peixoto”), but had no clear conception of “Panará
land” in the sense of a defined territory that they possessed, or had
possessed. Their word for land (kupa) meant “earth,” or “soil.” In
1991, after long exposure to the Kayapo and other Indigenous
groups in the Xingú, and to discussions of land issues in the Xingú,
the Panará came to recognize that under the terms of Brazilian
society, their territory belonged to them. They spoke of “Panará
land” (panará nyo kupa), and had an acute awareness that resettle
ment from their land to the Xingú and the subsequent expansion of
the frontier into the Peixoto implied losses and damages to them.
About 1986, a group of Panará men went to Brasília to demand
compensation for the land they had lost in the transfer from
Romero Jucá, the then-President of FUNAI. Jucá gave them a num
ber of shotguns. In 1991 the Panará returned to Brasília, seeking to
reopen a discussion of compensation for their traditional land with
FUNAI. In November of the same year, the Panará mobilized suffi
cient support to return to their traditional land for the first time in
nearly 20 years.
The six Panará men who went to Matupa and Peixoto de
Azevedo discovered two things. First, they saw that a large part of
their traditional territory had been occupied by the gold rush that
had started as soon as they were removed. Virtually the entire
Peixoto de Azevedo basin was devastated. Tens of thousands of
placer miners (garimpeiros) had passed through the Peixoto goldfields, blasting out the riverbeds with high pressure hoses, reducing
the gold-bearing sediments to rivers of mud, and extracting the gold
with mercury. The result was a malarial moonscape, with acres of
standing water, mercury-contaminated mud flats, and dead streams
and rivers. The gold was almost gone, but there was still mahogany
in the more distant forests, and along the roads was a ragged patch
work of cattle ranches and farms.
On a reconnaissance flight, however, the Panará saw that the
northeastern sector of their traditional land remained intact — with
the forest still standing and no signs of occupation. Crossing the
hills of the Serra do Cachimbo to the Iriri watershed, in the region of
the villages of Nampôrõ and Sonkànasã, where the Kayapo had
attacked in 1967, and where the Panará had had several previous
villages, the Panará saw only forest — the closed, primary tropical
forest of their land.

A group of Panará men went to Brasília
to demand compensation for the land
they had lost in the transfer from
Romero Jucá, the then-President of
FUNAI. Jucá gave them a number of
shotguns.

  

      
Panará chief Akà at once declared his intention to reoccupy and
gain government recognition for the remaining Panará territory. In
an interview in the Peixoto goldfield, the day after the flight in No
vember 1991, Akà stated, “The land where I was born has been
consumed, the forest razed, the rivers filled in, the animals finished.
White people can stay there and we won’t argue. But we have found
a part of our land that is still forest, and we are going back there. If
the white chiefs send their people there, then we will fight.”
In the following three years, as Akà declared they would, the
Panará undertook a series of steps to reoccupy their traditional land
and gain official government recognition for it. They sought support
not only from FUNAI, but from a group of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) as well — the Environmental Defense Fund,
the Instituto Socioambiental (formerly the Ecumenical Center for
Documentation and Information and the Nucleus for Indigenous
Rights), and the Associação Vida e Ambiente (formerly Fundação
Mata Virgem). In a series of subsequent visits to the region, groups
of Panará men located former village sites, gained an understanding
of the processes occurring in the area, and formulated a strategy for
reoccupying their remaining land. The NGOs, responding to the
Panará request for support, provided logistical and technical sup
port such as maps, satellite images, and legal research.
The Panará found an area of some 488,000 hectares (more than
1.2 million acres) of their traditional land still unoccupied and
intact, on the border of Pará and Mato Grosso states, comprising the
upper headwaters of the Iriri and Ipiranga rivers. Part of this land
(in Pará) had been claimed by the military as part of the Cachimbo
air base (which was to have become a nuclear test site, until the
military nuclear program was terminated by President Collor). The
remainder, in Mato Grosso, was ceded to the Institute for Land
Reform and Colonization (INCRA), for the settlement of small and
medium farmers from other parts of the country as agricultural
colonists. In this part of the Panará territory, called Gleba Iriri, a
group of ranchers, loggers and local politicians, reportedly with the
support of the state Superintendent of INCRA, had been perpetrat
ing an extensive land fraud operation (first detected by the Panará
on an overland trip to find the site of the village of Sonkànasã).
Opening clandestine airstrips in the area, the group would divide up
the public land into lots and sell it to third parties, intending to
legalize the illicit transactions through INCRA, and quelling any
competition through armed force. The “group of ten” was, at the
outset of the dry season of 1994, beginning to move into the remain
ing intact portion of the Panará area. If they were successful in get
ting the fraud “legalized” before the Panará established themselves
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in the area, gaining official recognition of Panará rights in the area
would be seriously complicated.
In May of 1994, the Panará identified a site for a village on the
Iriri river, and began work on the new village, gardens, and an air
strip. In August, having built a village and cleared gardens and the
beginnings of an airstrip, the Panará, through their attorneys at the
Nucleus for Indigenous Rights, filed suit in Federal court in Brasília
for the demarcation of the remaining portion of their traditional
land, guaranteed them in perpetuity by the Brazilian Constitution.
In September 1994, FUNAI convened a working group to carry
out the official identification of the Panará territory. Led by anthro
pologist Ana Gita de Oliveira, the group travelled five days up the
Iriri river from the Kayapo village of Kubenkokre to verify the pres
ence of a group of Panará in their new village. Two days after the
FUNAI team left the Panará village, the ranchers’ gunmen arrived,
looking for the FUNAI team. After a tense exchange, the gunmen
left. The Panará then withdrew to Kubenkokre, fearing an attack.
In November of 1994, the Panará convened an historic meeting
in their village in the Xingú, to discuss their plan to move back to
their traditional territory with the leaders of the peoples of the
Xingú. Most of the principal actors of Xingú Park were present:
Kayapo chief Rauni, his nephew and director of the Xingú Park,
Megaron, Kajabi leader and FUNAI post chief Mairawe and Kajabi
chiefs Prepuri and Cuiabáno. Claudio and Orlando Villas Boas, the
park’s founders, were invited but did not attend. The Panará as
sembled, for the first time, all of the Xingú leadership in their vil
lage. The four Panará chiefs, or elder men, Akà, Teseya, Kôkriti, and
Krekõ, publicly declared the group’s intention to return to the land
of their parents and grandparents. They emphasized that the Xingú
is not Panará land, that their land is fertile, abundant with game and
fish. Nine other Panará men and women spoke to the same effect.
One younger man spoke against the move. The large majority of
leaders of other Indigenous groups in the Xingú who spoke sup
ported the Panará initiative, and many — Txicão, Suya, Kajabi —
spoke of their lands outside the present boundaries of the Xingú.
Olimpio Serra, who succeeded the Villas Boas brothers as adminis
trator of the Park, remembered the Villas Boas’ initial proposal for
the Xingú Park — a much larger area than the present reserve,
which, had it been created, would have protected the land of the
Panará, the Txicão, and the Kajabi and made the attraction and
transfer of these groups unnecessary.
Serra recalled the moment when the contact of the Panará had
begun, with the concept of the Xingú Park put in jeopardy as the
BR-80 road cut across the northern end of the Park. Since that time,
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the Indians of the Xingú, principally the Kayapo, have won back,
piece by piece, the land removed from the Park when the road was
built. With the demarcation of the 5 million hectare Mekragnoti
Indigenous area in 1992 in southern Pará state (an initiative led by
Rauni), an expanse of contiguous Indigenous lands much like the
original proposal for the Xingú has taken shape. The Panará area is
the next step in this process, as Prof. Serra noted. In other words,
the vision that Claudio and Orlando Villas Boas, anthropologist
Darcy Ribeiro, and others, had of the Xingú in 1950 but were politi
cally unable to achieve, is being made a reality by the Indians them
selves, most recently by the Panará.
PANARÁ AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE AMAZON
Panará history is more than a dramatic story of how one Indig
enous group lost, and then found again, its traditional territory. The
history of the Panará in fact exemplifies important larger trends in
several senses.
First, it is a story about the Amazon and about Indians, about
destruction of the forest and the abuse of the rights of a tiny minor
ity. So apparently, it is one of those tales that foreigners worry
about, but that are held to be peripheral to the concerns of the more
than 60% of Brazilians who live in cities, the perhaps 90% who live
outside the Amazon, and the more than 99% who are not Indians.
In reality the implications of this story are of national and global
significance.
The time frame of the Panará story is the same time frame as the
development of the Amazon: most of the more than 426,000 square
kilometers of Amazon deforestation has happened since 1968
(Fearnside 1993). The motor of deforestation is also the same — the
road. The logic of the construction of the Cuiabá-Santarem was the
same mixture of ideology and economic speculation that motivated
the Trans-Amazon and other road building adventures — a military
geopolitical drive to occupy the vast interior before others did, and
the supposition that large infrastructure works in the region would
bring about economic growth and prosperity.
Both the fear and the hope have proved unrealistic. No foreign
power or migratory wave from abroad threatens the region. And,
after tens of billions of dollars of public investment, there is little
prosperity to be seen in the Amazon. The World Bank found that in
1980 the major cause of deforestation in the basin — agriculture —
was responsible for one half of one percent of the national GDP
(World Bank 1989). What is left today in most of the Panará terri
tory, as in other waning gold boom areas, is a seriously degraded
river basin where the gold rush passed, a handful of cattle ranches,
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and three cities in precarious circumstances since the superficial
gold deposits are running out. There is, for the time being, still
mahogany, but it too will be inevitably consumed. Loggers in the
region are rumored to estimate that the commercially exploitable
mahogany will be exhausted in the short term, counted in years
rather than decades. While the gold rush has indisputably consti
tuted an important source of income for the rural poor in the Ama
zon (cf Cleary 1990), the declining production evident in the
Peixoto appears to be general (US Department of the Interior 1994).
Both gold and mahogany tend to concentrate income upwards, and
large scale contraband export deprives the government of revenues
from the liquidation of what is in essence public natural capital.
Development in northern Mato Grosso, as elsewhere in the
Amazon, is strongly marked by the private appropriation of public
goods (the land, the gold, the mahogany) to benefit a tiny elite, with
substantial, and more broadly distributed, environmental and social
costs. As Philip Fearnside (1993) has shown convincingly, it is not
the case that deforestation is caused by poor smallholders cutting
down the forest for subsistence: while medium and large landhold
ings (>100 hectares) are less than 8% of all holdings, they account
for 70% of the deforestation in the region. Much of the deforesta
tion is a result of the land rush, in which the radically inequitable
distribution of land and income in Brazil as a whole has been repro
duced in the Amazon. In 1980, less than 1% of landholders in Brazil
controlled half of the land, while the smallest 50% had less than 3%.
Income distribution is similarly skewed. In the Amazon this pattern
is in some cases exacerbated: in Mato Grosso, for example, 70% of
the landholdings occupied only 3% of the land area, while the 7% of
the holdings over 1,000 ha occupied 83% of the land (Fearnside
1993). In short, if landlessness and poverty have driven colonists and
rural-to-urban migrants to the Amazon and cities like Peixoto de
Azevedo, what they find there is most often not a solution. The
process that brought the frontier to the Panará territory has not
resolved the problems that put it in motion, it has simply displaced
them.
What is at issue in Brazil and the Amazon then, as in the Panará
territory, is not a struggle between environmental protection and
development. Rather it is a struggle between a model of develop
ment that benefits relatively few, at great human and environmental
cost, and the possibility of a better development model, one that can
sustain economic opportunity based in the conservation of natural
resources.
What the Panará are doing now, in 1995, is paradigmatic of what
needs to be done if the possibility of another development model is
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to be preserved. The demarcation of Indigenous lands like the
Panará territory is a critical step towards legality and order in the
chaos that reigns on public lands in the Amazon. Twenty percent of
the national territory is public land, much of it in the Amazon.
Invasions of Indian lands and conservation units are rife, private
land claims remain to be sorted out, and different and conflicting
categories of federal land are superimposed on one another (Santilli
1994). This sends the worst possible signal to private actors, who, in
the absence of any effective enforcement of environmental or other
legislation, freely appropriate public lands, extract resources, and
disseminate destruction. No effective incentives for sustained forest
management are possible until land rights are clearly organized,
since no one will make a long-term investment without some assur
ance that they can reap the benefits of it.
The Panará have mobilized public institutions (FUNAI and the
Federal Prosecutor’s Office) as well as private, non-governmental
groups, in order to short circuit land fraud in their area, and are
pressing forward the legal and de facto protection of the land. In
short, they are in the process of bringing order out of chaos. They,
like other Indigenous groups and many rubber tapper and Amazon
peasant communities, have an interest in preserving large expanses
of forest from the most destructive forms of occupation of the re
gion. This is why, in the struggle over land at the mining, ranching,
and logging frontier, where the policy for the future of the region is
being made, the initiatives of such groups are a critical element for
any strategy for conserving large areas of forest and preserving the
possibility of a better development model.
Preserving the possibility of a better development model, how
ever, is not the same thing as demonstrating how it is to be achieved.
In securing their land rights, the Panará will indisputably perform a
substantial environmental service by defending an area of forest the
size of Delaware. But for the Panará, as for the neighboring Kayapo
(who occupy more than 10 million hectares in southern Pará and
northern Mato Grosso), the challenge is to find practical and reliable
sources of cash income that are environmentally sustainable. The
Kayapo have recently renounced timber and mining contacts
(Turner, 1995) that have occasioned environmental damage and
social tensions among them, and the present generation of Panará
leaders is also opposed to deals with loggers and miners. Even the
Kayapo areas most affected by logging and mining are, by virtue of
their size and the Kayapo ability to control access, immense reposi
tories of biological diversity. This is easily verifiable by comparing
satellite images of the Kayapo area and the surrounding region over
time — the difference between clearcut cattle ranches and the for-
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ested Indian areas becomes immediately obvious.
Ultimately, however, the defense of territory in itself will guaran
tee neither the conservation of biological diversity nor the well being
of the Indigenous peoples. Impoverished Indigenous groups utterly
dependent on the uncertain largesse of the government for income
and assistance are unlikely to hold out against the predatory exploi
tation of their resources. If defense of territory is the necessary con
dition for the sustainability of the Indigenous lands, in the absence
of which the very possibility of large scale conservation on the public
lands of the region is compromised, then reliable government assis
tance (for health care and education in particular) and viable eco
nomic alternatives are the conditions through which it is possible to
imagine Indigenous territories as part of a broader regional strategy
of conservation and sustainable resource management.
Perhaps the most important implications of the Panará project
are conceptual. Both the Panará and the groups supporting them
understand the project as a learning process. To succeed in the
immediate objective of reoccupying and defending the land will
require that the Panará continue the process of reconstituting their
traditional society — reasserting the competence of Panará leader
ship to propose and execute strategies adequate to changing social,
historical, economic, and ecological circumstances. The success of
the Panará project depends on the ability of the Panará to re-create
themselves as the subjects of their own history.
Many environmentalists, and some anthropologists, understand
Indigenous culture as a “fixed repertoire of ‘tradition’,” or as a static
body of knowledge and customs, as Terence Turner (1995) has
pointed out. The enthusiasts of Indigenous resource management in
tropical forests and its critics both tend to see change as entirely
derived from the outside, and essentially as loss or degradation.
Such a static view of Indigenous cultures can account for neither the
enormous proliferation of Indigenous societies and cultures in the
Amazon before 1500, nor the complex dynamics of internal change
within Indigenous cultures evidenced by the disputes over resource
use among the Kayapo and the Panará reoccupation of their terri
tory. The case of the Panará clearly requires a more dynamic con
ception of culture: as a “flexible capacity for collective adaptation or
self-creation,” as Turner has so well put it (Turner 1995).
If culture is the capacity for collective self-creation, and not
merely a repertoire of tradition, then the Panará reconstitution of
their traditional culture is to be understood as their recovery of the
capacity for self-creation. This has important implications for think
ing about the long-term sustainability of the Panará territory and
other Indigenous areas. The Panará return takes place on a different
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landscape, physically as well as socially and economically, than did
the contact. To recast themselves as the subjects of their own his
tory, the Panará have incorporated a plethora of new technologies
and concepts. The great challenge, and potentially the most impor
tant result of the project for the Panará and the public interest, is to
make it pragmatically possible for the Panará to incorporate the
concept of sustainability.

QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q:
I have a question of clarification about FUNAI. Academics
like me have seen it as a kind of bad guy, but you have men
tioned that they have been helpful in this case. Could you
explain how FUNAI fits into this process?
SS:
Well, there are extremely good people in FUNAI — there is a
small but important core of people who are very serious about
Indigenous land rights. The fact is that various higher au
thorities, from the President on down, who have not had
Indigenous rights as their priority, have imposed themselves
upon FUNAI — everything that you have heard about them is
right. Nonetheless, the agency is capable of carrying out its
mandate.
It also varies according to the moment. At present, were it
not for the NGOs, despite the best intentions in the land
division of FUNAI, this identification would not have hap
pened because FUNAI didn’t have the money and would not
have been able to do it by itself. In the last two years they have
received something on the order of about 5% of their budget
ary request. Were they better organized and not grossly over
staffed with useless functionaries and understaffed with
competent people, they still wouldn’t have the resources to
carry out their mandate.
Q:
Is there a danger that the Panará may deplete the resources in
their new area, as it is just a fraction of the area that they
originally occupied?
SS:
Well, that’s a good question. You have to remember that this
is an area about the size of the state of Delaware for a group of
158 people, so there is a lot of land and it is enormously rich.
Nonetheless, it’s a real problem. From their perspective, of
course, they see themselves as being in a much more tightly
squeezed position now. A large part of what had motivated
them to leave the Xingú four years ago was that, as their chil
dren grew, they realized that there was not enough land for
them there.

 

 
I think that we have to bet on their adaptive capacity and
ensure that they have the necessary information upon which
to base good judgments. It is important for them to have a
sense of ownership of this area, so that they can begin to think
about new strategies for subsisting in it.
The immediate priority, given the situation, has been to
secure their rights in the area. The next critical step, of course,
is to begin a discussion of resource management and sustain
able income generation, and this is something that is being
contemplated in the project.
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Stephan Schwartzman Working Group
The discussion in this group focused on the relationships be
tween the Panará and the other actors in the area. From the time of
contact and through their first few years in the Xingú Indigenous
Park, the Panará had overwhelmingly negative relations with other
groups, including other Indian groups, government agencies, set
tlers, and road crews. Once they were able to found their own village
in the Xingú and began to reestablish their cultural identity, the
Panará were eventually able to form a network of strategic alliances
with other Indigenous groups, NGOs, and government agencies.
When they decided upon pursuing an agenda of return to their
traditional lands, they were able to access sufficient support through
this network to be able to make this a reality. The following excerpts
explore some of the dynamics of this remarkable transformation:
This has been a cultural transforma
tion. We are talking about these people returning to (a part of)
their homeland after twenty years. Their return is mediated by
the NGOs and sanctioned by the government. In what sense can
we see this dynamism ever slowing down? It seems that dyna
mism begets dynamism, and that we will see rapid changes in
this area on and on and on.
Steve Schwartzman: In thinking about this region we have to seriously
revisit what has been a strong tendency among anthropologists
and planners to imagine that the Indians are simply going to
disappear. The Panará case and others show that, even where the
situation suggests that the culture has no chance whatsoever,
they can remain viable. So in projecting plans and zone use
strategies, if you don’t take the presence of these groups into
account, you are making a big mistake. Nevertheless, it is a very
dynamic situation — Indigenous groups are changing in re
sponse to the dynamic processes that are going on around them.
Mac Chapin: To what degree do conservationist arguments support the
Indians’ land claims? Specifically, since it is very difficult to get
support for Indigenous rights per se, you need to overlay conser
vationist arguments and say that the Indians are the best manag
ers of this land. For example, the EDF is an environmental
group, not a human rights organization as such. What would
happen if there were no environmental arguments?
SS: Naturally it depends on the context — which organizations,
when, and where? Clearly in this case, and elsewhere in Brazil,
Janet Sturgeon, Moderator, Yale F&ES:
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there has been a sea change in the approach taken by both inter
national and Brazilian environmental organizations. At present,
it is impossible to ignore the environmental logic of the defense
of Indigenous lands in Brazil. This is essentially summed up in
satellite images showing progressing deforestation. The Indians
are among the only actors out there who have the capability and
the legal mechanisms to stake a claim of that size where there is
any contest at all. That’s not to say that the Indians are ideal
managers, but that’s another issue.
Q: Was the decision to move back a consensus by the Panará, or did
it come about some other way? Also, during their 20 year exile,
did the government provide any kinds of services for them?
SS: Yes, it was pretty much a consensus decision. They wanted to
move back to their traditional land, an area that they felt is better
than the one they had been moved to. This has been their posi
tion to the government and to the other Indigenous groups in
the Xingú park.
At contact, in 1973, FUNAI set up a small area for them
that included a couple of Panará villages. At that time, FUNAI
was completely incapable of controlling the situation. Once road
construction began, there was an epidemic, health care was
sporadic, and no one could even speak with the Panará. It was
complete chaos. They decided arbitrarily that, to save the survi
vors, they would move them into the Park where there were
better services. In fact, by the standards of Brazilian Indigenous
areas, the Xingú Park has better medical care and education and
better access to trade goods. This helped the Panará to increase
from 69 survivors in 1977 to about 170 today.
Kasia Grisso, Yale School of Public Health: You mentioned earlier that the
Panará made allies among the other Indigenous groups in the
Xingú. How have their actions affected these groups and their
relations with them?
SS: Well, since the 1950s the Xingú park has existed as a substantial
Indigenous area. It was created when the region’s traditional
Upper Xingú culture was discovered. This included 7 or 8 groups
speaking languages from 4 major linguistic families but sharing a
common culture and living in peace. This impressed the Park
developers, who saw the region as the last best defense for the
Indigenous people. So these groups remain in the southern half
of the Park, and, in the north, the Park is inhabited by groups
that have been drawn in to protect them from the ravages of
development.
The Panará were the last to be brought in and were brought
in from the furthest away. When they arrived, in relation to the
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other groups in the Xingú, they were wild Indians: they had no
clothes, no white man’s goods, and they spoke no Portuguese. It
was a horrible experience. They had more women than men and
they spent their first two years there living in the villages of other
groups, including the Kayapo — their most ferocious traditional
enemies. Some of their women and children were appropriated
by other groups, so they were really on the verge of extinction.
Getting out from this and founding their own village was a very
important event. Since then, they have developed amicable but
ambivalent relationships with the other groups. Strategically, in
terms of this project, the key alliance has been with the Kayapo.
It is very interesting because these are exactly the people with
whom they have fought for most of this century. There is an
animosity, but also a kind of mutual respect. Both groups have a
strong warrior tradition, their languages are related, and they
recognize their cultural similarities. The Panará goals are strate
gically important for the Kayapo as well, since the Panará area
will protect the major headwaters for the Kayapo region.
To follow up, what about alliances with Brazilian groups?
Well, they’ve also been critical. When they decided that they
wanted to pursue indemnification and return, the Panará con
tacted individuals they knew. Among them was the former direc
tor of the Xingú Park, then the director of the Rainforest
Foundation’s Brazilian partner. She took them to the Nucleus
for Indigenous Rights, an Indian Law organization in Brasília,
which began analyzing their case and contacted the Ecumenical
Center for Documentation and Information. They also asked
after me, since I had lived there for a year and a half. Their gen
eral approach was to ask “Where are all the white people who
have been through our village and will support us?” They con
tacted everyone they could. The groups who ended up respond
ing were us (EDF), the NDICG, and the Fundação Mata Virgem,
as well as the FUNAI administrator of the Xingú Indigenous
Park, Megaron, who is a Kayapo and has been a fundamental
point of support. This has worked well. There has been a kind of
natural division of labor among the NGOs.
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Indigenous Politics and “Local Heritage” in the 1990s: Shifting Concepts
of Land Use, Land Tenure, and Self
Theodore Macdonald
Cultural Survival
ABSTRACT
The development of Indigenous political organizations in the Ecuadorian Amazon is illustrative of the state of affairs
throughout the region. The moral economy that had governed inter-ethnic relations until recently has given way to a
political economy in which Indigenous groups have come to understand the importance of defining the issues surround
ing their relations with government agencies. This has led to Indigenous initiatives in land management and territorial
demarcation, but also to an increasing focus on political activity rather than practical solutions that has made it difficult
for these projects to progress beyond planning and training. Nevertheless, it is too early to predict the outcome of these
developments, as they are ongoing.

INTRODUCTION
Over the past 20 years tenure regimes, land use and Indigenous
political strategies in the Amazon region have been changing radi
cally. This paper approaches the problem of what we mean by “local
heritage,” a term that suggests permanence, with a specific question:
Why do we now hear strong Indigenous demands for land and
natural resources, yet witness “development” projects, particularly
in forest management, the results of which suggest their inability to
manage or sustain either?
Lowland South America’s rain forest communities host a wealth
of Indigenous resource management projects, particularly forest
management. Yet few if any are thriving and several heavily sup
ported ones face economic crises and questionable social and bio
logical sustainability. Others have simply collapsed. Ironically, in
many project areas residents hold title to their land and understand
that tenure security often requires “land use” programs; so the risks
and incentives for sound management are in place.
Technical problems, in part, reflect inexperience and limited
administrative skills. However, forest management and similar
conservation projects also illustrate skillful use of national and inter
national environmental concerns to establish political alliances and
solicit economic support. Either observation suggests that some
social science “remedy” may lie in creating or tuning a management
machine, or exposing a hint of opportunism. Rather than rush to
resolve a “problem” which we identify, this paper illustrates that
much of the analysis still lies in defining a situation from the stand
point of local people.

 

 
TIME AND TENURE REGIMES
Several recent studies (e.g. Hardin 1968, 1977, Bromley 1992,
McCay and Acheson 1987, Peters 1994, IASCP 1995) open debate
on some common assumptions regarding land tenure, common
property use, sustainable resource management, and Indigenous
land use patterns. Some challenge the hypothesis that secure tenure
leads to improved land management and careful stewardship. Oth
ers reject sweeping generalizations that common property invites
mismanagement, environmental abuse and resource destruction.
Such broad tenure/use assumptions suggest that local concerns
with tenure claims and patterns of land/resource use are consistent
or permanent. However, any current picture is but a single frame
arrested during a period of rapid change in Indians’ relations with
broader national societies. For many native Amazonians the pan
orama extends beyond single family plots to include broad territo
rial and resource claims.
Indigenous peoples, particularly those involved in their recentlyestablished organizations, now understand their situation through
new forms of socio-political analysis. As these new “communities”
alter their debate with the dominant non-Indigenous society and
reconfigure their ethnic boundaries, land and resource rights have
become the principal themes for that discourse.
However, and critical to the initial question, the analysis is not
yet “operationalized” in terms of land and resource use. Tenure
regimes remain as political concerns, characterized more by regular
pushing, pulling, positioning and posturing than by clearly defined
management plans and production schedules. Most land use
projects serve largely as expressions of local control over land and
resources rather than as exercises in its management.
Meanwhile, outside observers evaluate land use programs
through objective but nonetheless static criteria and standards for
social and biological sustainability. Consequently, many resource
management initiatives, poorly understood by social scientists and
barely underway, have been proclaimed successes while their short
comings are either glossed over or denied. But, as several widelyknown projects now either totter precariously or have fallen, their
situations invite, perhaps require, analysis and evaluation from
current, dynamic Indigenous points of view.

Tenure regimes remain as political
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SHIFTING “ECONOMIES”
As with land and resource rights, changing concepts of “commu
nity” have produced new understandings of inter-ethnic relations
and the Indigenous situation in general. Previously, inter-ethnic

  

      
relations in the Upper Amazon were understood largely in terms of
a “moral economy” — a frame for ordering inter-ethnic relations,
related norms and patterns of reciprocity, including rights to land,
resources and the fruits of production (Scott 1976). Like any other,
these relations developed over time and gradually assumed a set of
norms which, though unbalanced and exploitative, served to guide
interaction. That “moral economy” has collapsed in all but a few
settings where missionaries or others provide essential goods and
services.
Many Indigenous people now interpret their status in terms of a
“political economy” — rules and practices resulting from systems of
production and distribution of wealth. This provides a set of tools
for understanding social and economic positions, and illustrates a
status which Indigenous people now regard as unacceptable. It also
identifies property which Indigenous peoples now claim or reclaim
— land, resources, and culture. But “working relationships” to
guide the use and distribution of resources remain to be defined
through negotiation and practice. Meanwhile, emerging patterns
draw from experiments with new, unfamiliar actors as well as reac
tions to the previous social order associated with a moral economy.
ECUADOR AS AN ILLUSTRATION
The Amazon Basin is a patchwork of cultures and communities.
Nevertheless, in terms of local Indigenous organizations, recent
political actions and community-based development issues, Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela share much in
common. Ecuador, in particular, stands out as an example of orga
nization, political actions, land use projects and international visibil
ity. A review of the changing concepts of land tenure, resource rights
and inter-ethnic relations there introduces issues common to the
region.
ECUADORIAN INCIDENTS
Six key events in the recent history of Indigenous interactions
with the national political process inform the present policies of
Amazonian Indigenous groups in Ecuador. These events illustrate
an ongoing effort to sieze the initiative in land tenure discourse that
in turn has moved Indigenous organizations onto the national po
litical stage.
In the 1970s a North American agronomist designed an inte
grated land use system for the fragile tropical forest ecosystem of
the Ecuadorian Amazon. He argued that his model would meet a
family’s subsistence and market economic needs in an ecologi-
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cally sustainable manner. When the scheme was presented to
national agrarian reform officials, land use specialists and repre
sentatives of Indigenous organizations, it drew nods of approval
from most. The Indigenous representatives rejected it sum
marily.
For them the project’s land-use technology was irrelevant;
they opposed the size of the model. It was designed for a 50
hectare plot, the standard holding awarded to colonists by the
government’s National Institute of Agrarian Reform and Coloni
zation (IERAC) without ever taking into consideration Indig
enous land claims.
Four years later the director of Ecuador’s National Forestry
Directorate enthusiastically invited local Indigenous participa
tion in conservation programs enabled by recent forestry legisla
tion. The Indians rejected the offer to accept members of the
Indian organizations as guards within protected forest lands.
They argued that their organizations should have taken part in
the formal meetings which determined the new rules, rather than
assisting in their subsequent implementation.

Supported by over 150 community
members, the Indians sequestered the
government officials for several days
until they finalized a broad agreement
— referred to as the Sarayacu Accords.

In 1988, the new government of President Rodrigo Borja selected
three close advisors who set aside three hours every Tuesday to
meet with representatives of the Indian organizations. Indian
attendance, however, was irregular and unenthusiastic.
Eight months later, three of the Indigenous leaders accompanied
one member of the advisory committee and the Assistant Direc
tor of IERAC to a small jungle Indian village, Sarayacu, to nego
tiate a dispute between that community and encroaching oil
exploration teams. Supported by over 150 community members,
the Indians sequestered the government officials for several days
until they finalized a broad agreement — referred to as the
Sarayacu Accords — which focused on land rights, resource
control, bilingual education and development programs. Ironi
cally, these were the same issues which made up the agenda for
the sparsely attended government meetings.
By the early 1990s Indian organizations were introducing claims
for large Indian territories. In June 1990, government failure to
follow through with these agreements helped spark a national
non-violent movement, the Levantamiento Generál, and in late
1992 produced a long Indigenous march from the Upper Ama-

  

      
zonian town of Puyo to the national capital, Quito. The protests
produced a presidential declaration recognizing their claims and
promising titles. Similar political actions and subsequent presi
dential decrees occurred in Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and
Bolivia during roughly the same period.
These organizations, beginning largely in the mid-to late-1980s,
then began to solicit and receive funds for community-based
land use and resource management programs.
These incidents and activities highlight the ongoing evolution of
a broad new social phenomenon — Indian organizations — which
pervades much of South America’s political arena and challenges the
previously clear lines of difference, subordination, public deference,
and related norms and patterns of reciprocity. That transition took
place in two distinct phases, each of which is marked by a different
understanding of the relationships between Indigenous groups and
other entities. Here we briefly review that transition.
PERIOD ONE
Development of a “Moral Economy:” Patron-Client Relations in
the Ecuadorian Amazon
Community Land and Resources
For many Indigenous groups the Ecuadorian Amazon’s physical
space was divided into a patchwork of kin-based settlements with
borders defined by human use and reinforced by spirit beings. Until
the late 19th Century, this space was violated only by sporadic trav
ellers, government officials and missionaries. The few permanent
mission sites and government settlements were small and the resi
dents rarely ventured onto Indigenous lands. Inter-ethnic relations
had little impact on the Indigenous social and economic life or the
land and resources needed to sustain it (Macdonald 1979,
Muratorio 1991, Whitten 1981).
As demand for the Amazon’s rubber increased in the late 19th
century, merchants travelled up and down every tributary of the
Upper Amazon in search of rubber trees and Indians to tap and
drain them. As these merchants settled into the Upper Amazon, they
altered inter-ethnic relations through regular and intimate contact
with the Indigenous population. The merchants became the princi
pal suppliers of manufactured goods and, in turn, the recipients of
most raw materials. They also became vital intermediaries between
Indians and local and national authorities. Without any pretense of

 

 
social or economic equity by either group, inter-ethnic relations
were guided by clear but informal norms, mutual obligations and
rules of reciprocity.
Impact on Economics and Settlement Patterns
In the Upper Amazon, labor performed for these merchants/
patrons did not radically alter the Indigenous life style. Neither the
nature of the work nor the hours spent performing it demanded
drastic reallocation of time and energy. Nor did this labor force a
restructuring of the residence pattern; much of it was performed
within the settlement or during periods of temporary residence
elsewhere. Existing concepts of territoriality were easily extended to
establish areas for gathering gold and rubber. In addition, labor
extended to the patron did not radically alter existing subsistence
schedules or other aspects of resource and time allocation. In brief,
the norms and rules of reciprocity which generated a moral
economy required only minor shifts in time allocation to meet the
demands imposed by the patron. A new inter-ethnic order was
established but the social and economic patterns which had gener
ated much of the existing Indigenous social order remained largely
unmodified and subsistence patterns remained intact.

For Indians, personalized inter-ethnic
bonds diminished or disappeared as
relationships shifted to impersonal
private enterprises, state bureaucra
cies and communities of colonists, all
of whom threatened the previously se
cure rights to land and resources.

PERIOD TWO
Interpretation Through Political Economy
Beginning in the 1960s, colonization changed the lives and ex
pectations of Indigenous peoples in Ecuador and other parts of the
Upper Amazon. Colonists effectively ruptured the moral economy
and signaled a qualitative shift in inter-ethnic relations. Previously,
outside interests depended on the region’s inhabitants, either as
souls for religious conversion or as sources of cheap labor. Colo
nists, however, generally regarded Indian communities as obstacles
to their expansion. They were more concerned with displacing
occupants than negotiating relationships with them. For Indians,
personalized inter-ethnic bonds diminished or disappeared as rela
tionships shifted to impersonal private enterprises, state bureaucra
cies and communities of colonists, all of whom threatened the
previously secure rights to land and resources. They began to redraw
their maps of ethnic boundaries and reinterpret the nature of interethnic relations. They also began to organize, challenging the new
powers and opening political space for themselves.

  

      
Ethnic Federations
Initiated in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Indigenous organizations,
or “ethnic federations” (Smith 1983), have now established them
selves throughout the Amazon basin. They have organized into local
and regional federations, national pan-ethnic units, and, most re
cently, international organizations (Cultural Survival Quarterly
1984; Smith 1984). Most federations maintain three primary con
cerns: 1) defense of land and resources; 2) expansion and strength
ening of their organizations; and 3) maintenance of their unique
ethnic identity. Today, ethnic federations are recognized social and
political forces, and have thus created niches for themselves within
plural national societies. Recently, there have been efforts to incor
porate them as the logical institutional link for work with develop
ment and environmental agencies (Wali and Davis 1992;
Inter-American Development Bank 1993; Macdonald 1994). By the
early 1980s, to an extent greater than in any other Latin American
country, Ecuador’s Indian response to colonization and other exter
nal threats to their land and resources was the mobilization of a new
national political sector.
Ecuadorian Ethnic Federations and
Government Programs
1980-1984 The Roldos/Hurtado Administration: From Opposing
Colonization to Promoting Land Rights
As a challenge to the national agrarian reform agency (IERAC)
and a demonstration of their perceived land rights, several Ecuador
ian federations formed a regional Amazonian group, the Confedera
tion of Indigenous Nations of the Ecuadorian Amazon,
CONFENIAE. Their 1982 congress declared that IERAC should
recognize and title land along traditional boundaries, acknowledging
and formalizing an existing order rather than dividing territory as if
it were state property.
In 1981 the Ecuadorian congress passed a set of forestry laws —
the Ley Forestál y de Conservación de Areas Naturales y Vida Silvestre.
These laws established forest management as a national priority and
encouraged the development of forestry programs by exempting
from agrarian reform all protective forests, lands in permanent use
for forest resources, and those with established plans for reforesta
tion. Formally at least, this put forestry and conservation programs
on a par with more environmentally destructive programs such as
cattle raising, and thus encouraged programs like community for
estry.
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But, as illustrated by the incident mentioned earlier, Indian
organizations regarded the legislation as yet another government
effort to exercise control over their land and resources without
consulting with them. Rather than focusing on ways to benefit from
the laws, the organizations were more concerned with how the laws
were drafted and promulgated.
1984-1988 León Febres Cordero:
Political Opposition and Indian Territories
Beginning in 1984, government leaders under a strongly neoLiberal government led by President León Febres Cordero advocated
unrestrained economic activities for the private sector, encouraged
colonization in the Amazonian region and publicly opposed popular
organizations. IERAC halted all communal land titling, yet
government-awarded concessions for African Palm plantations
increased and expanded rapidly, often on Indian lands. By 1985
these tactics provoked outcries from the regional and national In
dian organizations (Amanecer Indio 1985) and in broadly circulated
public documents and publications (CONFENIAE 1985; Carrion
and Cuvi 1985).
The León government produced an atmosphere in which popu
lar actions were treated as a threat to the state, and were met by the
unprecedented presence of heavily equipped and highly visible
police and sharp government statements. Most NGOs and other
groups remained quiet out of fear that some form of government
violence would be visited on the relatively peaceful country. By
contrast, CONFENIAE’s position became even more militant. Mov
ing deftly within a delicate political atmosphere, the Indian organi
zations continued to hold public meetings and maintained a
relatively high public profile.
At their 1986 Congress CONFENIAE again focused on land
titling, tenure regimes, and resource management. But, rather then
continue to ask IERAC to title Indigenous lands, CONFENIAE
resolved to oppose any further colonization, to seek an end to titling
of colonist and agro-industry lands and, more importantly, to
staunchly defend the area’s increasing movement towards “self
demarcation” (auto-lideración). In addition, and as a potential
stimulus to future community-based forestry, the Indian organiza
tions stated that they would take charge of any development pro
grams within the communities.

  

      
From Political Organization to Resource Management:
The “Era of the Projects”
Until the late 1980s, the federations had focused on institution
building at the local, regional and national levels. But many of the
communities began to challenge the organizations, some for per
sonal or petty political reasons and others because they questioned
the exclusive focus on organization.
At the same time a growing national and international environ
mental movement took an intense interest in the rainforests of the
Amazon. National and international cries to save rain forests were
accompanied by a significant increase in international funds avail
able for local projects. Indian groups received funds from a variety
of sources and frequently referred to the shift as the “era of the
projects.” In late 1987 one of CONFENIAE’s members, the Federa
tion of Indigenous Organizations of Napo (FOIN) began the
country’s first Indigenous effort to link land tenure to claims of
sustainable land use.
The project’s immediate spur appeared following a March 1987
earthquake which swept away a sector of the only road which con
nected the northern Amazon with the capital, Quito. The govern
ment quickly cut a new road through relatively unmodified tropical
forest dotted with Indian communities suddenly exposed to colonist
invasion.
Scattered Indian households quickly cleared forest frontage to
demonstrate their presence along the road. This small demonstra
tion effort soon escalated to extensive logging as individual purchas
ers and wood product companies bought up any logs and sawn
lumber visible from the roadside, and then maneuvered to obtain
timbering concessions for additional cutting in the communities.
The offers led to internal disputes in several communities as Indians
maneuvered against each other to get the cash from lumber sales, in
spite of ridiculously low prices.
FOIN’s directors recognized that the prices were unacceptable
and that extensive logging threatened these communities’ future
resource base. They argued that a resource management project
would generate income and provide security for the future. This also
gave FOIN an opportunity to provide the services associated with
this management and requested by its affiliates. In March 1988, they
began the first phase — research and planning. Nevertheless, while
motivation was sufficient to start the work, it was not enough to
institutionalize a long-term technical and administrative program.
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Expanding “Auto-Lideración”:
From Individual Communities to Ethnic Territories
Beginning in 1988, several Quichua federations shifted their
attention to demarcating Huaorani Indian territory and began to
physically cut lines in the forest for a 600 km perimeter which used
Huaorani territory as one edge of a series of adjacent ethnic territo
ries. The initiative shifted the Indigenous position from one of
securing community borders to defining a larger unit over which
they claimed a set of rights.
The immediate, expressed concern was simply recognition that
rights existed and could serve as a basis for future discussions over
resources such as oil, minerals, and forests. This was a quantum leap
in their perception of the state. They no longer focused on demon
strating possession through use; such arguments assumed that the
State had the right to place conditions on Indian lands. Resource
management projects, therefore, no longer carried the same weight.

Staff enthusiasm diminished and sev
eral members began to treat their in
cipient professionalism simply as a
means to regular paid employment.

Kuna Technical Assistance
In early 1989, training in general resource management planning
and conservation of fragile lands began with support from Panama’s
Kuna Indians, who were among the best trained in the hemisphere.
FOIN invited two Indigenous staff members from the Kuna’s
Project PEMASKY to train the staff of their project (Project
PUMAREN) in the general procedures of conservation and resource
planning.
The team continued its work, but it was unproductive in several
ways — project funds were frequently diverted or withheld, work
schedules were irregular, and travel funds for work within the com
munities were not disbursed. Consequently, the communities, aware
that some sort of federation-run project was underway, were either
uncertain of its work or questioned its utility. Moreover, staff enthu
siasm diminished and several members began to treat their incipient
professionalism simply as a means to regular paid employment. In
brief, the organization’s lack of support did little to enhance the pro
ject’s status among the technicians, the trainers or the communities.
Forest Management — Lessons from the Palcazu
After initial training the team focused on production systems.
They sought and obtained training in natural forest management
from members of the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative of Peru’s
Palcazu Valley. In January 1991, technicians travelled from Peru to
identify forest lands where natural forest management would be
most appropriate. Surveys indicated that no individual community

  

      
had sufficient forest to support a single-community-based forestry
enterprise. Accordingly, several communities formed a coordinating
committee to parallel the FOIN team, but they soon sought to un
dertake the work independently. They did not see much value in the
technical team and also began to question the idea of “common forest
property.” So community members redesigned the so-called “com
munity forest” by mapping the land into single family-owned plots.
Meanwhile, the federation’s enthusiasm shifted further toward
the politics of positioning. At present a variety of activities are still
underway in the area, but progress is slow. Local and international
NGOs seek alternative international markets for PUMAREN prod
ucts and the project staff, as well as the communities, have received
support and advice from several experienced and enthusiastic tech
nicians who have worked with the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative.
Nevertheless, there has been a progressive loss of interest on the part
of the federation and an increasing sense of cynicism on the part of
the communities.
CONCLUSION
Drawing heavily from observations on a specific country and
project, this brief paper nonetheless suggests a regional pattern.
After a burst of enthusiasm, as the community-forestry project
moved to the details of project planning and implementation, the
presence and support of the federation’s leadership diminished and
focused on national and regional political activities.
However, now is not the time to pass judgement on the organi
zations or to suggest that community-based forest management is
impossible under any circumstances. Difficulties arose when the
federations tried to balance their political priorities with the detailed
technical and administrative work needed to design and implement
resource management projects at a community level.
It would be heartening to suggest that the two needs can be
realized at the same time, but, at the moment, this is simply not the
case in the Upper Napo. Moreover, reports of project work in other
areas indicate that few have advanced beyond planning and training.
Similar situations mark most Indigenous resource management
projects, including those using sophisticated electronic and similar
technology, as illustrated in the Winter 1995 Cultural Survival
Quarterly (Geomatics: Who Needs It?). Most projects are still demar
cating or planning future work. Few have become effective produc
tion units or successful enterprises.
Planning and training are essential phases of all projects. But, to
suggest that such a broad range of local projects now find them
selves at the same stage of project development simply by coincidence
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pushes the limits of credibility. The similarities suggest and support
the initial observation: though Indigenous organizations now evalu
ate their situation skillfully through a broad political economic
frame, the organizations and communities have not yet moved to
operationalize that understanding. That is not to suggest that they
cannot or will not, but simply that they have not at present. Despite
the desires of international observers, support groups, and local
communities for rapid advances to resource management, they do
not appear imminent.
Though potentially discouraging, the present situation is not
cause for despair. The changes in status and role which have come
about in many Indigenous communities since the appearance of
local organizations illustrates some of the most successful and non
violent social change in the hemisphere, if not in the world. These
efforts should be recognized and applauded for what they are and
where they have taken Indigenous peoples, not elevated falsely or
denigrated prematurely for what they are not.
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Theodore Macdonald Working Group
The tensions in Ecuador today are generated from issues regard
ing the relations of Indigenous peoples with the government, inter
national aid agencies (NRDC, USAID, etc), international resource
corporations (Conoco, timber interests, and so on), advocacy
groups charged with protecting or arguing for their interests, and
with other Indigenous groups.
The political structure is of primary importance in this discus
sion. The government is unwilling to treat the Indigenous organiza
tions as equals, since this would justify the Indigenous peoples’
claims to land tenure. Also, there is a question as to who is empow
ered to govern funds received in the form of endowments for re
source extractions. The gift economy is also problematic because
money and material benefits are provided to appease the groups
rather than providing these benefits with a defined, measurable
challenge to put them to a certain use.
One of the challenges that groups like Cultural Survival must
face is developing negotiation skills within the Indigenous commu
nities. There is little doubt that conflict and disagreement will con
tinue. As a result, the only way to avoid bloodshed is to empower
the Indigenous peoples with the negotiating skills necessary to
achieve their goals, instead of using international aid groups as
“translators” of the needs of the community. The image of the large,
powerful, wealthy foreign entities arriving to save the small and
helpless native Quichua Indian is simply no longer an adequate or
justified perspective.
There is a commonly held belief that the Indians will destroy
their lands if they are not provided tenure, but the reality presents a
much different picture. They do not want to build or cultivate their
lands simply to gain the “legal” right to it. Management plans may
be useful, but they must come from the Indigenous parties. The
Indians have excellent ideas, but due to overenthusiastic foreign
involvement, a lack of a negotiating framework or background, and
a political system that is slow to accept this potentially threatening
entity, they have been unable to articulate these ideas.
The discussion commenced with a question regarding the
Conoco - Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) negotiations
in Ecuador, in which the NRDC represented Indigenous groups who
would be affected by Conoco oil exploration. Negotiations became
very complex and costly, and Conoco eventually withdrew. This case
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For more information about the ConocoNRDC negotiations, interested readers are
referred to articles in the September 27,
1993 and May 2, 1994 New Yorker, as well as
letters in the August 25, 1993 New Yorker.

  

      
was presented as a model of the inability of those concerned to listen
to or allow the Indians to speak for themselves and, instead, impose
what is believed to be best for them by outside groups.
The following excerpts are highlights from the discussion:
I’m interested in learning more
about what is generating the current tensions between local
organizations and community members who don’t see these
organizations as benefiting them.
Ted Macdonald: It’s a Pandora’s box. There is no community with a
singular focus, in which everyone is always in total agreement.
This would really be the subject of a whole other seminar.
There was an earthquake in March of 1987 that destroyed the
road between the oil fields and the capital. So, very quickly the
Ecuadorian government cut a road through what was virgin
forest, an area containing about 40 Indigenous communities.
They did this with the support of USAID under some very
strange circumstances — the government had been claiming that
everyone in the region was literally starving to death because
supplies had been cut off. Of course, the road had only been
built a few years before, and supplies were continuing to be
transported by river, as they had been for several thousand years.
USAID’s modest contribution enabled us to work with the
communities. Because the road had been opened, the Indian
organization realized, there would be an influx of colonists into
the area. What this organization was very good at was alerting
the local people to this, which was something they had not real
ized. Essentially what people did was build a shack and clear
some forest to plant corn along the road to demonstrate their
presence. Loggers began to come through, buying trees for about
75 cents apiece. Though a small amount, it was a source of
money where there had been none. So, the people were being
encouraged to deforest, and the leadership of the organization at
that point asked us to bring in the technical assistance that
would help develop a natural forest management and conserva
tion program.
When the government changed six months later, and the new
regime eased the aggressive colonization policy and agreed to
recognize Indian organizations, interest in the project dropped
off, because it had been seen primarily as a challenge to the old
government, as a way to demonstrate control over land and
resources. Even so, there was still tension within the communities.
There were people who wanted to continue selling wood, while
others were more concerned about tenure. The communities
Emily Harwell, Moderator, Yale F&ES:
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began to fight among themselves and to question these organiza
tions, which were functioning in the political arena and travelling to Quito and Washington and so on. There was a certain
amount of jealousy, and there had been no tangible results. So
one of the goals of our work was to provide the long-term tech
nical team that could actually provide services to these commu
nities, separate from the political maneuvering.
There was still a lot of tension. The earlier government had
divided many communities by promoting alternative, funded
organizations, and by giving gifts to communities. Schoolhouses
and the like, while not necessarily addressing the political goals
of the communities, were at least tangible benefits.
There continue to be significant disputes between local orga
nizations and the members of the communities. These organiza
tions are, in fact, democratic grassroots representation, yet there
remain tensions. Our strategy has been to deal with these federa
tions so as to come up with regional strategies, rather than work
ing simply with individual communities, which had been the
pattern as far back as the 1950s. In practice this is difficult and
somewhat frustrating.
Nevertheless, the political gains made by these organizations
are real and are very significant. They do represent the commu
nities, and they are quite strong.
Celia Nyamweru, Anthropology, St Lawrence University: I have two questions.
The first concerns the role of oil companies in the region, as
described in Joe Kane’s article. I would like to know what your
take on that article is because it seems that the international oil
companies are going to move into the region no matter what.
My second question is more general — to what extent do you
think the Indigenous posture, i.e., that they own the land and
that they can do with it what they wish, regardless of any con
cerns of sustainability, has been stated as an overt agenda, and
what will groups like Cultural Survival do in response to this?
TM: The Indigenous groups do claim the right to manage their lands
as they please, but no, they do not say that they will destroy the
land. This idea is part of a political game, and you need to ask
who is saying this. You need to remember that there is a signifi
cant gap between Indigenous communities and the self-pro
claimed “environmental” community, as Janis pointed out last
night.
As for Conoco, we felt that they were the one company in the
world (Chevron is now talking about it in Papua New Guinea)
that was willing to talk to Indian and environmental organiza
tions and to meet mutually agreed-upon standards. We met with

  

      
them, and they said they had a commitment to this approach,
and were ready to negotiate with Indigenous groups. They asked
us to facilitate the process, but we declined — we said that first
we should check in with the organizations. I think that Conoco
was prepared to get involved in making endowments to the
communities and so on, but they got scared away when the
negotiation process started to look like it would be messy, with
certain other environmental groups opposed to the whole idea.
Another company got the concession an hour after Conoco
withdrew, and they’re doing everything the wrong way. I think
the article was way too simplistic, because it’s not just a question
of big, bad oil companies versus innocent natives.
CN: Would the Ecuadorian government allow direct negotiation
between the Indigenous people and the corporations and Indig
enous administration of any endowments that come out of such
negotiations?
TM: My sense is that there was enough international leverage to have
pushed the government to accept some arrangement of this sort
— an international body that would administer the endowment.
Everyone could have benefited from this arrangement — the
humane oil company, the pioneering government, and of course
the Indigenous groups. I think that this is a tragic lost opportu
nity.
Julie Greenberg, Yale F&ES: It’s clear that you think that the allegations
made by Joe Kane are too strong, but could the NRDC have
taken better steps to find out what the Indians wanted?
TM: The biggest single problem was that they tried to move too fast.
They were being pressured by Conoco to come up with an envi
ronmental plan. They should not have agreed to fit into this time
frame for someone else’s advantage. They needed more time to
be able to talk with the communities and to reach a consensus.
Andrea Esser, Clark University: What groups does Cultural Survival talk to
in developing strategies to help these people? Specifically, what
are the gender, class, etc., patterns developed from interviewer to
interviewer? For example, I know of one case in which a male
interviewer spoke with only male group members, yet used this
sample as representative of the whole.
TM: Yes, this is a huge problem, and it is often based on assumptions
that are simply not true, such as that only men engage in for
estry. It is a serious problem that cannot be solved by any for
mula. This is where anthropology comes in — you need to
elucidate the nature of the order in the community so as to be
able to know if what you are hearing is representative of the
community or not. For any project, you can find somebody in
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the community who is interested in it, but does that make them
representative? This is why projects that are initiated by a com
munity usually get more long-term support from the commu
nity. Gift-like projects that come down out of the heavens often
don’t work very well because they don’t fit into the standard
norms of reciprocity. It’s someone else’s idea, so there’s not a lot
of interest in getting it done. There is a discontinuity between
what is given and what is expected, and many communities are
based on reciprocity. It goes back to the larger question of how
one deals with a community. It is not sufficient to dump money
on the people, you need to be seen as working for them.
Michael W. Finkbeiner, Land Surveyor: How does the situation in Bolivia
compare to that of Ecuador?
TM: Both countries have similar political structures. I have been
speaking only of the Amazonian peoples, not those Indigenous
people in the highlands. Ecuadorian Indigenous groups have
copied the structure of Bolivian groups — the issues of land,
natural resources, and dignity. At present, Bolivia has no incen
tives in place to protect the forest, so, economically speaking, it is
better to cut them down, and the Indigenous groups are having a
rough time.
Henry Kernan, Forestry Consultant: Do Ecuadorian citizens still have the
right to clear land and cut timber on public lands?
TM: Yes, but those lands are being increasingly regulated, and the
right applies only to unoccupied lands (tierras valdeas), which
usually are also Indigenous territories. This is where demarcation
and extractive reserves and so on demonstrate use on lands that
do not appear to be “used” in the sense encoded in these laws.
John Bela, University of Massachusetts: How successful are local Ecuador
ian groups compared to the larger environmental organizations?
What impact is David Neal and his environmental group having?
TM: David Neal, of the Missouri Botanical Gardens, is a salvage bota
nist, going ahead of the bulldozers, climbing trees and gathering
data prior to destruction. He is a bit naïve and has been criticized
for being too cooperative with the corporations who are mining
the areas. We have cautioned him about this but, on the other
hand, he sees this as an opportunity that he can’t turn down
because the areas will be lost regardless.
As for the other part of your question, the answer is that it is
mixed. Some environmental groups ally with local organizations
to help in management, while some have clear political agendas.
Leftist alliances, for example, try to construct a permanent oppo
sition to the government through the local Indigenous groups.
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The Experience of the Alto Juruá Extractive Reserve with Vegetal Leather:
Engaging Forest Product Markets for the Survival of Ecosystems and Cultures
Chico Ginú
Associação Alto Juruá
ABSTRACT
The Alto Juruá Extractive Reserve, in western Amazonia, is beginning to produce vegetal leather, a value-added rubber
product used in the manufacture of shoes. The production of vegetal leather allows the people of the reserve to make a
better living from forest products than is possible through extraction alone. Additionally, because the management of
this project is local, production of vegetal leather allows the people of the reserve to work in dignity. In turn, this
strengthens regional efforts for the conservation of forested areas.

I’d first like to say good afternoon to all of you, and to thank you
for inviting me here, to be here among you for the first time.
I don’t have any slides to show you, but I do have my experience
— my computer is my head. I will first describe our experience with
vegetal leather in a few words.
The economic crisis in Brazil over the last few years has had a
great effect on the traditional peoples of the forest, rubber tappers,
and Indigenous workers, and has put their lives into a delicate bal
ance.
VEGETAL LEATHER
The idea of producing vegetal leather came from the rubber
tappers themselves, partly in reaction to the crisis we have been
suffering in Brazil from the fall in the price of rubber. We had to
search for an alternative — a way to produce rubber products rather
than just sell the rubber itself. Vegetal leather is produced by coating
cloth with raw rubber and then smoking it to make a durable, water
proof material. This technology had been used for years by rubber
tappers to make waterproof bags out of old sugar sacks.
The proposal to develop vegetal leather was sent to Ecomercado
in Rio de Janeiro and to Déjà Shoe. It came from rubber tappers in
Boca do Acre who had started an experiment working with vegetal
leather. So far it has been a very positive experiment — here I have a
pair of Déjà Shoes made with vegetal leather from our area.
In the Alto Juruá Extractive Reserve (AJER) we began experi
menting with producing vegetal leather last year. We produce the
best — 96% of our product is of high quality, suitable for use in
shoes.
Next to the extractive reserve there are two Indigenous communi
ties — the Yawanawá and the Cashanawá — who are also producing

  

      
and testing vegetal leather experimentally. It appears to be a viable
response to the economic situation that the Indigenous people and
the rubber tappers are facing today.
Why are we concerned about producing products from extrac
tive activities? We are concerned because we are trying to improve
the lives of the people who make their living from these products.
We see vegetal leather as one of the real economic alternatives to the
situation we face today in the Amazon, because this product is of
very high quality.
With rubber there is a market problem — there isn’t one. Veg
etal leather is an alternative that creates a market. However, we still
face the same problem in that the production of vegetal leather does
not guarantee a market for the rubber produced by the four differ
ent communities involved in this project. It is simply not yet enough
to fulfill the needs of these communities.
We are just now in the beginning of this experiment, but our
vision for the future, and the vision of the social movements with
whom we work, is that we will produce not just the vegetal leather,
but also the finished product — the shoes. However, in order to do
this we need, first, to establish a market.
I’d like to stop soon so I can leave time for questions, but first,
I’d like to mention our relationship with and the work we have been
doing with the Indigenous communities. We have been working
with them for many years, and I would like to tell you about some of
the concerns we have.
CONSERVATION AND PEOPLE
One thing that I have heard about often, in Brazil and in my
travels, is that everyone is always talking about biodiversity and
conserving biodiversity — fighting to save the green and to keep the
forest standing. However, what we need to start talking about is the
life of the people who live in the forest.
Unless we can support the people who live in the forest, by help
ing them with education and health care, for example — unless we
give the people who live within the forest a way of living there —
then the forest will not continue to exist. Even today we have heard
people asking “what will become of the Indigenous and traditional
people of the forest?” I say that they will not lose their traditions if
we are able to support them. If we are able to support them in these
traditions, then we will preserve the green — we will keep the forest.
If we speak only of preserving the forest without helping the people,
then, as we speak, it will burn.
We can also see that if there was not this resistance, this struggle,
on behalf of the Indigenous and traditional people of the forest,
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there would not be the forest biodiversity that we still see today in
the Amazon.
Talking about conservation and preservation of the forest is very
interesting, but we must actually work to support the people who
live in the forest, and help them to continue living in the forest, but
with a better quality of life. If we do not do this, then the forest will
die. Unless they have some way of living in the forest, the people of
the forest will have to turn to cutting wood, commercializing game,
or working for ranchers. In the past, Indigenous people and rubber
tappers often worked for landowners for years and, at the end, had
nothing to show for it but a gift.
Though some Indigenous people have lost their cultures, this is
not because they wanted to lose them, but because they have been
forced into it by outside forces. For example, in the 1940s, and more
recently, during the military dictatorship, people were sent into the
forest to kill Indigenous people. I think it’s very sad when you have
people killing other people, and Indigenous people are human be
ings as well, after all. This is a tragic situation and we have to re
member that losses of culture have been forced on these people by
outside forces.
I would like to speak less to allow more time for questions about
our experience in running an extractive reserve. I am entirely at your
disposal for the next two days — which really is not enough to de
scribe my 17 years spent working in this area.
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QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q:
Does the independent production of vegetal leather further
the tension between the producers and local cattle ranchers?
CG:
The violence in these areas has decreased, in fact, because
vegetal leather is being produced from areas inside Indigenous
and extractive reserves. These reserves were already demar
cated by the government, so production there does not affect
relations with the ranchers. The economic situation in Brazil
is such that it does not affect only forest workers — it also
affects the ranchers who are living off their land. Nevertheless,
the violence in our area has diminished, partly due to pressure
from within our communities as well as from outside. For
that, I would like to thank those of you from outside of Brazil
who exerted this pressure to stop the violence in my area.
Q:
To what extent has the market for vegetal leather and other
products reached beyond green consumers? Is there a market
in Brazil — do consumers in Brazil see this as a product out
of their own forest?

  

      
CG:

Right now we’re really still in an experimental phase, so the
product does not yet have a large market. We hope that in the
future we will be able to reach a larger market both in Brazil
and internationally.

C HICO G INÚ
Mr. Ginú is a rubber tapper from the Alto Juruá river in the state of Acre, northwest of the Amazon. He was recently
elected president of the Alto Juruá Extractive Reserve (AJER) dwellers association. Despite strong local opposition from
rubber barons and cattle ranchers, AJER has fulfilled all the legal requirements necessary for rights to use the land. They
have organized a cooperative, the Associação Alto Juruá, and encourage active community participation.

 

 

Chico Ginú Working Group
The discussion focussed on the events leading up to the forma
tion of the Alto Juruá Extractive Reserve, and covered some of the
conceptual details of administering an extractive reserve.
The importance of adding value to
forest products and the importance of catering to the green
market is always mentioned. However, Sharon Flynn from CI
said that the green market is not a reality, that people are not
really willing to pay more for green products. What does the
Rubber Tappers Association think about it? What is the best way
to deal with this type of green product — one that claims it will
help the rainforest? Might this green market be just a passing fad
and might it not be better to study the real market?
Chico Ginú: This problem is one that we have always had: dependency
on outside forces. That is why we are doing this experiment right
now with vegetal leather. This is an experimental process that
came from us. The idea is to create a direct link between the
community and the market. We are trying to link the commu
nity directly to the market, because if we have an intermediary it
is always the producer that ends up losing. So, in our work with
Déjà Shoe we are very thankful for this project we are doing with
them, but we have no intention of staying only with them. We
have to go beyond and look for other markets. Vegetal leather is
a new process, and we are also looking for other new products
from nature. We know that alternative products exist in the
forest, but we need more study and research to identify them.
Peter Wilshusen, moderator, Yale F&ES: I would like to know if dealing
with the market and the influx of income from this new product
is causing any adverse impact in the community.
CG: Well, the real problem is always the fact that we do not have
money. So, to deal with this new source, we have a sector which
works with finances to administer the money.
PW: I asked this question because I know of many organizations that
began with no money and experienced problems when outside
money began to come in. Still, it appears that AJER is more
organized than these groups, and might be better able to cope
with this situation.
CG: We hope that in the future we will develop our own projects.
Right now we need outside help, and contributions are welcome,
but in the future we want to do things on our own, because
ultimately, we do not want to be dependent on outsiders.
Beto Borges, Rainforest Action Network:
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Does your organization have any connection
with the government, local or regional?
CG: The extractive reserve is in a federal area, and sometimes we get
some support from the regional and local governments, but the
main connection is that the federal government demarcated the
area.
Steve Schwartzman, Environmental Defense Fund: Could you explain the
history, the process, and difficulties in forming a concession and
developing a management plan?
CG: The extractive reserve started as a resistance movement by the
rural workers’ unions. In 1978, when the first union offices were
founded in the seringais — the rubber producing states — there
was a lot of pressure because this was something very new and
many people did not know what to think about it. Most of the
land was owned by large ranchers and seringalistas (rubber
barons), and the rubber tappers had no rights, not even the right
to set their own prices for the products they made. You men
tioned that 70% of the land in Brazil is owned by 1% of the
people, but in our region, 100% of the land is owned by them, so
there was considerable pressure exerted against the unions.
Rubber tappers live isolated in the jungle, without access to
education or health services. Often, for example, if tappers sold
rubber to someone other than the rubber baron, the land owner
would bring in the police to beat or kill the workers.
So, we started to become more organized, and we based our
organization on the Estatuto da Terra — a 1964 law stating that a
person could lay claim to land for himself if he or she lived
peacefully and uncontested on it for a period of time. This was
an old law, one that was never enforced, so part of our struggle
was to use the legal system to make sure that the statute would
be respected. In 1985 we had the first national meeting of rubber
tappers and since then, our movement has been growing and
growing.
So, the Conselho Nacional dos Seringueiros (CNS, the National
Council of Rubber Tappers) came from the union movement
and we tried to have more power in the national and interna
tional arena. The major fight of the CNS was the creation of the
extractive reserves, which is related to agrarian reform for the
rubber tappers. In 1989 we had the second meeting of the CNS
and we created a Board of Directors for the Council, because
before we had only members. After this second meeting we
started to move ahead — towards creating the extractive re
serves. The purpose of the extractive reserve was the expropria
tion of land from rubber patrons. The land would become
Austin Troy, Yale F&ES:
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owned by the federal government but the rubber tappers would
have the right to live on and to use the land.
In the first proposal for the creation of an extractive reserve,
we had support from the Minister of Justice and the Attorney
General, and we were able to create the first Extractive Reserve,
the Juruá, and launch the movement.
Another thing that helped our movement was the death of
Chico Mendes, because it created national and international
pressure. Thereafter, the Brazilian government started to expro
priate land to create the extractive reserves. But then things
stalled, and for two years the extractive reserves existed only on
paper.
Eventually, we had to pressure the government to implement
the decree, so that the reserves could become a reality. In 1991
we had two general meetings with all the people in the commu
nities and with technical support from professors and anthro
pologists. There, we discussed a plan for the use of the reserve.
Then we submitted our land use proposal to the IBAMA, the
Brazilian environmental agency which would have the responsi
bility of administering extractive reserves. IBAMA analyzed our
plan and made comments, and we spent 6-8 months in this
review process. The proposal kept coming and going with cor
rections and changes, and in the end, the final changes were
completed last October 7.
Now we are using this plan and soon, by next April or May,
we will receive the formal concession that will give us legal rights.
So, for example, in the same way that the Congress makes laws
under the Constitution, in the same sense we created the laws for
the extractive reserves, and these laws are going to be observed
by the people who live there. This land use plan encompasses
everything — fishing, hunting, extraction of forest products, and
everything else. This document regulates the use of the reserve.
Next May we will get the legal document that states that the land
is owned by the government, but that we, the rubber tappers,
have the right to live and work there for the rest of our lives —
we just cannot sell it.
Andi Eicher, Yale F&ES: If someone in the community breaks the rules,
for example, tries to sell or clear land, how will you deal with it?
CG: Well, the government will not hire a bureaucrat to monitor land
use in the reserve — they do not like to live in the forest. When
we created the extractive reserve we became a legal entity with
autonomy, so we can have our own rules. We created a Board of
Directors that is elected by the people of the community, and we
have people from the communities being trained by IBAMA to
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be monitors of land use. These people are responsible for moni
toring the land and, if infractions happen, they will inform the
Board of Directors.
The incident will be discussed by the Board, and if they find
that our community laws have been broken, people will be pe
nalized for breaking them. However, this will not be done in a
violent form.
I have two examples of community rules that are fundamen
tal to the management of the reserve: 1) if a rubber tapper moves
from an area to work in another part of the reserve, he must
inform the Board; 2) if he wants to cut a tree to make a boat, he
should get authorization for this. Why are these rules necessary?
Because we have registered the location of each rubber tapper to
control extraction, so we need to know when people move. Also,
the authorization to cut trees is necessary because there exist
outside pressures from people who want to buy timber, and we
have to prevent the destruction of the reserve.
Let’s say someone is breaking the rules, for example, hunting
with a dog. What would be the penalty?
Usually, in the first case a warning is given to the person. If the
person breaks the rules again, the community meets and decides
what penalty can be applied. In the worst case they may even
expel the person. This has never happened yet. What often hap
pens is that the person is reprimanded by the community, and
the individual chooses to obey the rules thereafter.
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Neoliberal Ecopolitics and Indigenous Peoples:
The Kayapo, The “Rainforest Harvest,” and The Body Shop
Terence Turner
Department of Anthropology
University of Chicago
ABSTRACT
Even though the “Trade Not Aid” program undertaken by The Body Shop in Kayapo communities has been touted as
the realization of the “Rainforest Harvest” approach to conservation, it is in fact a wage labor relationship whereby the
Kayapo are not compensated for the real product they provide The Body Shop: their photographic image. Furthermore,
this program is but one part of a portfolio of income sources available to the Kayapo, and does not prevent them from
engaging in environmentally exploitative contracts with loggers and miners, and so should not be seen as an exclusive
alternative to environmentally damaging land use practices.

The Kayapo, an Indigenous nation inhabiting the southern
fringes of the Amazon forest in central Brazil, have gained global
renown for their aggressive, politically astute, and amazingly suc
cessful defense of their traditional homeland from invading settlers,
land speculators, miners, and government developers. Over the past
two decades they have made themselves a successful test case of the
ability of an Indigenous Amazonian society to defend its territory,
operate effectively in the national and international political arena,
and selectively adopt modern technologies such as video and
telemedia without sacrificing its essential cultural autonomy. Re
cently, the Kayapo have become a test case for another major issue
for contemporary ecological and Indigenous advocates: the effec
tiveness of the commercial marketing of forest products as a strategy
for saving the forest and its native inhabitants from destruction and
dispossession by development.
This approach, a synthesis of free-market liberalism with activ
ism in defense of the environment and the survival of Indigenous
cultures and forest peoples, has been baptized the “Rainforest Har
vest” by its main theoretician and most prominent practitioner,
Jason Clay, until recently the director of Cultural Survival Enter
prises. The basic idea of the “Harvest” approach is that demonstrat
ing that rainforest ecosystems can be economically productive, by
getting Indigenous communities and other forest dwellers involved
in sustainable kinds of production of marketable forest products, is
the only realistic way of saving them from economically motivated
destruction by settlers, ranchers, loggers and miners. Making the
ecosystem yield a profit, proponents of this approach argue, is in the
long run a more effective and reliable way of saving it than conven
tional approaches relying on aid and political protection from gov

  

      
ernments and private organizations. Commercial production of
ecologically non-destructive types, so the argument runs, is also
superior to dependence on aid as a basis for the coexistence of In
digenous communities with the outside world. At the same time, it
provides them with a more reliable and less environmentally de
structive source of funds to meet basic needs such as medical, educa
tional and other services than either government aid or destructive
forms of extractive enterprise such as gold mining or logging.
The approach clearly fits in with the currently fashionable
neoliberal idea that the free market is the best solution to social and
economic problems, and that for-profit capitalist companies are the
most effective agents of social policy.
The British-based cosmetics firm, The Body Shop, has adopted
this ideologically congenial approach as the basis of its marketing
appeal, and has launched several projects for the ecologically sus
tainable production of components of its cosmetic products in
Indigenous communities in various parts of the world, the most
prominently featured of which are located among the Kayapo. It is
important to be clear that The Body Shop’s “Trade Not Aid”
projects, as it calls them, despite their superficial appearance as
instances of the “Rainforest Harvest” model, are not really a fair
example of Clay’s approach, which assumes genuine profit-regulated
production and aims at volumes sufficient to permit competition in
local and world commodity markets. The Body Shop’s Kayapo
projects, by contrast, do not constitute market-regulated production
in this sense; they are really just for show, or as the Brazilians say,
para Ingles ver (“for the English to see,” an expression left over from
the days of the slave trade, when the Brazilian navy made a show of
enforcing the British Navy’s ban on the importation of slaves).
Both the “Rainforest Harvest” approach and The Body Shop’s
“Trade Not Aid” program have come in for a good deal of cogent
criticism, which in spite of the real differences between them applies
in some measure to both. The most trenchant of the critics, Stephen
Corry of Survival International, has distinguished between straight
forward “fair trade” projects designed to help local communities
produce for local markets, on terms that guarantee them a fair re
turn for their products (which he supports), and Rain Forest Har
vest schemes like The Body Shop’s Kayapo projects in the following
terms:
[Rain Forest] Harvest projects [such as The Body Shop’s]
relate explicitly to trade with a foreign company ... there is no
local market whatsoever. The company is able to set the price
unilaterally, and to dictate how much or how little it will buy.
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This is dependence, not empowerment ... It is simply another
example of a powerful company selecting and controlling a
powerless labour force, in a way not dissimilar to the struc
tures maintained by colonialism—in other words, it is busi
ness as usual. (Corry 1994, 37)
Corry rejects Rainforest Harvest arguments that the only (or at
any rate, the best) way to save the forest and its peoples is to make it
profitable on the grounds that they play directly into the hands of
development-oriented governments and international financial
institutions that dismiss subsistence producers as of no social value,
and justify the invasion and take over of their lands in the name of
economic productivity. He insists that the rights of forest peoples to
their lands and ways of life should be recognized on grounds of
historic rights of prior occupancy rather than making them depen
dent on economic productivity. He points out that the more eco
nomically productive the natives make their traditional areas, the
greater will be the incentive for others to take them over, as the long
history of Indigenous societies in the Americas attests.
I would add that the fact that Indians or rural rubber-tappers are
managing to make a profit from forest production is unlikely to
appear a significant argument to private urban corporations, gov
ernment development agencies, or impoverished settlers from other
regions who have no way of sharing in such profits or participating
in the productive activities in question. These, however, are the
groups that hold political, economic and demographic power, and
that have invariably been the sources of the invasion and destruction
of forested areas.
Corry further argues that income from the sustainable produc
tion of forest products can never approach the far greater (if nonsustainable) profits to be had from logging and mining, and
therefore is not a realistic alternative to them as a source of income
for most communities of forest people. Ecologically sustainable
production will therefore tend to be regarded as a supplement rather
than a substitute to ecologically destructive forms of extraction, and
thus cannot be regarded as an incentive for conserving the ecosys
tem.
Reinforcing this point is the fact that the proportions of total
product actually sourced from forest peoples in commodities mar
keted by Rain Forest Harvest schemes, such as those of Cultural
Survival, Ben and Jerry’s, and The Body Shop, have in some in
stances been minuscule, the great bulk being made up of conven
tionally sourced items produced in the usual socially and
environmentally exploitative ways. The implicit or explicit claims of
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such schemes to constitute economically significant incentives to
save the rainforest, in other words, are mere hype:
There is no evidence that it helps conserve rainforests, it
does not empower rainforest peoples, and, worse, it subverts
the case for tribal peoples’ land rights. It arises from the
marketing ploys of profit-making companies, not from the
real needs of rainforest communities or an intelligent con
sideration of their rights or environmental concerns. (Corry
1994, 37)
Clay answers that, in the case of the projects initiated by Cultural
Survival, it was sometimes necessary to draw on conventional
sources to enter the market in sufficient volume to gain the neces
sary foothold, but that the aim remains to convert, in the long run,
to supply by “forest peoples.” Be this as it may, the partial adapta
tion of the “Rainforest Harvest” approach by private corporations,
as exemplified by The Body Shop, substantiates Corry’s criticisms
(and those of several others as well).
THE BODY SHOP PROJECTS AMONG THE KAYAPO: THE
“RAINFOREST HARVEST” “ PARA INGLES VER ”
In 1989, Anita Roddick, the director of The Body Shop, attended
the well publicized Kayapo-led rally of Indigenous Amazonian na
tions at Altamira to protest a massive hydroelectric dam scheme on
the Xingú river that the Brazilian government was planning to build
with financing from the World Bank. Eager to identify her company
with the prestige of the now world-famous Kayapo and their charis
matic leader, Payakan, she offered him an airplane and a project for
pressing Brazil nut oil in his community, A’ukre. Payakan accepted,
and the press for extracting the oil, to be used in the company’s hair
conditioner, was duly installed in 1990. Today The Body Shop has
added a second Brazil nut oil press in another community, Pukanu,
and started a second project for the manufacture of bead jewelry by
Kayapo women in four villages. The Body Shop sells the items in
their outlets. The Kayapo thus became the first Indians in Amazonia
to participate in the new wave of “green capitalist” enterprises based
on environmentally sustainable production.
The Body Shop pays a good wage by regional standards for the
Kayapo Indian labor employed in producing Brazil nut oil and bead
jewelry. By far the most important value the Kayapo contribute to
The Body Shop, however, is not the oil and bead bracelets they
produce, but their photographic images, and reportage about the
projects in the media, which serve as free advertising for the com-
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pany and for which it pays not a penny to the Kayapo. The Body
Shop boasts that it does not pay for advertising; it relies solely on
such images and accounts of its projects in its shops and coverage in
the media to build the “politically correct” image that is the basis of
its consumer appeal. But is this not a covert form of “aid not trade”
by the Kayapo to The Body Shop? To call this “fair trade,” as The
Body Shop does, is to make a mockery of the term.
The Body Shop is the sole buyer of the Kayapo products, and
thus is able to set both the price and the amount of product it will
buy. The Kayapo have pressed it to allow them to expand produc
tion and install oil presses in other villages, but The Body Shop has
refused, saying that it cannot use any more of the product (even
though Kayapo-extracted Brazil nut oil comprises less than one per
cent of the volume of its “Brazil Nut Hair Conditioner”). The Body
Shop’s interest in the projects is clearly their value as advertising,
and it has no interest in expanding them beyond the token levels of
production required for this purpose. It is not interested in allowing
the Kayapo to engage in “trade” in the ordinary economic sense of
free and competitive access to markets, and runs the projects in such
a way as to prevent them from doing so. The projects thus take on
the character of piecework wage labor rather than “trade” of prod
ucts on the market; they are strictly regulated operations based on
total control of production volume and demand by one partner. All
of this, of course, is inconsistent with the slogan of “Trade Not Aid,”
of which The Body Shop holds up their Kayapo projects as a prime
example. It is also inconsistent with what they have led the Kayapo
to believe, namely that the projects are normal economic production
operations aimed at making a profit through the marketing of the
product.
The “Trade Not Aid” slogan is deceptive in yet another sense in
so far as it suggests that “trade” projects like The Body Shop’s repre
sent a viable alternative to aid for the Indians from governmental
and non-governmental sources. This is patently not so. The real
implications of the “Trade Not Aid” slogan in this respect have been
made brutally clear by the Brazilian government, which has cut off
its appropriations for aid to Indigenous peoples. Faced with the
suspension of medical, educational and other services, Indigenous
peoples like the Kayapo have been driven to rely on the only forms
of “trade” available that can provide anywhere close to the amounts
they need to pay for the services they so desperately need: mining
and logging, the most destructive forms of extractive production.
The small Body Shop projects, maintained essentially for their value
as advertising rather than as serious productive enterprises, do not
begin to meet the need for communal income in the absence of
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government and private aid, and cannot become viable alternatives
to the much larger sums easily available from the loggers and min
ers. The two Kayapo communities with the Brazil nut oil projects
have both granted concessions to loggers, and Pukanu has granted
one to gold miners as well.
So “Aid” turns out to be essential if the “Trade Not Aid” projects
of firms like The Body Shop are not to become mere smoke screens
concealing the economic desperation that drives such communities
to open themselves to the most environmentally, physically and
culturally damaging forms of “Trade.” It is thus not only deceptive
of The Body Shop to tell its customers that buying Brazil Nut Hair
Conditioner “give[s the Kayapo] an income to help protect the
Amazon rainforest,” but also politically retrograde for it to imply
that its “trade” renders redundant non-commercial forms of “Aid”
such as government support for basic services and political and legal
struggles for land and human rights.
The Body Shop projects have certainly not led the Kayapo to give
up their dealings with loggers and miners (Pukanu did expel its
miners, for reasons unrelated to The Body Shop projects, last year,
but A’ukre opened negotiations with a group of miners during the
past year, inviting them to explore in a corner of their territory —
fortunately they did not find any gold). The Body Shop’s refusal to
expand the volume of production in its existing projects or to ini
tiate any further projects in other Kayapo communities means that
for the Kayapo as a whole, and even for those communities with
projects, the amount of income the projects provide is far short of
meeting what the Kayapo now feel to be their needs. Furthermore,
The Body Shop’s maintenance of tight administrative control, and
its continuing role as sole supplier of capital equipment and sole
customer, able to fix unilaterally the levels of production and de
mand, means that there has been little “empowerment” of the
Kayapo as “equal trading partners” as Body Shop publicity has
claimed. Fortunately, the Kayapo have already obtained government
recognition of their control of their land, so they are not a case to
which Corry’s criticism applies. In this case, the Rainforest Harvest
approach has not lead to a substitution of market production as the
object of Indigenous support activism in place of the struggle for
legal land rights, but only because that objective had been realized
earlier.
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THE KAYAPO PERSPECTIVE
Such, at any rate, are the criticisms that can be made of The
Body Shop’s operations among the Kayapo from the standpoint of
an anthropological observer. But what of the views of the Kayapo
themselves? Here we immediately find that, in apparent contradic
tion to the critical views advanced on their behalf, the Kayapo are
enthusiastically supportive of The Body Shop. Kayapo of the com
munities with Body Shop projects want them to continue, and there
is no shortage of willing workers for both Brazil nut oil and
beadwork production. Other Kayapo communities would like The
Body Shop to install similar projects, and have been disappointed
with Gordon Roddick’s announcement that The Body Shop will not
expand the number of its Brazil nut oil and beadwork projects.
Kayapo opinion, in short, seems fairly unanimous that The Body
Shop projects are good for them.
The question must be asked, however, whether Kayapo enthusi
asm and willingness to work implies fully informed consent to, and
agreement with, the terms of The Body Shop’s own definition and
representation of its operations. The answer to this question is
clearly “No.” The Kayapo start from a recognition of their funda
mental dependency on the Western economic system — Brazilian,
British, or Transnational — for a whole series of commodities they
have come to need but cannot make themselves. They know the only
way to get these commodities is either to persuade the state or other
parties to give them as “presents,” in the style of the old Indian
Protection Service or visiting film crews, or to somehow get the
money to buy them, either from timber and mineral concessions or,
as a last resort, by working for wages. All of these, they are aware, are
varieties of political-economic dependency; they do not expect them
to be “empowering” (they have done quite well empowering them
selves through organized political action and diplomacy, notably in
obtaining official demarcation of their reserves, but that is another
story). They chafe at the unaccustomed degree of subservience and
regimentation exacted by the firm and efficient management of The
Body Shop Brazilian project manager, but they are willing to put up
with it for the sake of the income the work brings in.
The Kayapo do not look upon The Body Shop projects as
straightforward “trade” relations in which they act as “equal trading
partners.” They see them rather as aid mixed with trade. That The
Body Shop has gone to the apparent inconvenience of coming to
them from half-way around the world, bringing them elaborate oil
pressing machines and great stocks of beads to be made into brace
lets, all to allow them the opportunity to earn money through indi
vidual work, appears to them as the gesture of a benevolent patron.
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They know that it is not being done simply for pecuniary gain from
the trade in the commodities they produce. Precisely why the be
nevolent patron has gone to such lengths to aid them, however,
remains obscure. Not a single Kayapo, I believe, has yet fathomed
this ultimate mystery, and The Body Shop has not thought fit to
explain.
Meanwhile, they prize the degree of individual empowerment
the income from the work makes possible. Women, especially, have
benefited from the chance to make money of their own, indepen
dently of their men, through the manufacture of the bead bracelets.
Few of them would otherwise have this chance. For ordinary men
(not chiefs or leaders) the Brazil nut oil work brings in more than
they could acquire without going off to work in a mine or for a
logging crew. For Kayapo men and women alike, The Body Shop
therefore represents a valued option they want to keep open.
This, however, is not to say that they have any idea of closing off
any of their other options for monetary income, political conces
sions, territorial expansion, medical or other basic services, or other
forms of aid, simply because The Body Shop option is available.
They have learned to say the right words to The Body Shop, thank
ing them for making available an alternative to reliance on logging
concessions (which might well come in handy at some future time
when the timber is exhausted), while continuing to sign logging
contracts with the Redenção sawmills. Payakan, the A’ukre leader
who for some time served as The Body Shop’s chief Kayapo symbol,
was particularly adroit at keeping all the balls in the air in this way,
producing noble ecological rhetoric for The Body Shop and other
eco-patrons while secretly negotiating mahogany concessions and
having other Kayapo sign the papers. The same policy is pursued by
Pukatire, the leader of Pukanu, the other village where The Body
Shop maintains a Brazil nut oil press.
It would be missing the point to see these canny leaders as trai
tors to the supposed ecological principles of their own cultures or
“corrupt” sellouts of their people; the Kayapo, despite the large
amounts of nonsense to this effect produced by romantic journalists
and some anthropologists, were never ecologists in the contempo
rary Western sense, and they never saw their title to their own land
or their relations with organizations like The Body Shop as restrict
ing their freedom to use their resources for their own economic
purposes. Leaders like Payakan and Pukatire are simply following
the policy that most Kayapo see as their best option, namely that of
exploiting all opportunities for strengthening themselves economi
cally, politically, and territorially through all available forms of
trade, aid and political action.
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The Kayapo, in sum, are pragmatic eclectics, who are no more
concerned with the ideological rhetoric of Western ecoliberals than
were their 16th century ancestors with the mystery of the Holy
Trinity. Their acceptance of The Body Shop projects does not imply
their agreement with the policy of Trade Not Aid, or with The Body
Shop’s representations of the linkage between its trade projects and
the preservation of the ecosystem, or with The Body Shop’s repre
sentations of their own empowerment or equality in the relations of
production and trade. Nor does it imply that the Kayapo understand
The Body Shop projects for what they really are, namely symbolic
operations undertaken primarily for public relations purposes,
whose value as “trade” to The Body Shop is virtually incidental. This
means that the Kayapo do not understand how they are exploited by
these projects, through the unpaid extraction and use of their repre
sentations in Body Shop publicity. Although The Body Shop, in an
attempt to forestall criticism on this fundamental point, has ob
tained the consent of Kayapo leaders to the use of their words and
images, the Kayapo have no conception of the value of this publicity
to The Body Shop. They cannot be said to have agreed to what they
do not understand.
Meanwhile, the pragmatic Kayapo approach to The Body Shop,
which essentially comes down to making the best of a not very good
deal for the lack of anything better, may serve as a model for a prac
tical resolution of the debate between proponents of the “Rain For
est Harvest” and their critics. If peasant or Indigenous communities
like the Kayapo want projects such as The Body Shop’s for the lim
ited benefits they bring, provided they do not entail the closing off
of other options either for trade or aid, and ideally would comprise
only an auxiliary part of such a mixed portfolio, then critics of these
projects should also support their continuation in the communities
in question, while continuing to call for the correction of their ex
ploitative and dependency-inducing aspects and criticizing their
self-serving misrepresentations. This essentially means transforming
The Body Shop projects and other “Rain Forest Harvest” efforts into
genuine “fair trade” projects such as those that have been developed,
with far less fanfare, by organizations like Oxfam. These are projects
run by local communities aimed wholly at generating a return to the
producers from their work, without the ulterior purpose of promot
ing the interests of an external profit-making corporation. Opened
up to competition from alternative customers, including local mar
kets where practicable, stripped of their pretensions as substitutes,
rather than supplements, for governmental aid, legal rights and
political struggle, and given the chance to expand their production
to economically significant levels rather than merely functioning as

The Kayapo ... are pragmatic eclec
tics, who are no more concerned with
the ideological rhetoric of Western
ecoliberals than were their 16th Cen
tury ancestors with the mystery of the
Holy Trinity.

  

      
tokens to lend credibility to non-Indigenous businesses or philan
thropic organizations, such projects can play a constructive role, and
to that extent should be encouraged. In the specific case of The Body
Shop, however, the essentially symbolic function of the so-called
“trade” projects as unpaid advertising holds out little hope for such
development.
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q:
Although some of Stephen Corry’s criticisms of the Rainforest
Harvest approach certainly apply to The Body Shop case, I
think he exaggerates when he charges that this approach
supplants the need to defend Indigenous land rights. Rather,
Jason Clay and others argue that simple defense of land rights
is not enough, that economic forces are also needed.
TT:
Well, I certainly agree, but I am not sure that Rainforest Har
vest activities are the kinds best calculated to serve that politi
cal function. My point is not to reject the usefulness of
Rainforest Harvest projects, or even The Body Shop project,
though I am pretty skeptical about it. I think that we should
listen to the Indigenous people and realize that in the current
situation in Amazonia, Indigenous and forest dwelling people
need all the help that they can get, and a little pragmatism is
perhaps appropriate.
Q:
What would your reaction be if The Body Shop were to start
participating in biological prospecting — trying to bring
Kayapo cultural knowledge into the commercial sector?
TT:
Well, it’s not an academic question, because The Body Shop is
already doing this. They’ve initiated a project, hired a chemist,
and they have their Brazil nut oil project foreman working
half-time going out into the forest with the Kayapo and col
lecting promising medicinals. I think that The Body Shop is
up to a scam, much like similar scams elsewhere.
As you all know, there is a global rush on the part of major
pharmaceutical companies (Ciba-Geigy, Parke-Davis,
Wellcome, etc) to identify marketable natural molecules. It
takes vast resources to test and develop such products. The
Body Shop does not have these resources, but what it does
have — or thinks it has — is a certain amount of access to
Indigenous environmental knowledge. It hopes, I think, to
identify potentially marketable substances that it can submit
to preliminary testing to the point where there is some basis
for a claim, and then go to big companies and interest them in
taking up this project — it can be a middleman. It has already
told the Kayapo that it has a really hot project for them
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whereby The Body Shop will help them to enter into contracts
for other product. What products? Well, they’ve been very
cagey thus far, but I think they are positioning themselves to
be able to cream off some sort of middleman position in this
rush for molecular resources. The danger is that the Kayapo
and other Indigenous people who become involved in this
process are going to get a dismissive payoff and not be able to
control the terms of their agreements with the ultimate devel
opers and marketers.
Are you taking part in the debate with Darrell Posey and Hall
about the nature of Indigenous knowledge and how it is used?
Well, having worked for thirty years among the Kayapo, I will
start by saying that Darrell Posey is a fraud; that he has made
up the data that he claims to have about this fantastic system
of forest management that somehow all other anthropologists
in the Amazon missed. They missed it because it doesn’t exist
— Darrell Posey has made it up. His exercises in ethnobotani
cal and ethnoentomological science are science fiction.
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Terence Turner Working Group
There has been a lot of hype concerning rainforest product mar
keting strategies, such as those set up by Ben and Jerry’s and The
Body Shop, whose products have been sold under the guise of saving
the rainforest. Under the current system, this strategy is economi
cally unsound as these products appear to bring in a very small
amount of money as compared to timber harvesting.
Further sociological and cultural difficulties are encountered in
attempting to create a capitalist system for Indigenous people who
are used to communal living. This has proven to be a major limita
tion not foreseen by First World firms engaged in Rainforest Har
vest-type activities.
Dr. Turner suggests that a working solution will be reached only
by trial and error, with a great deal of input necessary from the
Indigenous groups. He stressed the importance of letting the groups
decide for themselves, and identified the need to give them the
authority to do so.
The legacy of the hype is that it produces, in short, no
economic returns in the sense that the total profits were not
paying for the project. A second problem was the lack of infor
mation that was available at the time. A number of firms got on
this bandwagon and signed agreements promising very high
returns from the environmental premium, and simply never
paid the minimal amounts that were due. A lot of us, and I fault
myself as well, just didn’t know what was going on — that it was
not the panacea that it had appeared to be.
Terence Turner: Well, I’d like to note that on the Cultural Survival
Enterprises side, the effects of the Rainforest Harvest strategy
were counterproductive due to a lack of communication be
tween the First World headquarters of the operation and what
was actually going on at the local level. The difficulty in articulat
ing these green capitalist projects at the local level is almost
unimaginable. It is not only a question, as Sharon Flynn was
suggesting, of getting a capitalist project going at the local level.
There are so many other social and economic problems that are
immediately engendered in these communities that the social
and economic overhead gets to be much larger than expected
and can really interfere with the production process. In this case,
it seems that people really didn’t know what they were doing.
There was a lot of rhetoric, but in reality, it was not a capitalist
business — it was hype.
TM: The simplistic Rainforest Harvest strategy played into the sentiTed Macdonald:
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ments of “environmental” people. It promotes the idea that, for
example, eating Rainforest Crunch helps save the rainforest,
when in reality it may actually hurt the rainforest. This kind of
marketing ignores local social and economic complexities, and
fantasy and reality become blurred.
George Appell: No one ever thought about the social implications and
problems potentially associated with the Rainforest Harvest
strategy, with bringing a capitalist project into a non-capitalist
community. Given all of the sociologists involved, I find this
particularly surprising.
TT: Yes, that’s a key point, one that I wasn’t able to get to in my talk.
I have a much longer manuscript, entitled The Invasion of the
Body Shop, to be published soon. It includes an ethnographic
record of the sorts of problems George mentioned as they devel
oped in A’ukre and Pukanu, these two Kayapo communities
with the oil nut projects.
I have a number of reservations about green capitalism
projects that stem mostly from my failure to believe in capital
ism. I suppose this disqualifies me by Ms. Flynn’s criteria. One
reason is precisely the point George raised. When you install a
capitalist project in a non-capitalist community, you are at
tempting a total social and cultural revolution. If you try to
install an isolated or encapsulated project which does not disturb
the community, you will find this is impossible because you need
to find local entrepreneurs, of which there are many, to quote
Ms. Flynn. Certainly you can find people who will take money to
be the go-between between the benevolent gringos and the pro
ducers. This results in social differentiations which cause com
munity tensions as some members join the capitalist project and
change roles. This is exactly what happened in the Kayapo com
munities — the community actually split up temporarily, and a
deep schism remains. A lot of this is dreadfully dangerous, so to
really get involved, you need to consider more than just how to
balance books and how to trade on favorable terms.
Mac Chapin: Part of the problem is the communal nature of the com
munity. Among the Kuna of Panama, for example, they are used
to doing things as a group, in some predetermined order, with a
structure. When you bring in capitalism, it promotes the indi
vidual and the work of the individual. As far as I know, no one
has figured out an effective way to work with collectives in a
capitalist system.
TT: Yes, there are not very many good models of collective capital
ism — capitalism is uncollective. It’s not just a question of indi
viduals versus collectivism. Commodification is itself another
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fundamental distortion, as shown by The Body Shop’s rhetoric.
They claim they are trying to commodify Indigenous knowledge
without changing the native culture. Well, commodifying the
native culture is a fundamental change of the culture because
one of the things that commodities imply is private property. If
you suddenly make a commodity of cultural knowledge, a su
premely shared thing, you attempt to identify it as the product of
some person or community. Whatever identification you make
will be a fundamental distortion which will introduce serious
social and cultural distortions, proportionate to the remunera
tion for the commodity in question.
Stephen Gallagher, Southern Connecticut State University: Given these views,
do you believe that the only way Indigenous cultures will survive is
by remaining isolated? Since interactions with the capitalist sector
have always had the effect of eliminating common property and
collective institutions, and since these groups function in a resource
base they control inadequately, can they survive only by withdraw
ing into the jungle and being self sufficient?
TT: Nobody in the world can do that anymore. However, it is pos
sible for Indigenous groups, communities, or leagues of Indig
enous people to gain control over land and resources and
thereby join the world community while maintaining their own
culture relatively intact. National laws vary, but in Brazil, Indig
enous resources are constitutionally and legally protected, al
though this does not mean they are in fact protected. In
December, the leaders of the 15 Kayapo communities met with
the federal prosecutor and the chief of the federal police, and
gave unanimous Kayapo support for an operation by federal
police to expel all miners and loggers in all Kayapo areas — an
area about the size of Scotland. This had been blocked by the
Kayapo earlier, because they had had agreements with the log
gers and miners, but, in the meantime, there was something of a
social revolution due to health impacts of mercury and malaria
brought in by the operations. They are using their legal rights
and enlisting the federal government in their defense. So it is
possible for a politically together group to assert control over
their resources. Now they’re in the initial stages of trying to
begin sustainable forestry in the area.
Jim Murphy, Tufts University: Is this the beginning of the end of their
cultural independence as they begin to integrate with main
stream Brazilian society?
TT: No. There is increasing integration, but it is important to distin
guish between isolation and culture. They have achieved a lot,
including, in a space of 30 years, going from first contact to
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being prominent members of regional society on their own
terms — something that no other group has been able to do.
Politically, they are still acting as autonomous communities
within their own land, and though they have many interactions
with Brazilian society, they are not contiguous with it. They still
act through their own communal institutions, and Indigenous
positions of leadership remain. They are not losing culture, they
are changing it in a way that affords them a viable expression of
what’s worth living for in their society. It’s a cultural change, but
it’s still a viable, independent culture.
MC: I think the Kuna in Panama are very similar — they’re good at
engaging the outside culture while remaining distinct. Given all
of this, what role can rainforest products play in the end?
TT: I think they can now play a more important role in the future. I
think of The Body Shop project as a pilot project which shows
you can get Indigenous communities to produce non-timber
forest products in an organized and viable way. There exists a
potential to generate income from expansion to other products
and greater volumes. It may be possible that forest product
exploitation could generate enough basic income for the Kayapo
to free them from dependence on government and NGO aid for
medicine and other basics. Despite everything I have said today,
I still think that this can be a way to go for Indigenous commu
nities, within limits. If you can avoid the mistakes and the hype
of outfits like The Body Shop and can work with relatively disin
terested NGOs like CI, perhaps these self-led harvesting projects
can be a supplement to the community.
Wendy Gerlitz, Yale F&ES: What is the role of an organization that ini
tiates a project like this when the culture begins to change in a
way that is no longer conducive to the conservation goal of the
organization? For example, when the local people seize control
of the land, kick out the loggers, and then turn around and use
the land themselves for the same unsustainable logging.
TT: No organization ought to consider itself as the exclusive alterna
tive to these economic activities. NGOs are coming in with sus
tainable production projects, but these projects have never
amounted to more than a small percentage of the total produc
tivity of the community. The project leaders, whether they be
NGOs or The Body Shop, or whoever, are not in a position to
say “You are doing our project therefore you no longer need the
other projects.” They can only offer an alternative. This will be a
pluralist process with different kinds of approaches attempted,
no one will get ascendancy, but it leaves lots of room for an
approach which emphasizes demonstration projects.
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Building Markets for Non-Timber Forest Products:
Challenges and a Few Lessons Learned
Sharon Flynn
Conservation International
ABSTRACT
Properly applied, non timber forest product (NTFP) development can be a way to advance conservation goals by
providing an economic return to local people from natural areas. NTFP development is fraught with pitfalls, many of
which arise from a lack of understanding of market dynamics and business practices. NTFP projects are successful only
when they address risk taking and risk sharing, select products appropriately, and manage enterprises effectively. These
measures are not easy, and require business expertise. Furthermore, long-term success requires that local partners have
the opportunity to access the information and skills necessary to make effective business decisions.

The first thing I would like to say is that I work for Conservation
International (CI) and I am not a biologist. I work within a depart
ment at CI called the Conservation Enterprise Department. What we
do is work very closely with local communities, with our country
programs and with other NGO partners to target Non-Timber
Forest Products (NTFPs) that could be harvested, processed, and
marketed. We help local communities and NGO partners to develop
the enterprises needed to establish the supplies of these products,
and at the same time travel all the way down to the other end of the
chain — to work with the marketplace and figure out how to work
with firms in setting up strategies for distribution and supply so as
to get what’s in the forest out into the marketplace and out to the
consumer.
So, when I thought about what type of audience would be here, I
imagined there would be communities — like we have from Mexico
and Brazil — who are actually working with NTFPs, representatives
from NGOs involved in NTFP projects, and students who are inter
ested in working in this area. What I wanted to do was share with all
of you some of the challenges and lessons that we have learned at CI
by actually doing forest product development.
Economics drives rainforest destruction. Local people clear
forests to plant crops, raise cattle, and feed their children, and gov
ernments grant logging concessions to generate foreign exchange
revenues and pay off debt. Over the past decade, conservation
groups and local communities looking for innovative ways to coun
teract these pressures have fought back with market based strategies.
One of these strategies is the development of enterprises based
on the extraction of sustainably harvested Non-Timber Forest Prod
ucts. Conservation International helped to pioneer the use of NTFPs
in conservation with the launching of the Tagua Initiative in 1990.

 

 
Since then CI has expanded its NTFP work to include 3 major in
dustries, 11 ecosystems, and 15 to 20 different products.
This paper discusses issues relevant to the enterprise aspect of
NTFP development and presents some of the broad challenges CI
has identified and a few of the lessons we have learned. This paper
does not address the numerous and critically important ecological
and socio-economic challenges of NTFPs. All of the decisions made
about demand and supply-side strategies should be taken within the
context of ecosystem conservation goals. Enterprise decisions must
support the overall ecological and social integrity of the project and
promote conservation, but I’m focusing on enterprise issues because
that’s what I know well, and because many NGOs neglect to look at
this aspect when they are considering NTFPs.
CI believes that simply harvesting and processing NTFPs will not
save the rainforest. Rather, NTFPs can play a role as important tools
for conservation. NTFPs help strengthen integrated conservation
strategies that include education initiatives, resource management,
communications, and land tenure and policy work. NTFPs can help
provide alternatives to ecologically destructive activities and demon
strate the viability of sustainable forest management. In many com
munities and governments, it is easier to talk about jobs and income
rather than conservation, and NTFPs can serve an important de
monstrative role to both local people and national policy planners.

Simply harvesting and processing NTFPs
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A FEW OF THE CHALLENGES
Markets are not perfect and therefore NTFPs are not easy. If
markets were perfect then forests would be valued differently and
NTFPs might be easier. In most cases, there is a reason or reasons
why the aggressive marketplace has not catalyzed the harvest and
processing of NTFPs. Producers of NTFPs face numerous market
failures and barriers-to-entry in commercializing their products.
This an important point for NGOs and communities with visions of
easy market access and simply solved inefficiencies.
Producers of NTFPs generally encounter two types of challenges.
The first set are classic market failures — lack of capital and infor
mation. Producers may have immediate access to products in which
the market has great interest, but firms and producers usually do not
know about each other and face huge investment costs in bridging
the gap. In the development of NTFPs, NGOs and governments
have helped to resolve these gaps by channeling information be
tween firms and producers and by offering access to cheap sources
of capital. This is the primary role of CI in its NTFP work.
The second set of challenges faced by producers can be broadly
termed as socio-political failures. These challenges stem in part from

  

      
the marginalization of forest producer groups by governments.
Solving information and capital gaps may be relatively straightfor
ward, but solutions are useless unless the capacity is there to actually
get the leaf off the tree, into a processing system, onto a boat or a
truck or a mule, and into the marketplace. Broadly defined (and
there certainly may be more), these socio-political challenges are:
• lack of resource ownership/land tenure rights
• barriers to collective action and organization
• lack of educational options
• lack of transport infrastructure
Identifying and understanding these challenges is key in develop
ing NTFP strategies with the highest possible chance of success. The
“lessons” outlined below are general rules that will help meet these
challenges.
LESSONS LEARNED
Creating strong markets for NTFPs involves work along the
entire length of the value chain — from the forest to the end user.
Much like any other business, this work requires a series of choices
and decisions along with a large dose of uncertainty. However,
unlike most businesses, the goals of developing an NTFP are usually
more complex than making a profit. Building financially healthy
enterprises in the middle of the forest, without running water or
electricity, that are based on ecological sustainability, community
empowerment, and are linked to conservation, is a fairly daunting
task.
CI’s “lessons learned” are broadly defined guidelines that help
minimize uncertainty and help make decision-making easier. Deci
sions are still tough and uncertainty will never be eliminated, but
understanding the boundaries of what you know and don’t know
certainly helps.
GENERAL LESSONS
Risk
Sharing Risk
An important role CI plays in developing NTFPs is to absorb
risk. We absorb the risk of producers who have something to sell but
no market access, and we absorb the risk of firms who want new
products but don’t know where they are or how to get them.
Sharing risk among the three players — producers, firms, and CI

 

Building financially healthy enterprises
in the middle of the forest, without
running water or electricity, that are
based on ecological sustainability, com
munity empowerment, and are linked
to conservation, is a fairly daunting
task.

 
— is key in insuring a product’s longevity. Risk should be shared
according to each player’s capacity to absorb it.
Of the three, rainforest producer groups face the greatest risk.
Economic options are scarce and the cost of failure in a subsistencelevel lifestyle is high. Yet, at the same time, most producers partici
pate in some form of marketplace every day and most understand
the buy and sell mechanism. The goal is to garner the greatest re
ward with the least risk. CI helps minimize the costs by helping to
link producers with market partners at a flexible pace that creates
gradual acceptance and understanding of risk.
On the demand side, while markets in general are fairly elastic,
firms are not. Switching sourcing of Brazil nuts from a stable, well
known New York broker to an unknown supplier in the jungles of
Peru with a crackly phone line is a risky venture for a business.
While firms can usually absorb more risk than producers, they face
their own failure costs. By serving as a link between the firms and
the producers, CI helps design production and sourcing strategies
that meet both sides’ needs and that are dynamic over the long-term.

Doing NTFPs is capitalism, pure and
simple, and if you don’t like capitalism
then you probably shouldn’t be doing
NTFPs. While most rainforest produc
ers understand the buy and sell mecha
nism, many NGO staff do not.

Taking Risks
Think big, but take small steps to get there. Since bringing
NTFPs to market often means doing what no one else has done, be
creative and idealistic in the final goal. Getting a vegetal leather
product out from the forests of Brazil and into a Déjà Shoe is a
pretty amazing thing. We need to think big; think about how to
make these great connections. But, be smart, analytical, and wise in
how you decide to get to that goal.
Don’t Forget This is Capitalism
Doing NTFPs is capitalism, pure and simple, and if you don’t
like capitalism then you probably shouldn’t be doing NTFPs. While
most rainforest producers understand the buy and sell mechanism,
many NGO staff do not. Philosophical or ideological problems or
concerns with the whole issue of capitalism can often serve to derail
a project. Building NTFPs is a business — the pursuit of profit and
the need to pay attention to the bottom line. It means competition,
pricing, loans, banks, credit, successes, failures, and lots of hard
work.
Asking for a buck is a lot different than trying to make a buck.
This is something that can be quite alien to NGOs. You can cultivate
a donor for two years, but you’re going to get your million dollars
on a single day, and there’s not much control about what you do
with that million dollars. Meanwhile, nine out of ten new businesses

  

      
in the US fail, and it takes businesses in the US three to five years to
even make a profit. Doing NTFPs is hard; it takes a lot of persever
ance and it takes a long-term perspective.
LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT PRODUCTS AND ENTERPRISE
DEVELOPMENT
Product Selection
Overall, products should be selected that make the best eco
nomic sense for the producers over the long-term. CI does not
encourage the selection of products based on the whim of a particu
lar client since this makes the producers totally dependent on a
single buyer, as Terry Turner pointed out in the Kayapo case. Mar
kets change, prices fluctuate, and clients lose interest.
Look for Real Value
Don’t assume that just because products are ecologically inter
esting and might have a potential use that there is real value. To
have real value, products must have a market and it must be possible
to commercialize them. There is little value if you can’t get the leaf
off the plant, and the wax off the leaf, all at a price that makes sense,
and into a form that people want to buy.
Start with Existing Products and Look for New Ones
Despite the words of caution on real value, there are many prod
ucts not yet commercialized that are of great interest to the market
place. There are four areas in which greater value can be brought to
rainforest producers:
• Improve the value chain for existing products
The harvest, production, and marketing of most products is not
always done efficiently. Interventions can be made into existing
processes to add efficiency, reduce costs, and bring more benefits to
the producer.
For example, allspice in Guatemala is a major industry, although
Guatemala ranks second behind Jamaica in the Global market.
Jamaican allspice commands a higher price, because it is sun dried,
whereas it is dried over a fire in Guatemala. When companies ex
tract the oil to use in ketchup (the largest user of allspice), it tastes
smoky. So one of the interventions that CI has been discussing — one
that can be an easy thing to help bring a greater value to the producer
— is developing portable solar driers that people can actually take out
into the forest with them when they are collecting allspice. These types
of interventions can be put in place easily, do not require any great
marketing strategies, and entail the least risk for the producers.
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• Look for by-products of existing processes
Products and product processing already in place may yield
valuable by-products. For instance, sugar cane processing (although
not an NTFP, but a good example) has been found to yield cheap
quantities of alpha-hydroxy acids (AHAs). AHAs are all the rage
now in the personal care industry and are being used heavily by
everyone in skin care products.
Another example is the tagua waste generated by button disk
manufacturing. This waste product has great potential as an abrasive
for industrial cleaning, and we are beginning to develop this as a way
to increase the benefit to the producers.
• Look for competitive advantages
NTFPs need to compete in the marketplace based on functional
ity, price, and quality. Products should be selected based on their
overall competitive advantage in the market.
• Don’t try to swallow too much of the value chain at once
When designing strategies to link producers with the market, a
realistic assessment should be made of the market’s needs, the
producer’s existing production capacity, and the economic and
ecological time pressures. With most products, as one travels along
the value chain, processing, marketing, and distribution strategies
become more complex. Trying to transfer too many of those com
plexities to the producer level at too rapid a rate will only increase
the chances for failure.
When one starts working with NTFPs, one needs to constantly
think about how to get more value added processes back, but if you
do too much of that at once, the whole thing will just crash and
burn. This is an interesting challenge that I think the vegetal leather
producers are facing now — they’re doing the raw materials, so the
next step is to ask how they can start doing more of the processing.
There is a whole set of risks inherent in this. For example, vegetal
leather could be used to make handbags. In the handbag industry,
however, styles change every six months, so, if you’re going to
choose that, you need someone out there in the marketplace who
lives and breathes the fashion industry, and who can constantly
funnel you ideas on colors and styles as they change.
CI has found that value, in some cases, will travel toward the
producer anyway. For example, the Tagua Initiative in Ecuador
began in 1990 on the community level with simple harvesting of the
nut. Recently, due to pressure and interest from Ecuadorian primary
manufacturers, the community is looking into taking on some of the
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initial processing done by those primary manufacturers. CI is help
ing the community to start thinking about setting up drying and
slicing operations within the community itself.
Write a Business Plan
The simple exercise of compiling a business plan will require a
complete analysis of both the supply and demand for a product.
Specifically, it will require analysis of a sometimes overlooked com
ponent — transportation. With NTFPs, transportation is a major
issue as getting a product to market from remote areas will add high
costs to the end price. These costs must be taken into account when
determining the overall feasibility of the product.
Improve Technologies
NTFP producers working without conventional sources of en
ergy need to be creative in gaining efficiencies and reducing costs in
their production systems. Any NTFP will require investment in
innovative harvesting and production technologies to increase prod
uct competitiveness and bring greater benefits to the producer.
Someone needs to be there who’s a tinkerer — someone who’s
constantly thinking of new ways to put things together.
Target Community Entrepreneurs and Focus on Skills Development
The key to any successful NTFP is community ownership of the
enterprise. Rainforest communities are full of entrepreneurs who
have the energy and insight to pursue good product opportunities.
Simultaneous to production and marketing, training and educa
tional initiatives should be offered that will hone the managerial and
business skills of producers and insure a technical base for long
term, stable management of the enterprise.
Most businesses in the US fail because of management problems,
not because of market problems. NTFP producers are often saddled
not only with this problem, but also with marginalization in the
sense of educational options.
Hire Good Managers and Support Them
While most rainforest producer groups understand the basics of
product development and marketing, many products require a more
complex set of skills than are initially available within producer
communities. A good manager is key in starting up an NTFP enter
prise and in coordinating the skill development activities. Good
managers are strategic thinkers, good business people, good com
munity workers, and want to live in the forest. These people are very

 

 
difficult to find — believe me, I’ve spent a year and a half trying to
find at least one.
LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT THE MARKET:
Understand How Real Markets Work
Understanding how markets work is critical to operating suc
cessfully within them. Not fake markets, not markets that you want
to create, not markets that you think you can create, but how real
markets work. This is the only way that NGOs or anyone else work
ing in the area will be able to find the strategy that makes the best
sense for the producer.
The first step at CI for any NTFP is to do a comprehensive ana
lytical overview of the market and the product. This is the basic
information that will be used to build a marketing strategy. Size,
trends, major players, distribution strategies, and sourcing habits
should all be clearly identified
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Build Strategic Partnerships
Working with firms that know, understand, and live and breathe
the market is the best way to get a product into the right channels
and into the hands of end users. Markets are complex and working
with firms who know what they are doing will increase the chances
of success. When developing a strategy for a new product or range of
products, CI searches for marketing partnerships that will bring the
greatest market access and institutionalize products into the main
stream. A good example of a strategic partnership is what Déjà Shoe
is doing with vegetal leather.
Stay in Tune with the Market
Strategic partnerships also have the added benefit of keeping
producers informed about the market. However, firms have their
own agendas and may choose to communicate information selec
tively. Mechanisms should be established that will funnel market
information to producer groups on changing prices, trends, and
other news.
Diversify
Diversification of markets will minimize risk by reducing depen
dence on single clients or products. It can take place both horizon
tally and vertically.
Diversification can take place horizontally within a market by

  

      
increasing the size of the client base or expanding uses for the raw
materials. When building diversified markets horizontally, serious
consideration should be paid to the trade-off between long-term
market access and selling immediately to many outlets. For example,
in the personal care market, CI chose to work with a single supplier
in a given segment in order to get the biggest access to a large num
ber of end manufacturers. In addition, the supplier brings expertise
in safety testing, chemical analysis, sales, and marketing. The other
option would have been to facilitate sales directly to end manufac
turers. The decision to work with a single supplier was made after
thorough analysis and understanding of the expectations of main
stream end product users and their general lack of capacity to source
directly.
In addition, markets can be built vertically on the international,
regional, national, and local levels. A complete understanding of the
product’s economic value chain will reveal opportunities. In general,
demand will dictate the mix, but CI has found that the vertical mix
also depends on:
• geographical closeness to a specific market
• type of product manufactured
• quality and price
• nature of the industry
• production capacity of the producer group
Don’t Bank on the Green Premium
Consumers, particularly North American ones, are fickle, and
generally suspicious of green messages. While consumer polls tend
show a great desire to buy “green” or “environmentally friendly”
products, feedback from actual retailers indicates that, if given a
choice, most buyers choose a low price over green content. This is
an unfortunate reality, but a reality nonetheless. Products should
therefore be functional, price competitive, and of the highest qual
ity, and long-term, stable markets should be targeted.
CONCLUSION
Building markets for NTFPs requires strategic thinking, good
information, and common sense. Bringing isolated rainforest pro
ducers into the tumultuous mainstream market is a challenging task.
Flexibility, sound judgement, and the ability to make decisions
under a high level of uncertainty are needed to maximize success.
As a tool for creating an overall strategy for NTFP development
this paper is limited to enterprise and business issues. There are
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many other ecological and social criteria that must be included, such
as the ecological sustainability of particular products and the actual
conservation impact of the enterprise. Enterprise development and
marketing decisions should be taken within the context of estab
lished conservation goals for a particular ecosystem.
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q:
It seems that this sort of market development creates an infor
mation dependency and, additionally, requires producers to
conform to a “western”, or “northern” market construct. In
that light, is Conservation International investigating or pro
moting more localized markets, as opposed to strategies based
on, say, the US need for handbags or allspice?
SF:
Yes, we look at markets on local, regional, and international
levels — markets are markets, so although there is such a
thing as dependence on foreign markets, there is also such a
thing as dependence on regional and national markets. Often,
the risks are the same and the costs of failure are the same.
When looking at NTFPs, therefore, it is always important to
determine whether or not they make sense, whether or not
you are willing to do it, and whether or not you are willing to
take on the issues involved in working in the marketplace, and
how all this will affect conservation in a given area.
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Sharon Flynn Working Group
Sharon Flynn led the discussion with Conrad Reining, the Direc
tor of the Guatemala Program at Conservation International, and
Liza Grandia, a Yale student and Community Extensionist with
Conservation International in Guatemala. The discussion centered
on the interactions between local and global economies, and how
NTFPs fit into this context.
Is CI working in other parts of the world?
We are working in Asia, Africa and Latin America, in
regional, national and international markets. In Asia, the empha
sis is on the products, while in Latin America it is on the raw
materials. In Peru, we work with Brazil nuts, in Ecuador with
Tagua, and in Costa Rica and Panama with fruits for the national
market — actually for a fruit drink that McDonald’s is making
there. In Madagascar, we work on the local level with some basic
products and some handicrafts. CI looks at NTFPs as part of a
strong conservation strategy. Of course, to do this effectively, we
also have to consider the ecosystem and the situation in the
particular country to see how they can work with the NTFPs.
Q: You talked about people working in the communities, but how
are the people there involved with CI? Are they Guatemalans or
are they part of CI? How does it really work?
SF: It really depends on the program. Most of the CI personnel in
Guatemala are not gringos — they are local people. This is the
reason that CI was founded, 10 years ago — it was a break from
The Nature Conservancy because that wasn’t happening. Conrad
can give more detail about the program in Guatemala.
Conrad Reining: In broad terms, the strategy is one of conservation. We
have been working in the Maya Biosphere Reserve in Northern
Guatemala since 1990. The idea there has been to work with the
local communities because the central government in Guatemala
is pretty weak. You can’t count on the National Park Service or
government to do anything. Instead, we need to count on local
governments and people. The way we do this is to connect with
producer groups that are already using NTFPs, because they
already have a vested interest in seeing the forests survive. So
what we have done is approach and suggest to them ways of
working with these other NTFPs as well. We try to identify ways
to diversify and get around some of the problems with middle
men — to get more of the value to the local people. We spend a
lot of time going in and talking to these communities and telling
Q:
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them what it means to work with these products and building
the capacity of the community to develop these things on their
own with some technical assistance. The basic goal is get the
local groups empowered. This then becomes the tool of conser
vation because once something is set up you have built a con
stituency within the community that wants to conserve the
forests. It might not be a lot of people but if they are interested in
conserving the forest then at least there is a local voice.
I work in Brazil where sometimes we have problems when the
communities start to commercialize NTFPs. There is always one
big company that is getting the product and putting it on the
market. How does a company, such as The Body Shop or Ben &
Jerry’s, really put money back into the community? I don’t see
how it is possible to make these NTFPs sustainable and help the
community — what will compel these companies to return the
money? Furthermore, is this conservation strategy really sustain
able? Once these projects leave the communities, we have found
that communities cannot sustain the NTFP. So how can we
improve the ability of these communities to maintain these
NTFPs?
To maintain sustainability they have to use the right strategies.
The NGOs need to have it done correctly — NGOs can really
push the market around and this is how they can be most effec
tively involved. They can push the market in the right direction,
but it needs to be done correctly. Also, there has to be the man
agement capacity within the communities. What often happens
is that there isn’t the education provided and there isn’t the
training provided. If the communities don’t know how to man
age the NTFPs, then you have to have skills development to have
long-term management of the community enterprise. You can’t
ask the community to do something that they are unable to do.
Usually, they don’t have the technological skills to do the whole
product.
On the company side, any business faces the challenge to
make as much money as possible. In these situations, where the
company might be the only source of information for a single
tribe, it has a strong incentive to manipulate their trade relation
ship. I agree with Terry Turner in his analysis of this dynamic;
however, I think that companies need to be recognized for the
values they have — they are not necessarily all fat cats, and some
do approach their suppliers with a genuine concern for equable
relations. Nevertheless, the producer needs to understand the value
of the market, the company, and the particular product. Ultimately,
you don’t want to remain dependent on one single company.
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I think a good example of this is the Mutran family in Brazil who
supplies Ben & Jerry’s. In this case, there is a single family mak
ing a lot of money from the NTFPs. The communities add value
through processing and by providing the basis for a green mes
sage, but the Mutrans do not share any of the profit.
The Mutrans are an example of a monopolistic regime. This is the
kind of thing CI is working to change. They control the Brazil nut
trade out of Brazil and they control the market there. They control
all the information and all for their benefit. They are greedy and a
lot of producer groups can be screwed over in the process — they
are an extreme example of control of the market place. On the
other hand, companies do add value. The Mutrans probably add
value as well because they know suppliers in Brazil and they have
connections in the international marketplace.
This is where your research and understanding of the value
chain can help in determining what you should do. Interventions
can be made, but you need to understand what is going on. It is
not easy to break a monopoly like the Mutrans. It is hard for a
lot of producers to get together because each controls only a
small percentage of the marketplace. They are all competing, as
well, and need to make wise decisions. Idealistic goals like break
ing up the Mutrans are not realistic, but there might be a lot of
other things we can do to get around monopolies. Cultural
Survival does this kind of thing.
How do you analyze the market for a certain product? Can you
walk us through this process?
Basically it is just a lot of research: who are the major players,
how are the products sourced, what are the distribution strate
gies, what are the different types of products, and so on. I know a
lot about the personal care market, for example, and I had to
learn it all before I could begin to be active in it with NTFPs. You
need to understand how all these things work. Take The Body
Shop — they operate in a $60 billion market. This is a big mar
ket and the end manufacturer is going to want to have complete
control over the product. They need a lot of different quantities
and qualities of the different products. Plus, there is a lot of FDA
oversight. All the while we need to figure out all these factors as
we develop our strategies. We have to look at the suppliers and
the industry trends and read the magazine articles. So, to be
independent, these NTFP producers need to understand the
markets. They need to talk to these companies and figure out
what is good and bad about working with them. We are con
stantly studying all the information and trying to make decisions
based on what is going on — the decision is coming from research.
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I was a Peace Corps agroforestry volunteer in Mali. There, I
worked to establish local markets in Mali and was working with
rural community groups to try to develop local markets. In Mali,
many Indigenous plant and animal products had been replaced
by western goods, but now urban populations no longer have the
money to buy these goods. So we were trying to find ways to
introduce these local products back into the market, and I think
maybe the challenges were a little different.
Well, no matter what market you are dealing with, you need to
ask the same questions: who is the market; does it make sense;
what is the product?
Is there resistance on the part of the local urban population
because they don’t want their own products and maybe they see
the western products as better?
That is an important issue, but it isn’t a driving force. We’re
trying to find products that make sense and that people want —
that’s a market, and it doesn’t matter where it is. If international
markets make sense for the volumes that these projects produce,
then that’s fine. Often times there aren’t national markets for
these products, as is the case in Guatemala. So, we look at what
ever market we can that will work and that will help diversify the
production.
There is a competitive advantage with Guatemala, in particular
— it is close to the US. Sometimes people think international
markets are more risky but that’s not always true. For example,
selling to the Mutrans might be more risky then selling to Ben
and Jerry’s.
International trade has a lot of experience with various goods, so
adding another product can fit into existing market structures.
There are ecological problems that can arise from market in
volvement and there are market problems that can arise from
ecological concerns. A market driven boom-bust cycle can de
velop that is detrimental to natural populations, or an ecosystem
may not be able to supply the volumes demanded by the market.
How do you reconcile these forces?
To avoid problems of having communities getting involved in
projects that eventually fail, we start projects at a small scale and
then build from there. You need to make sure that the market
makes sense, and some communities can begin doing the prod
uct. Something that people talk about is the idea of franchising.
Think of a community building a franchise and an NGO subsidy
to figure out what is going on in the market place. Once the
community owns the technology and is a business that is inter
facing with the market, then you can build leverage. Once one
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community has gotten it figured out, then it can negotiate with
other communities. You can’t have an NGO go and tell all these
communities what to do because there are often errors in com
municating the message correctly. It goes back to risk, and how
you manage and absorb risk, and being conservative in your
actions.
CR: This might not create a lot of jobs right away and you will have
only a small amount of production at first, but you want to
expand slowly — you don’t want these boom and bust things.
You need to keep expectations really low, so that people don’t
expose themselves to too much risk. If say you only have four
jobs but the project ends up with eight jobs, that’s a bonus. Then
you can think that you did more then you thought you were
going to do.
Liza Grandia: Also, I think it’s important that everyone knows what is
going on so the community isn’t mad if the expectations are not
met.
Q: Do you run into ideological conflicts with other NGOs about
how to change things? How do you work around this and does it
deter your work?
SF: These conflicts deter the work of the entire conservation move
ment. CI has pissed off some people at The Nature Conservancy
as well as WWF, and as a result some people have come over to
CI. This has been detrimental and there are still some hard feel
ings. Even within CI there is a challenge to NTFPs and enterprise
development. The staff of anthropologists, sociologists, and
ecologists don’t like what I am doing. These people look at what
I am doing and say “yuck — this is capitalism!” So again, don’t
forget this is capitalism — you can’t do it and pretend it’s not.
Producer groups and SEED enterprises speak the same language
— they understand the buy and sell mechanism, but the problem
comes when NGOs have different views of what capitalism
should be. CI isn’t trying to change the whole market, we are
only trying to change a small part of it. We are capitalists and
that’s what we pursue, but CI is not interested in reconstructing
economies — we encounter problems because of that.
Q: What are some of that challenges that you face in marketing
NTFPs? Is transportation of the products a challenge?
SF: Cost. Transportation is a cost. For example, in the Colombian
Choco there is only one small road so you need a boat. It costs
$2000 to get in there — the same price as to get to New York. So,
yes, transportation is expensive and you need to include these
things in your business plans, otherwise you won’t realize the
costs until they finally kill the project.
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Global Trade and the Rainforests: Corporate Growth vs Indigenous Prosperity
in Tropical Countries
John W. Friede
Director, Worldview, Ltd.
ABSTRACT
Newly established instruments, such as the World Trade Organization and the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
are serving to open international markets by dismantling barriers to free trade between nations. This will serve to
facilitate the entrance, and hence the dominance, of multinational corporations in developing nations. Concerned only
with their own profit, these corporations will inevitably deplete these nations’ natural resources while maintaining their
populations in a state of poverty. Domestic fiscal policies have been emasculated as social instruments by these arrange
ments, and, at present, tropical rainforests and their associated cultures are nearly defenseless.

INTRODUCTION: A NEW ERA FOR GLOBAL TRADE
In December 1994 the United States joined 124 other countries
in the newest expansion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). This expansion significantly reduces barriers to
trade by lowering tariffs around the world by $744 billion over the
next decade, and creates the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
police trade among nations (Sanger 1994). The treaty addresses
diverse themes that affect tropical countries such as intellectual
property rights and agricultural subsidies.
By liberalizing trade rules, the WTO further transfers authority
from governments to corporate leaders whose activities are guided
solely by the profit motive. Able to effectively “externalize” environ
mental and social costs, many of the corporations likely to prosper
are bigger than sovereign nations. Ford, for example, has an
economy larger than Saudi Arabia and Norway combined (Barnet
and Cavanaugh 1994). The treaty ignores legitimate concerns for
accountability and citizen participation since dispute resolution
mechanisms remain shielded from public scrutiny. The toll in the
tropics includes accelerating rainforest loss, cultural genocide, and
species extinction. Several elements of the agreement subvert efforts
to encourage sustainable development.
THE DEBT CRISIS AND RAINFOREST DESTRUCTION
International lending agencies have loaned heavily to less indus
trial tropical countries because of their rich resource base and ap
parent potential for economic growth. As interest rates climbed in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, tropical countries amassed huge
foreign debts while the market value dropped dramatically for cash
crops such as coffee and tea. The resultant debt crisis led to spending

  

      
cuts in public services such as health care and environmental protec
tion, promoting the intense exploitation of the less industrial coun
tries’ natural resources (Adams 1991; Lambert 1991).
The debt crisis continues to be a major catalyst of tropical defor
estation. It is no coincidence that the five countries with the largest
rainforest areas are also among the world’s most indebted
(Revington 1992). International lending agencies committed to the
“market economy” fail to recognize the role of global trade in the
process of deforestation. As long as this trade results in foreign debt,
opportunities to pursue sustainable development will be scarce
(Myers 1992). Sustainable development is development that seeks to
meet present needs, without compromising the capacity to meet the
needs of future generations (Rural Advancement Foundation Inter
national [RAFI] 1994).
Membership in the WTO restricts rainforest countries’ ability to
conserve scarce natural resources by eliminating trade barriers such
as government export controls. Trade policy removes limits on how
much timber can be extracted from tropical forests, undermining
efforts to develop markets for sustainably produced forest products.
In addition, democratically established tropical timber boycotts are
threatened. To keep them, nations may be required to pay the WTO
a trade penalty.
TIMBER AND MINING ACTIVITIES: A GLOBAL VIEW
No country with valuable natural resources has pursued its long
term best interests by giving them away. Nevertheless, new WTO
trade rules have made bans on whole log exports illegal, discourag
ing local processing of wood products and obliging tropical coun
tries to make these and other resources available to the highest
bidder.
These bidders include Japanese companies that dominate the
tropical timber industry, valued at over $8 billion annually
(Rainforest Action Network 1989). These companies control the
global chain of timber trade and can deprive tropical forest govern
ments of tax revenue by allowing subsidiaries in tropical countries
to run at a loss.
Traditional systems of forest property rights and management in
Indonesia have been supplanted by timber concessions and develop
ment schemes — which grant rights to a few stakeholders at the
expense of many others (Barber, Johnson, and Haflid 1993). The
timber industry employs only 0.2% of Indonesia’s total labor force.
Recently, this industry bulldozed highly productive rattan and fruit
gardens of the Dayak peoples of East Kalimantan under military
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escort. They clearcut all standing timber leaving nothing but ruined
gardens, angry Dayaks, and damaged, exposed topsoil (Anonymous
1994).
In Malaysia, huge timber concessions have been awarded, and
the subsequent export of forest products from this region is respon
sible for 30 to 40% of deforestation. The export industry has already
caused erosion, water contamination, species extinction and the
annihilation of Indigenous cultures (Lambert 1991). In 1990,
Sarawak’s logging industry generated about $2 billion in foreign
exchange. However, environmental and human rights activists warn
that the last remains of the ancient Borneo rainforest are being
permanently extinguished at a rate three times faster than the Ama
zon rainforest (Human Rights Watch/Natural Resources Defense
Council 1992).
In Thailand, commercial logging led to a decrease in forest cover
from 29% to 19% of the land area between 1985 and 1988 (Lambert
1991). In 1988, unusually heavy rains hit Thailand’s deforested
slopes resulting in landslides that covered entire villages. Four hun
dred and sixty people died and thousands were left homeless (Miller
and Tangley 1991). Under the WTO, reforestation programs are
now a trade violation.
Increased participation by rainforest countries in agreements
with international mining companies has historically hurt, and will
continue to hurt, these countries and their Indigenous populations.
In 1967, a subsidiary of US Steel called Meridional was responsible
for the discovery of the immense Carajás iron ore deposit which
may ultimately destroy 16% of the entire Amazon rainforest. The
greatest destruction occurs when timber is gathered from Indig
enous lands for the project’s pig-iron smelting factories (Balée
1994). Throughout the Amazon rainforest, roughly a million gold
miners are disrupting aquatic ecosystems with mercury pollution
(Lovejoy 1994). As a result of their activities, the livelihood of the
Yanomami and other Indigenous nations is threatened (Weiss and
Weiss 1993).
In southern Mexico, 450 Lacandón Maya Indians are currently
fighting logging interests who have carved roads into their rainforest
home, the largest remaining tropical rainforest in North America
(Nations 1988). Increased international trade has been described as
a “death sentence” for their survival as a culture (Tyndall 1994).
Their struggle to protect their timber and other natural resources —
and the billions of dollars that investors have lost as a result of the
agreement’s inability to integrate Indigenous needs — brings to the
forefront the downside of the free market throughout the tropics.

[The Lacandón Maya] struggle to pro
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CORPORATE FARMS DISPLACE TRADITIONAL LAND
OWNERS
A basic premise of free trade wrongly assumes that competition
and efficiency improve living standards for everyone. New global
trade rules ban import controls, requiring tropical countries to open
their borders to multinational corporations whose agricultural
products are often produced below the cost of domestic production.
Farmers are forced to intensify production to make up in volume
what they lose from lower prices. Indigenous food production sys
tems are replaced by monoculture export crops like tobacco, sugar,
or cotton which require heavy chemical use, impoverish the soil,
and displace small farmers. The displaced farmers either move fur
ther into tropical forests, slashing and burning for subsistence farm
ing, or become part of the growing urban poor (Rainforest Action
Network 1992; Ritchie 1992).
Multinational corporations are poised to take advantage of mar
ket participation by tropical countries; the 500 largest corporations
control 70% of world trade. Strong international competition will
keep unemployment high and salaries low in developing countries
but, as Henry Ford once said, “If you cut wages, you just cut the
number of your customers” (Barnet and Cavanaugh 1994). Com
mon sense dictates that this global system cannot last long.
In the Philippines, millions of farmers of rice, corn and sugar
may soon be displaced because of their government’s decision to
switch production to export high-value crops like flowers (Tyndall
1995). Farmers in Malaysia and Brazil will soon face a similar fate as
their governments switch production to high-value crops for export.
As traditional landowners are displaced, cultures are lost and bil
lions of people lose their sense of self and community. The surplus
of gifted, skilled, undervalued, and unwanted human beings consti
tutes the forgotten victims of an emerging global system which
prizes the efficient production of goods for export revenue more
than the dignity of human beings.
EMERGING ISSUES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Under pressure from industrial countries, the Uruguay Round of
the GATT formalized Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) on the grounds that the absence of patent protection in
some countries could amount to non-tariff barriers. Multinational
corporations gather information from the genetically rich tropical
countries, manipulate it with rapidly evolving biotechnology exper
tise and then patent the new seeds, pharmaceuticals or other prod
ucts. Indigenous peoples receive nothing in the bargain, because
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under the new trade rules naturally occurring organisms are not
patentable, though genetically altered ones are.
Recognizing the contributions of Indigenous people is crucial.
Indigenous knowledge fuels multi-billion dollar industries, ranging
from food and pharmaceuticals to chemicals, paper products, and
energy. By consulting Indigenous peoples, specialist bio-prospectors
can increase their success ratio from one out of 10,000 samples to
one out of two. Had US researchers taken advantage of Indigenous
advice when collecting plants in the 1950s and 1960s, their success
rate could have doubled (RAFI 1994).
Giant pharmaceutical companies benefit the most in their agree
ments with tropical countries rich in biodiversity. In Merck
Pharmaceutical’s arrangement with Costa Rica, Merck receives
10,000 plant, animal or microbial samples for $130 per sample.
Since Merck invests an average of $125 million on research for each
drug, the discovery charge for one drug arising from the Costa Rica
agreement is barely loose change for Merck. Merck’s sales in 1991
alone were $8.6 billion, while Costa Rica’s entire Gross National
Product was less than $5.2 billion. For Merck, the Costa Rica con
tract is a bargain (RAFI 1994).
Merck’s sales are indicative of the economic value of
biodiversity. It has been estimated that each medicinal plant that
goes extinct could cost drug firms more than $200 million in sales.
Just two drugs derived from Madagascar’s rosy periwinkle earn
pharmaceutical companies more than $100 million annually as anti
cancer and childhood leukemia drugs. Pau d’arco, a medicinal plant
from Latin America long used to combat malaria and cancers, has a
current market value estimated at $200 million (RAFI 1994).
As private companies move into Less Industrial Countries’ seed
markets, Indigenous farmers are finding themselves paying for the
end product of their own genius. For example, amaranth varieties
based on material originating in Latin America have been patented
in the United States and are now being marketed in Mexico and
Peru where farmers are being forced to pay royalties on their own
inventions (RAFI 1994). Industry’s interest in tropical products,
such as natural oils, adhesives and latexes, will greatly ac celerate the
rate at which corporations make claims on Indigenous resources.

As private companies move into Less
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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: ROOTED IN THE LAND
In the face of this global system, about 1,000 rainforest cultures
still exist (Revington 1992). Nearly all are in conflict with the ex
panding industrial economy which has been insatiable in its demand
for minerals, timber, energy and other material inputs. Globe-span
ning production lines link consumers to tribal societies — to their

  

      
dispossession and to the rending of their ancient cultures.
The rapid loss of tropical biodiversity threatens the survival of
Indigenous peoples. Approximately 100 species per day are becom
ing extinct. More species are lost per week now than were lost in
total during the preceding three centuries (RAFI 1994). In 1990, the
Colombian Government gave back half its rainforests to its rightful
Indigenous owners, acknowledging that they were the best guardians
of the forest. The role of tribal peoples as caretakers can be appreci
ated by studying how closely existing Indigenous territories overlap
the area covered by the world’s threatened rainforests. Where the
rights of native peoples have been ignored, attempts to save
rainforests have been uniformly unsuccessful (Revington 1992).
Central to the struggle of landless peoples is agrarian reform. In
Brazil, just 2% of the landowners control 60% of the nation’s arable
land, and at least half of this land lies idle, since landowners often
regard land more as a status symbol than a source of crop produc
tion (Bellamy 1992). Extractive reserves have been established as
land use systems that have the potential to reconcile forest protec
tion with the needs and rights of Indigenous peoples (Viana et al.
1994). Since their inception, rubber tappers have recognized that
raw material production as an economic baseline for extractive
reserves has been a losing proposition. They have pursued improved
processing techniques and new product development as part of a
larger package of alternatives (Schwartzman 1995).
According to nineteenth-century economist Henry Charles
Carey, self-reliance is better achieved by the pursuit of commerce as
opposed to trade — commerce being defined as short-distance
exchange, while trade occurs over long distances. Commerce builds
community by binding together its productive elements. Long dis
tance trade undermines community by separating those who make
fundamental decisions that affect our future from those who must
live with the consequences of those decisions. Commerce nurtures
local ownership, but trade spawns absentee ownership. Commerce
encourages self-reliance; trade encourages dependence (Morris
1994). The abandonment of Indigenous groups’ sovereignty was
never subject to their approval, yet they are subject to the rules of
world trade as administered by the WTO. In response, Indigenous
communities should not move toward environmental entrepreneur
ship but toward collective self-reliance.
Recent initiatives by Indigenous groups reveal positive ap
proaches to establish economic self-sufficiency. For example, a
group of Kayapo Indians has set aside some of their forest as a re
serve for tourism, and some for research that will aid sustainable use
practices.

 

Commerce builds community by bind
ing together its productive elements.
Long distance trade undermines com
munity by separating those who make
fundamental decisions that affect our
future from those who must live with
the consequences of those decisions.
Commerce nurtures local ownership,
but trade spawns absentee ownership.

 
Those who participate in the new wave of colonialism, made
possible by global markets, should take to heart the words of one of
the most influential economists of the twentieth century, John
Maynard Keynes:
I sympathize therefore, with those who would minimize,
rather than those who would maximize, economic entangle
ments between nations. Ideas, knowledge, science, hospital
ity — these are the things that should by their nature be
international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is
reasonably and conveniently possible and above all, let fi
nance be primarily national (Daly 1994).
CONCLUSION
For the last fifty years, international financial agreements have
served as a political strategy of social transformation in tropical
countries at two levels: global and domestic. On the global level,
foreign debt was amassed, opening up national economies. On the
domestic level, an economic assault on the living standards of the
masses ensued. If industrial countries want to help tropical coun
tries, they should consider forgiving foreign debt and substitute
their hegemony for equitable exchange. Unfortunately, much of the
impoverishment of tropical countries caused by international trade
has been institutionalized by the WTO. The new trade rules are
based on the unsound assumption espoused by multinational cor
porations: unlimited natural resources exist worldwide.
The WTO eclipses international lending agencies as the most
significant threat to true sustainable development. The treaty con
centrates decision-making power in the hands of unaccountable
trade experts whose mission is to facilitate corporate access around
the globe. As Greenpeace International said in their 1992 report
UNCED Undermined, participation by tropical countries and Indig
enous peoples in this agreement will promote their “increased sub
ordination to market forces at the expense of local self-reliance,
sovereignty, democracy, and the biological and cultural diversity
necessary for ecologically sound and socially equitable develop
ment” (Rouht-Arriaza 1992).
To counter this, tropical countries need to develop domestic
production for internal markets, and support Indigenous initiatives
that further the process of self-empowerment, enabling all people,
including the poorest, to secure their basic needs and rights while
protecting the environment.
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QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q:
What do you think we can do about this?
JF:
Part of what we can do is give Indigenous peoples who have
been caretakers of the forest for thousands of years at least a
voice in how it’s managed today. We need to give them some
respect for their sovereignty and support efforts for selfreliance… and revoke the charters of a few big multinationals!
Q:
We are applying old economic models to new problems — we
need new models. I have found that there is a great deal of
good intentions, but I don’t think the tools we need to affect
change are available. How can we do this?
JF:
Worldview’s philosophy is to work in your community — the
power of your community is the power that is most accessible
to you. You don’t have to compromise there, because you
know what you want. The key is to link up with like-minded
folks in other communities. Horizontal connections will
enable us to move forward together.
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John Friede Working Group
A broad range of topics was discussed, but few solutions were
offered. Many big questions were left unanswered, including what
can be done to address barriers to trade while ensuring that local
communities are incorporated and treated fairly by international
markets. The general theme centered on where to choose one’s
battles in the era of the GATT, and a need for an overhaul of the
international economic system to remedy these problems.
MAJOR TOPICS
THE STANDARDIZATION OF CONSUMERISM
Local peoples are buying into extra-local markets on all scales.
Nevertheless, most of the economic resources are held by a minor
ity. As communities move into increasing states of consumerism, if
one is not economically secure one can not be in control of other
aspects of personal life, including health care and education.

Business opportunities could provide
the opportunity to transfer manage
ment skills and power to local peoples,
but what are the incentives to busi
nesses to conduct appropriate prac
tices?

FACILITATION OF NETWORKS
Worldwide grassroots communities are drawing on political
support and the facilitation of communication. One example is the
Native Forest Network, an Australian and United States organiza
tion that empowers grassroots programs by sharing technical infor
mation and resources. Regional technology is allowing for increased
communication and networking through faxes, phones, and GIS
mapping. However, this technology is not always a positive force for
natural resource conservation or management, as the same tools are
often used to identify exploitable resources. In each situation, ap
propriate technology must be used.
THE ROLE OF BUSINESS
Business opportunities could provide the opportunity to transfer
management skills and power to local peoples, but what are the
incentives to businesses to conduct appropriate practices? It is im
portant for the communities involved to have all of the information
they need about the companies in question. Business involvement
can undermine local control, nevertheless, there are many opportu
nities and benefits of community based and managed enterprises.
Communities which become dependent on businesses become
subject to the fallout of the market. If markets decline, the commu
nities usually cannot subsist on the commodities they are producing,
such as cut flowers or coffee. Some development projects are looking

  

      
at ways to mitigate the effects of business on communities through
searching for niche markets, diversifying products, and adding value
in the community.
THE ROLE OF NATIONS
Nations can be a positive force if they have an agenda that is not
profit oriented. To ensure this, greater participation by local groups
is needed in the national political arena. Nevertheless, the positive or
negative effects of national governments on communities depend on
who those communities are. For example, ethnic minorities that are
not considered citizens may be targeted for exclusively negative
influences by national governments.
The role of regional governments is often extremely important in
natural resource management. For example, in South Africa, the
States determine and implement environmental regulations. How
ever, even though governments are instituting such regulations,
NGOs are often closer to primary production and to communities
than are national governments, and are thus often in a better posi
tion to understand the dynamics and to work for positive change.
OUR CONSUMPTIVE BEHAVIOR
We, the industrialized world, must recognize our own consump
tive patterns as causal agents in tropical exploitation. This awareness
relies upon more effective education in consuming nations and a
change in the way success is measured — it can’t continue to be
strictly monetary.
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Appropriate Geomatic Technology for Local Earth Observation
Peter Poole
LEO Project
ABSTRACT
Geomatics is a useful new term for the use of advanced information technologies for the recording, storage, manipula
tion and analysis of geographical imagery. It includes remote sensing, global positioning systems and computer-based
image manipulation and analysis. While high technology geomatics has tended to concentrate analytical power, recently
developed, affordable systems now permit land-based peoples to use geomatics in pursuing land claims and environ
mental monitoring. New, off-the-shelf information technology makes it possible to mimic satellite-sensing capabilities in
light-aircraft based systems that are more appropriate for local applications. The Local Earth Observation Project has
adopted an applications-driven approach and built a complete system that can act as an alternative or complement to
satellite systems. Its capabilities are consistent with expressed needs of many land-based communities and with the
implementation priorities of the Biodiversity Convention.

The idea for this project, Local Earth Observation, came to mind
after meeting with NASA officials working on the Earth Observing
System (EOS), a constellation of satellites to be launched in 1996 as
an instrument for planetary management. Data streams from these
satellites will flow into computer models designed to mimic vital
earth processes and reveal significant trends. Ultimately these will be
converted into options, or justifications, for political decisions.
This is not a comforting prospect. The track record for interna
tional environmental negotiations is discouraging and it is difficult
to believe that the self-serving nationalism so conspicuous in the
debate over ozone and climate change will be suspended when it
comes to selecting among likely options. Delegations at the 1992
Earth Summit consistently championed national interests rather
than commit to the cooperative actions needed to address global
environmental issues.
Satellite systems concentrate vast arrays of sensitive data in the
hands of institutions supported by the industrialized nations. Since
first introduced in the 1970s, their output has been monopolized by
organizations with the technical capacity to analyze complex data:
land management agencies, resource corporations and academic
researchers. The prices for satellite imagery, initially subsidized, have
risen to as much as $5000 for a single frame. Plans to privatize pro
cessing and distribution of satellite information are likely to restrict
access by increasing prices further.
Remote sensing is often referred to as a “technology in search of
an application.” During its brief history, it has always been technol
ogy-driven — a hangover from its military origins. Although justi
fied in terms of potential applications, academic research reinforces
this tendency by focusing upon sophisticated and subtle technical

 

 
operations invariably unsuitable for operationalization. This has
generated an enormous literature but virtually no action.
TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES FOR LOCAL EARTH
OBSERVATION
Technological imperatives, military origins, institutional re
search and political convenience have combined to advance remote
sensing as a technology that concentrates rather than diffuses the
power that comes with the possession of global information. This
has been widely presented as inevitable but this is no longer the case.
New information technologies from a variety of sources can be
integrated to make cheap and credible alternatives to space-based
systems.
The LEO Project is an effort to explore and demonstrate this
alternative, to counter these concentrating tendencies with one that
is dispersive, to shift from technology-driven to applications-driven
systems, to localize geomatic technology so as to empower landbased people and environmental NGOs in remote areas, and to
democratize access to environmental information that is becoming
increasingly significant and occasionally proprietary. In deciding
what technologies to mobilize in taking this direction, we took
account of global and local trends from an applications perspective.

With virtually no technical resources
at their disposal, the communities scat
tered throughout these lands are faced
with a huge double task: to protect
their territory from intrusive settlement
and industrial resource exploitation,
and to adapt and reinforce traditions
of sustainable resource utilization in a
contemporary context.

APPLICATIONS FRAMEWORK: GLOBAL SCALE
On a global or continental scale, three current trends set a frame
work for developing local capacities to collect and apply environ
mental information: 1) Negotiations between Indigenous Peoples
and national governments. 2) An increasing focus upon commu
nity-based or people-centered conservation. 3) The emergence of
global conservation agreements which call upon governments to
recognize the historical contribution of land-based peoples to
biodiversity conservation and support them as exponents of sustain
able resource development.
REGAINING INDIGENOUS LANDS IN THE AMERICAS
It has been estimated that the current round of negotiations will
lead to Indigenous Peoples regaining various degrees of control over
a third of the Amazon Basin, and to about 13% of the Americas in
total. With virtually no technical resources at their disposal, the
communities scattered throughout these lands are faced with a huge
double task: to protect their territory from intrusive settlement and
industrial resource exploitation, and to adapt and reinforce tradi
tions of sustainable resource utilization in a contemporary context.

  

      
It is self-evident that traditional knowledge and practice has
proven sufficient to care for these lands in the absence of external
pressures. Such traditions remain at the core of many current
projects to reinforce local resource economies. But this knowledge
does not necessarily equip local groups to deal with the manifold
effects of distant industrial economies in remote areas: the impacts
of roads, mines and dams, trans-boundary pollution, deforestation,
and colonization. Geomatic technology, if localized, has the poten
tial to amplify the capacities of small, scattered communities to
monitor and protect large territories.
COMMUNITY BASED CONSERVATION
The principles and practices of environmental conservation have
evolved within the western scientific community, with a strategic
focus upon protected areas and species. It is now widely acknowl
edged that a protected area system must often be combined with the
active engagement of land-based people in the management of the
resources upon which they directly depend. The idea of communitybased conservation has taken hold within the environmental com
munity, and mainstream NGOs have launched programs designed
to involve peoples living close to protected areas. But concrete
accomplishments are rare, and this idea is in danger of becoming an
empty slogan, prompting deference rather than action — compul
sory rhetoric found only in the Vision Statement of project propos
als.
While initiatives taken by conservation groups are producing
ambiguous results, another set of historical circumstances is
prompting land-based peoples to assume a more assertive role in
conservation; to seize the conservation agenda. They are realizing
the negotiating advantage that comes with a better data base and are
adapting advanced mapping and information technologies in imagi
native ways: to gather and record traditional local knowledge, to
demarcate and protect recovered lands, to restore degraded habitats,
and to manage traditional resources under sustained use regimes.
These experiences demonstrate that “owning” the information
about land and resources can be as important as owning the land
itself. This idea is gaining currency in Indigenous strategies to re
gain, confirm, and exercise authority over traditional lands. Argu
ably, these activities also qualify as virtual implementation of the
Biodiversity Convention.
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THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION AND AGENDA 21
The global conventions emerging from the 1992 Earth Summit
are essentially designed to repair the damage inflicted by incoherent
industrial resource exploitation, much of it on lands appropriated
from Indigenous peoples. Although this is not explicitly stated, it is
clearly implied in language which calls upon national governments
to respect the unique contribution of Indigenous knowledge and
practice and to support its application in implementing these agree
ments. Scientific advisory groups are now discussing structures and
methodologies for implementing the Biodiversity Convention. A
recent Open-Ended Intergovernmental Meeting of Scientific Experts
on Biological Diversity (UNEP 1994) was charged with the “identifi
cation of innovative, efficient, and state-of-the-art technologies [on]
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity...” Six tech
nologies were prioritized:
• habitat, vegetation, and gene-variation mapping
• regional mapping technologies
• remote sensing for spatial heterogeneity and complexity
• geographic information systems
• aerial survey, patrol, and photography
• traditional knowledge of territories and habitats
These priorities correspond to the goals of the LEO Project and
to the expressed interests of many land-based communities.
APPLICATIONS FRAMEWORK: LOCAL SCALE
SURVEYS OF LOCAL NEEDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
INFORMATION
Technical development was based on surveys of over 200 conser
vation projects initiated by Indigenous or land-based communities
(Poole 1994, 1995), about half of them involving some aspect of
geomatics. This led to a first approximation of the needs and inter
ests in locally-acquired environmental information. The main con
clusion was that simple photo and video technology is sufficient to
meet most current local needs. On the basis of these surveys, appli
cations fall within five general categories:

Simple photo and video technology is
sufficient to meet most current local
needs.

• Mapping Land Use and Occupancy: In support of negotiations
over land, high-resolution and geocoded photography of
traditional sites provide irrefutable evidence of occupancy.

  

      
• Demarcating Traditional Territories: GPS units have been used
very effectively in self-demarcation projects. In some cases,
aerial imagery has been used to plan demarcations.
• Protecting Demarcated Lands: The kinds of boundary markers
that meet the regulations have little effect upon incursions
and some groups in the Amazon are looking into GPS/video
monitoring systems adaptable to light or ultralight aircraft.
High resolution is not necessary — ordinary video is quite
sufficient to detect changes near boundaries.
• Biodiversity Conservation and Management: The wide range of
local applications using both photo and video includes
habitat mapping, animal census-taking, water quality moni
toring, and forest management.
• Ecological Damage Assessment and Restoration: Assessing
impacts of industrial forestry, mining, water pollution, and
monitoring the progress of landscape restoration projects.
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY FOR LOCAL
EARTH OBSERVATION
The most critical decisions in designing the LEO system were
about which technologies to exclude, on the grounds of cost or
unnecessary complexity. Among the lessons learned from these
surveys is that many users do not need photogrammetric accuracies
of a few centimeters, nor do they need acute and specific spectral
data. To detect and monitor incursions on protected lands, video is
adequate. To make inventories of the biodiversity of small sites, high
resolution photography is sufficient. A combination of video and
photo is adequate for general or detailed monitoring of habitat
regeneration.
Advances in the development of light aircraft remote sensing
systems has followed two main paths. One is in refining imaging
systems by increasing spectral sensitivity. The other is in improving
the positional accuracy of the acquired imagery.
The first path has yielded a generation of video-based “multi
spectral scanners” capable of capturing data in narrow spectral
bands, or “windows.” Such scanners are excluded from the LEO
system on the grounds that these are more suitable for basic scien
tific research than routine mapping and monitoring operations.
Sophisticating the LEO technology in this direction would yield
diminishing returns in terms of the expressed needs of land-based
communities.
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GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS)
The second path of development is in the technology used to
guide survey missions and record the position of the images. This
uses the Global Positioning System (GPS), originally designed to
enable submarines to locate themselves more accurately. It com
prises a net of 24 satellites that emit signals that can be picked up by
a GPS receiver. When three signals are received, the GPS unit auto
matically computes and displays its geographic position as a
“waypoint.” Users can enter their own waypoints into the GPS unit
and then use it to navigate between any series of waypoints. The
GPS unit can also compute ground speed, time of arrival, and so on.
In the world of mapping, GPS technology is exerting an impact
equivalent to that of the transistor in the world of communications.
Coupling GPS units with cameras generates a powerful system for
environmental monitoring. This union has two attributes. First, all
images are “geocoded” — that is, the center point of the image is
recorded to an accuracy of 100m or better. Once geocoded, these
images can be compared with any other kind of geocoded data,
including maps, aerial photographs, and satellite images. It facili
tates local-global data trade. Geocoded information is also acquiring
a degree of legal acceptance, useful in responding to incursions on
Indigenous lands.
The second attribute is that air survey missions can be flown
without using maps. The GPS satellite net literally guides the aircraft
along a predetermined mission track and fires the cameras at appro
priate intervals. All mission tracks are stored in the notebook com
puter which integrates the imaging and guidance systems. These
flight patterns can be recalled and reflown at any time, making this a
useful system for monitoring environmental change.
Geocoding also equips local groups to engage in direct data
transactions with satellite systems such as EOS. They can amplify
satellite imagery by gathering highly detailed data from specific sites
through the same spectral window. This “ground-truthing” of satel
lite information is a service continually needed by such systems.
This is recognized by NASA, which runs an informal Light Aircraft
Research Program, exploring real-time linkages between light air
craft and EOS.

Following a strategy of demonstrating
rather than debating the merits of this
approach, we have constructed a map
ping and monitoring light aircraft,
equipped with an integrated mission
guidance and imaging system.

THE LEO ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND MAPPING
SYSTEM
The LEO Project develops technology to enable local groups,
communities, and agencies to acquire, analyze, and apply the infor
mation needed for biodiversity conservation and the sustainable
development of renewable resources. Following a strategy of dem-

  

      
onstrating rather than debating the merits of this approach, we have
constructed a mapping and monitoring light aircraft, equipped with
an integrated mission guidance and imaging system using the most
simple technology consistent with operational utility and safety. It
has these elements:
Aircraft
The aircraft used is a Murphy Rebel, in the experimental cat
egory. It has been substantially modified for remote area operations
with the addition of long-range tanks, reinforced landing gear, a
three-bladed propeller, and numerous reinforcements to the fuse
lage. Two camera hatches and equipment racks that will accept 70kg
of equipment have been installed behind the two seats.
Mission Guidance System
This is based upon an SEL 2000 GPS unit connected to the imag
ing system via a notebook computer. The computer display can be
used interactively with local users when planning missions and
provides an image to guide the pilot along the predetermined survey
track. This image can also be transferred to a navigation screen on
the panel.
Gyro-Stabilized Mount
The GPS records the position of the aircraft in space at the mo
ment of camera exposure, but this position can only be projected to
the image center on the ground if the camera plane is level at that
instant. A low-cost stabilized mount has been developed, using
auto-pilot gyros and a second computer. This uses fast servo motors
to correct for aircraft movement on three axes.
Photo Cameras
The camera being used for the current air trials is a 35mm
Contax RTS, which has been calibrated and equipped with the
fiducial plate required for stereoscopic image analysis. The Contax
contains a unique film-flattening vacuum system, producing images
of high quality for these applications. There are also mounts for
70mm cameras.
Video
Some researchers have developed sophisticated video-based
multi-spectral scanning systems. For the LEO system, we have de
cided to rely on straightforward color video.
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Digital Frame Cameras
These closely resemble photographic cameras and often share the
same optics, but the photo emulsion is replaced by a CD array of a
million or more pixels. They directly capture still images in digital
form and promise to eventually replace video-based scanners. There
is an advantage to acquiring direct digital imagery if it is to be sub
jected to computer analysis. Although spatial resolution is inferior
to that of conventional photography, it is superior to the still images
derived from video. For use in light aircraft, the current limiting
factor is storage — single images occupy a minimum of one mega
byte. We expect to incorporate a digital frame camera within a year
or so.
CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PLANS
The LEO aircraft is now undergoing trials in the Pacific North
west. These are being conducted in collaboration with Indigenous
resource groups and environmental organizations. The ultimate
objective is to transfer this capacity overseas and a proposal has been
developed to establish a self-contained local earth observation center
in Central America.
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Peter Poole Working Group
Among the most urgent threats facing Indigenous cultures is
how to get governments to respect their land claims, how to demar
cate these claims, and how to monitor and protect these lands.
Aerial imagery works well in helping Indigenous peoples respond to
external threats, as it amplifies local capabilities to monitor and
protect traditional lands in such a way that the relevant government
agencies cannot readily dismiss the Indigenous claims.
The discussion was oriented primarily around the technical
difficulties involved in Dr. Poole’s work, although a few questions
were directed at the impacts of technology on Indigenous cultures.
Dr. Poole opened the session with a brief discussion of the technical
difficulties involved in the one-year building of his specially de
signed plane, and how he got his projects with Indigenous cultures
in Canada going while the plane was being designed, built, and
tested. While the plane was being built, Dr. Poole went around to
various groups, told them what his plane could do and what his
imagery could be used for, and asked them if they had any use for
such information (which he would provide at cost during the testing
phase). The following text picks up at the end of the opening mono
logue.
In British Columbia alone there are currently 27 separate
Indigenous land claims in Canadian courts. Because there is a
great deal of merchantable timber in these areas, timber indus
tries are pressing hard for their own uses of the land. Local Earth
Observation (LEO) was used in a few cases where the areal extent
and a general bioassessment of the land claims needed to be
done. A smaller part of this project was in the assessment of
timber cutting boundaries, in order to determine whether or not
the timber industries involved were following the law. In many
cases, however, the imagery obtained from LEO’s flights showed
that timber companies were blatantly violating most conserva
tion laws involving harvesting practices on these lands. This
information is practically impossible to obtain on the ground,
due to restricted access or difficult terrain. An additional advan
tage to LEO’s work is that the imagery and flight path can be
stored on computer, which allows for easy monitoring in the
future.
Conrad Reining, Conservation International: Can you produce your own
maps?
Peter Poole:
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Yes. There are dozens of software packages available that can do
mapping from imagery quite easily.
Jim Murphy, Tufts University: How much memory does digitized infor
mation require?
PP: Quite a bit. Computers are keeping pace with memory require
ments quite nicely, although sometimes it is the computer limi
tations that hinder work. Also, photo companies can digitize
photos now, cheaply and quickly, although fiducial marks are
sometimes cut off.
Ramzy Kanaan, Clark University: What do you do with video imagery?
PP: Not much right now. It is primarily used for basic mapping, that
is, “what’s going on here?” We’ve used it to find point pollution
sources in the Queen Charlotte Islands, and to update old maps
for things like buildings.
Emily Harwell, Yale F&ES: Why would you want a moving image?
PP: Well, for example, you could fly the perimeter of an area to see
what there is along this boundary without taking hundreds of
still photos.
Mathilde Snel, Clark University: Are there cheaper alternatives to building
a plane?
PP: Fixing cameras to a plane’s wings is not practical over 400ft
above the ground, because beyond that you are unable to get
stereoscopic photos. In any case, it is very dangerous to fly that
low. There is a group in Arizona that is designing something that
clips on to the side of an aircraft to mount cameras on, but it is
still in the design stage.
Lisa Beaudoin, Worldview Ltd.: How manipulable is the digital data?
PP: Once it is in the computer, you can do anything you wish. How
ever, being credible is far more important, and these scenes are
meant to be ground-truthed.
Austin Troy, Yale F&ES: Can remote imagery be used in court, and if so,
what are the standards for admissibility?
PP: Yes it can be, but I don’t. I pass on imagery to those for whom I
work, and sometimes they use it for legal purposes. For example,
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund used it when looking for
timber companies’ compliance to stream buffer-strip laws. GPS
can place your imagery to an accuracy of 2 to 5 meters when
ground base stations are available nearby to calibrate to, and so
the images can be placed very precisely. It can be used in court
because it is easily replicated, and if the evidence is questioned,
you can go there in person to prove it.
EH: Does the mapping of territorial boundaries change the spatial
orientation of Indigenous people?
PP:

[Geocoded imagery] can be used in
court because it is easily replicated,
and if the evidence is questioned, you
can go there in person to prove it.

  

      
An Indigenous group in Venezuela contacted me to do a project,
and they have always told me what they want to do. And when I
present the photos I take, they have no trouble connecting their
terrestrial experience with views from above.
One interesting example is that the First Nation on
Vancouver Island has an interactive CD-ROM database, where
you can click on a map and have an audio-visual presentation of
information relevant to that place. They’ve included oral histo
ries and their creation myth sequence into the database. Basi
cally, they’ve put Indigenous knowledge into a different context
— Indigenous legends on maps. Legally, this helps with land
claims, and it also helps preserve some of their heritage.
Laura Appell: How much does your system cost?
PP: It is much cheaper than most methods or approaches; you can
buy a plane like mine for what it takes to fly the Canadian
government’s remote sensing plane for 10 hours. It will get even
cheaper — right now the biggest cost is the geostabilizer mount
for the camera, which allows it to point directly downward even
when the plane’s pitch is not oriented with the ground.
Payal Sampat, Tufts University: What are the laws relating to aerial pho
tography?
PP: There’s no consistency. In Canada, I classify my plane as experi
mental (since it was home-built), which does not allow me to do
full commercial work. However, it does allow me to have a hole
in my plane for the cameras without having to go through all of
the bureaucracy involved in having a hole in a “normal” plane.
PP:
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The Role of Environmental NGOs in the Changing Tropics:
Networking for Community Empowerment
Jose Roberto Borges
Project Support Coordinator, Amazon Program,
Rainforest Action Network
ABSTRACT
The Rainforest Action Network (RAN) has grown over 10 years to its present size and status by being committed to
networking. Close contact with local communities has enabled RAN to promote effective action, both in those commu
nities and in consuming communities. Political and technical support in the rainforest is complemented by persuasion
and boycotts of destructive companies. This coordination is made possible through true partnerships with local
rainforest organizations. Ultimately, this structure allows the agendas of local people to be heard internationally, and
permits effective coordination against destructive multinationals.

Good morning everybody. I am thankful to be here at this great
encounter. I wish that I had the time to meet every one of you, so
that we could learn of each others’ experiences. I have already met
some great people here, and I am sure there are many more of you.
I am going to be talking about a slightly different kind of tech
nology, of perhaps the oldest kind of technology: networking. We
have been networking since we got out of the caves. The purpose of
this presentation is to generate some constructive reflection on the
role of environmental organizations networking with Indigenous
and other environmental organizations in the tropics. This presenta
tion will be based on the concrete experience of Rainforest Action
Network in recent years.
I will start with a very brief introduction to what the Rainforest
Action Network (RAN) is all about. We were founded in 1985 by
Randall Hayes, who is still the executive director. RAN is a San
Francisco-based non-profit environmental organization working to
conserve the cultural and biological diversity of tropical rainforests
worldwide. We have grown quite a bit. Today, with the support of
an active 25,000 membership and 50 Rainforest Action Groups
nationwide, RAN is one of the leading organizations in the US
working on behalf of the rainforest and the human rights of its
traditional inhabitants. Through political and technical support,
financial assistance, and educational campaigns directed at consum
ers in industrialized countries, RAN supports the efforts of Indig
enous populations and other forest communities in securing their
traditional livelihoods while helping to halt the destruction of their
homelands.
In the past few years RAN has developed successful campaigns
around the world. In Hawaii RAN campaigned against geothermal
development and in the continental US it persuaded several Holly

  

      
wood studios to stop using Lauan plywood for movie sets. In Costa
Rica, RAN helped to stop the Stone Container Corporation from
building a large chip mill in the rainforest. In Brazil, RAN joined
collective efforts which led to the demarcation of 5.28 million acres
of extractive reserves and the creation of the Yanomami Park, while
in Ecuador, RAN funded the Quichua, Achuar, and Shiwiar Indians’
march to the capital city of Quito, resulting in the demarcation of
2.5 million acres as Indigenous territory. In the Philippines, RAN
was partially responsible for stopping Scott Paper from converting
rainforests into Eucalyptus plantations. In Papua New Guinea, we
successfully pressured Chevron to modify its operation to provide
for greater environmental protection.
RAN has also financed the efforts of several organizations and
community based projects through its “Protect-an-Acre” Program.
This is an alternative to “Buy-an-Acre” programs — a different
approach. As an organization we don’t endorse the purchase of land
as a conservation mechanism because we believe that it takes the
responsibility of the state to implement important changes such as
the demarcation of Indigenous lands, extractive reserves, and other
conservation areas. The Protect-an-Acre Program is an attempt to
direct financial resources to very site-specific grants. The maximum
for a grant is $5000, so it is a small contribution but it can go a long
way.
RAN’s Protect-an-Acre Program has been an extended effort to
contribute directly to forest communities struggling to defend their
most basic human rights and to protect the rainforests — the natu
ral resource base they rely on for survival. The Program has already
successfully contributed to several important projects throughout
the Amazon Basin and other regions. These are projects that are
primarily aimed at achieving land rights for forest communities and
implementing sustainable development activities to improve their
standards of living, while securing the ecological integrity of the
forest.
Presently, RAN is devoted to strengthening long-term programs
in three major areas: corporate responsibility, natural resource use,
and support for Indigenous rights and sustainable development at
the community level. At the corporate responsibility level, RAN
pressures multinational corporations causing destruction in the
rainforests into practicing socially and environmentally sound busi
ness. I like to see it as an issue of corporate responsibility rather than
just boycotts — I think you have to be more grounded. We are
trying to invite corporations to practice socially and environmen
tally sound businesses, but sometimes that is not enough. Our
present focus is on Mitsubishi and Texaco. We are in fact launching
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a boycott on both because their track records haven’t been very
respectful to the environment or to traditional peoples.
The Wood Conservation Campaign highlights RAN’s approach
to natural resource use. This campaign seeks the reduction of wood
consumption in the United States by promoting alternatives such as
the cultivation of kenaf and hemp for paper, while calling for a ban
on all tropical hardwood products not harvested in an environmen
tally benign and socially beneficial way. RAN’s Amazon Program
provides direct political and institutional support for Indigenous
and other traditional forest communities in the Amazon Basin in
Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. The Amazon Program will expand to
other Amazonian countries when resources are available. In addi
tion to its main programs, RAN also functions as an information
clearinghouse, disseminating the facts on the current state of the
rainforests and the different efforts to stop its destruction.

RAN’S TRADITIONAL PEOPLES PROGRAM
I am going to focus my talk here on our traditional peoples
program. We promote traditional peoples’ goals by finding institu
tional and political support. I am in charge of institutional support
for the Amazon program, which means reaching out for financial
resources for community based projects and other initiatives com
ing from those organizations working with Indigenous and other
traditional peoples. We also try to connect communities to research
ers or scientists so as to access technical know-how.
RAN has accomplished a great deal in the past few years. To cite
two of our many successes, RAN has worked closely with the Orga
nization of Indigenous Peoples of the Pastaza (OPIP) in Ecuador
and the Indian Research Center in Brazil. Through a five-year part
nership with OPIP, we supported their efforts in gaining autono
mous control of 2.5 million acres of traditional lands. We are now
providing financial and political assistance in their historic negotia
tions with Arco Inc. to secure environmental and social safeguards
in oil prospecting in the region. In Brazil, we have been providing
financial and technical support for the Indian Research Center for
the past six years. The Center combines traditional Indigenous
knowledge with modern technology in pursuing alternatives to
unsound economic development. Projects include work on the
recuperation of degraded lands, self-sufficient Indigenous enter
prises, and integrated resource management.
We have been developing a database of institutions doing re
search in appropriate technology, and various kinds of appropriate
energy sources, such as hydroelectric and solar. For example, we

We promote traditional peoples’ goals
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have arranged a program with Trimble Navigation in California,
who have agreed to lend a GPS unit to the new Instituto
Socioambiental, the Social and Environmental Institute, in Brazil.
They are doing very important work in demarcating Indigenous
territories as well as the integrative management of resources found
within those territories. So Trimble Navigation ended up donating
two GPS units, which have been used in work with the Waãpi Indi
ans in Pará and in constructing preserves in the Xingú.
DEFINING A NICHE
The most important first step in understanding your role as an
active participant in the framework of organizations contributing to
conservation efforts in the tropics is to determine your own niche as
an organization. This apparently easy task is sometimes difficult to
accomplish because of a lack of understanding of what really goes on
in the tropics or due to simply not knowing which direction to take.
Rapidly increasing demands may overwhelm you even before you
get started and the vast array of possible ways to contribute leads
many well-intentioned people to duplicate efforts unnecessarily. In
order to find your niche, you must first clearly define your organiza
tional goals, resources, and commitment.
Effective organizational goals should promote real partnerships
with organizations in the rainforest countries. This will not only
avoid paternalistic and unilateral relationships, but will also foster
equal participation in implementing solutions. In fact, equal partici
pation should be considered a pre-condition for networking with
any organization in the tropics.
At RAN, we recognize the critical importance of developing real
partnerships with forest communities who suffer from unsound
government and corporate development policies on a daily basis.
Our strategies are designed in close consultation with the legitimate
associations that represent the communities’ needs and rights.
Through years of experience working with forest communities we
have learned to identify how seemingly local problems are essentially
caused by macroeconomic forces. Therefore, we enable local com
munities to understand how foreign economic interests affect their
lives and help them to devise ways of organizing against develop
ment practices that jeopardize their traditional livelihood and re
sources.
Thus, RAN’s niche in halting the destruction of the tropical
rainforest is through direct support of its traditional inhabitants and
by applying pressure on the corporations and institutions in the
North that are partially or fully responsible for the destruction. All
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the while, we are also being constructive by pursuing alternative
models for natural resource use.
One of the projects we have financed through our Protect-anAcre Program is a bilingual education program for the Yawanawá
Indigenous peoples of the Alto Juruá region of the western Amazon.
The Yawanawá kicked out the missionaries from their territories
some years ago. Now they have started a new village, where they are
implementing some marketing initiatives, including a contract with
Aveda. They are producing materials for lipstick and shampoo. This
slide shows their nursery and that is their final product, urukü.
Sharon Flynn’s presentation gave me a lot of enlightening informa
tion about the role of green products — I left disturbed. I need to
think about it…
NETWORKING AND EMPOWERMENT
Once an organization’s niche is established, one should identify
its partners — the individuals, associations and organizations that
will collectively design the objectives and strategies to be accom
plished. Here, one should always be aware of the legitimacy of the
parties involved to avoid establishing deceptive partnerships.
The number of organizations and individuals working to imple
ment both the social and biological conservation in the “changing
tropics” is immense, probably in the tens of thousands. However,
finding a handful of trustworthy partners does not have to be that
difficult. The general rule is networking. Just contact those people
you already trust and try to identify a well-established organization
working in the region or on a particular issue. Often, you will find
ways of collaborating with other groups instead of trying to reinvent
the wheel.

LEGITIMACY
In addition to general networking, it is our practice at RAN to
visit frequently the regions where we are developing programs. This
allows us to meet directly with the members of different organiza
tions, visit forest communities, and talk to the local leadership.
Many times we participate in community meetings, which are espe
cially helpful in revealing how a particular community reacts to a
given problem. We believe that regular field visits are the best way to
learn how representative our partner organizations are at the com
munity level. For example, in a recent trip to Aguaruna and
Huambisa villages along the Marañon River in Peru, we were able to
verify that those communities had exactly the same opinion about

  

      
oil development on their lands as the organization which formally
represents them in Lima, the Aguaruna and Huambisa Council
(CAH). So, CAH can be seen as a good example of an organization
that is well connected to the base, the grassroots level. The degree to
which an organization is connected with its constituency is usually a
good indicator of how representative and legitimate it is.
At RAN, we really try to identify and work with those organiza
tions that are also working at the community level, for we believe
they are more legitimate and effective. Through supporting these
kinds of organizations we reach out to a much larger number of
people, empowering not only those individuals working within the
organizations, but communities as a whole.

COMMITMENT
Long-term commitment is another essential component in
networking with organizations in the tropics. No matter how ca
pable your partner organization may be, reliable and effective net
working can succeed only if based on a long-term commitment. The
lack of long-term commitment on the part of Northern NGOs to
their co-workers in the tropical South is a frequent cause of unful
filled expectations, disillusionment, and failure. Northerners should
not take on issues just because they are convenient. I recently heard
a comment by a senior staff member of a respected Northern envi
ronmental NGO who said the Amazon was no longer an interesting
issue for the World Bank and US NGOs. Whether he was joking or
not, this is exactly the kind of attitude that leads many people in the
tropics to believe that northern environmentalists are not fully
committed. The Amazon, home to one third of the world’s remain
ing rainforests, is and will continue to be an extremely relevant issue
to the North for years to come. It is only through dedicated long
term commitment to serious and equal partnerships with Southern
NGOs that we have a chance of going beyond the rhetoric of conser
vation in the tropics.
Long-term commitment provides for solid partnerships with
organizations in the tropics, strengthening their infrastructure and
their ability to respond to issues effectively. Through our Amazon
Program, for instance, RAN provides both financial and political
support for Indigenous communities, rubber tappers, and other
forest dwellers who have traditionally inhabited the Amazon
rainforests in an ecologically sustainable fashion. We strongly be
lieve that empowered communities are the best caretakers of the
Amazon Basin. Hence, RAN is devoted to help forest communities
achieve control of their traditional territories.

 

It is only through dedicated long-term
commitment to serious and equal part
nerships with Southern NGOs that we
have a chance of going beyond the
rhetoric of conservation in the tropics.

 
In addition, RAN’s Amazon Program researches how US-based
corporations cause social and environmental destruction in the
Amazon Basin and the governmental policies that allow this to
happen. By monitoring these macroeconomic dynamics we are able
to determine which companies should be held accountable for caus
ing social distress and environmental degradation in the forest com
munities we work with. We also engage legal mechanisms to
pressure such companies into practicing socially and environmen
tally sound business.
SEEDS OF CHANGE
Clear goals and long-term commitment are the keys to building
a strong organization that will not only be effective in supporting its
partners in the tropics, but will also develop a very respectable profile here in the North.
In its ten years of existence RAN has devoted itself to strengthening its niche and establishing long-term commitments with organizations in the tropics. With the support of a dynamic network of
hundreds of organizations and individuals, we have been able to
improve the infrastructure of many organizations in the South in
order to optimize our communications and their ability to deal with
local needs. This process, in turn, has enabled RAN to access strate
gic feedback from its partner organizations in the tropics when
designing and implementing our campaigns.
The contribution of Rainforest Action Network in the “Chang
ing Tropics” has been to secure the ecological integrity of the
rainforests and the respect for the human rights of their traditional
inhabitants, including Indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers.
To achieve this goal, RAN works through a dynamic network of
organizations and individuals, with a long-term commitment to
partnerships. We seek to provide organizations in the tropics with
direct access to information and resources, so that they can be em
powered and implement their own vision of development.
I will just leave you with a Brazilian saying: “O saber do povo é a
sua vida” — The knowledge of the people is their life. Thanks
much.

We seek to provide organizations in
the tropics with direct access to information and resources, so that they
can be empowered and implement their
own vision of development.
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Born in São Paulo, Brazil, Borges’ career began as a mountaineer and ecotourism guide in Brazil while he pursued a
degree in applied chemistry. In 1993 he received a BS from University of California at Berkeley in Conservation and
Resources Studies with an emphasis on Integrated Resource Management. Since 1990, Borges has been with the
Rainforest Action Network, where he developed their Brazil (Amazon) Program and has acted as a liaison to Latin
American non-governmental and Indigenous organizations. Currently Borges is the Project Support Coordinator for the
Amazon Program.

  

      

Jose Roberto Borges Working Group
The main themes stressed in this workshop were the need for
long-term commitments from NGOs, better coordination among all
parties, the identification of people with whom it is most effective to
work, and the dangers of representation by non-Indigenous profes
sionals. These themes are intertwined. For example, coordination
among organizations (North-North, North-South, and SouthSouth) can help identify true Indigenous community leaders and
evaluate proposed business ventures. Coordination also mitigates the
danger of Indigenous people either having to rely on only one source
of information, or getting conflicting advice from various NGOs.
Sharon Flynn suggested that coordination would be more effective
between staff members than between whole organizations due to
competition over resources.
As for identifying the most effective people to work with, Mr.
Borges suggested that Indigenous leaders may possess a bias different
from the community at large. Terry Turner added that some profes
sional Indigenous leaders represent developing bureaucracies more
than they do communities.
It was generally agreed that non-Indigenous professionals should
not attempt to represent Indigenous communities. Rather, it is better
that they merely present cases. For example, the goal of the
Rainforest Action Network is to empower the Indigenous peoples to
make decisions by providing information, not to represent them
outside the community.
The need for long-term commitments from NGOs and green
capitalists was illustrated with several examples. It is particularly
important for enabling a cultural understanding adequate for identi
fying a community’s needs.
The following excerpts expand on some of these themes:
Gary Dunning, Yale F&ES: How do you establish the legitimacy of the
organizations you work with? What factors do you look at to find
out if they are truly representative organizations?
Beto Borges: Well, we visit the region and try to ascertain the historical
process of the formation of the organization. We have to beware
of biased leaderships who are advancing their own goals that may
not necessarily be the goals of the community. We contact other
environmental groups working in a region, and we have found
that networking with one trusted group can help identify other
collaborators.
Terry Turner: I’m interested in the relationship among Aveda, RAN,
and the Yawanawá .

 

We have to beware of biased
leaderships who are advancing their
own goals that may not necessarily be
the goals of the community.

 
Our involvement is extremely limited in that all we do is support
the Indigenous groups by providing information so that they can
make informed decisions about their own futures. We try to find
out what these companies are all about and supply this informa
tion to the Indigenous associations, who are the ones who decide
whether or not to get involved. Personally, though, I’m a bit
critical of these relationships, because I am not convinced that
any of these companies are making sincere, long-term commit
ments to a given area or group.
In the Aveda case, they wanted exclusive access to the prod
uct, and this was stipulated in their contract with the Yawanawá
in exchange for 5% of the proceeds derived from that particular
product.
I think that while it’s important to be critical of these rela
tionships, you also need to realize that, in many cases, these
companies represent the only chance for a cash income from
sustainable, traditional activities.
Chico Ginú: I went to a meeting in Panama in November where some
Indigenous groups were represented by anthropologists. I
thought this was very strange, because, though the expertise of
social scientists and biologists and the like is extremely impor
tant in this context, how can they possibly claim to represent
Indigenous people?
BB: Yes, this is a problem for two reasons. First is the problem of
allocation of resources — more time and money needs to be
spent actually in the communities so that Indigenous people can
be empowered to speak for themselves. Second, there is the
ethical problem of trying to speak for someone else. I have seen
instances where researchers get too wrapped up with people they
are working with, and lose their scientific distance and presume
to speak for these people.
Sharon Flynn: I’ve been in conservation for three years, and I think
there’s a huge amount of waste and inefficiency that goes on.
Nevertheless, all of these organizations have the same goals, in
the sense of creating the conditions for positive change. Though
each group has its own flavor and location across the political
spectrum, the degree to which they are all working towards the
same thing creates a situation in which there is the potential for
cooperation. Cooperation at the organizational level is often
cumbersome and unproductive because of a competition over
resources, but at the staff level it can be extremely effective.
Networking on the level of you and I speaking to one another
every once in a while can go a long way towards eliminating
redundancy and increasing effectiveness.
BB:

We try to find out what these compa
nies are all about and supply this in
formation to the Indigenous associa
tions, who are the ones who decide
whether or not to get involved.

  

      

Knowledge and Information Resources for Local and Traditional Natural
Resource Users: Networking and Conferencing Systems, the Internet, Online
Services, Libraries, and Information Centers
Richard Labelle
Global Information Analysis
ABSTRACT
Global Computer Mediated Communications networks are growing rapidly, and are important tools for communication
and the dissemination of information by local groups. Though a wide range of technologies is available to users in
developed countries, connectivity is limited in much of the world. Various UN initiatives, in collaboration with local
NGOs, are seeking to improve this situation so as to facilitate communication among traditional resource users. The
human network and demand for these technologies already exists, and the task is to overcome cost and regulatory
barriers to the flow of information.

I would like to start by thanking the ISTF and the Yale School of
Forestry and Environmental Studies for inviting me, and Greg
Dicum, who discovered me using the technology we’ll be talking
about. He was using the gopher and discovered that I had partici
pated as an advisor in a workshop that the United Nations Develop
ment Programme (UNDP) had called together in September 1992.
That workshop dealt with a project that is the basis of a lot of the
work I’ve been doing recently, The Sustainable Development Networking Program (SDNP), which had been an idea of Mr. Maurice
Strong. As a member of the Vultman Commission in 1989, he pro
posed that, given the global knowledge base, and given some of the
technologies for Computer Mediated Communications, it might be
possible to assist in the development process by providing informa
tion access to key decision makers involved in making the concept
of sustainable development a reality. Many of the lessons and points
that I will relate today come from our practical experiences at SDNP
in attempting to implement this idea.
COMPUTER MEDIATED COMMUNICATIONS
AND DEVELOPMENT
The real objective of my talk today is to discuss the role of Com
puter Mediated Communications (CMC) technologies and to talk
about how they would be useful in the context of building the ca
pacity of Indigenous peoples to move towards their vision of sus
tainable development. As well, I think it is pertinent to talk about
the use of these technologies for another very important reason,
which I have not heard mentioned yet. This is the whole question of
the Decade of Indigenous Peoples, and the commitment that the
United Nations and the International Community made to Indig
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enous people as a result of Chapter 26 of Agenda 21, which deals
with the needs of Indigenous people to achieve sustainable develop
ment.
In September 1992, the UNDP had the task of taking Agenda 21,
the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), and putting it into practice. Agenda 21 is a
plan of action. It addresses the involvement of stakeholders at all
levels in planning and policy making for sustainable development,
and highlights the role and importance of various groups, including
Indigenous people and traditional resource users. Chapter 40 of
Agenda 21, the information chapter, noted the need to help bridge
the data gap separating the North and the South, and the need to
facilitate access to information for decision making. The goal of
implementation is to use these technologies to assist this process,
bearing in mind that sustainable development really is based on
participatory processes: involvement of stakeholders and the creation
of appropriate mechanisms for sharing information at all levels and
across all sectors of society.
First, we will look at some of the specific technologies related to
the use of Computer Mediated Communications as tools for en
hancing interaction. I would like to make it clear that the technolo
gies we are promoting when we talk about CMC are all management
tools. They are not ends in themselves and we are not promoting the
creation of infrastructure. We are not talking about creating dams or
building fiber-optic networks. We are talking about the use of these
technologies as tools to help bridge the gap between those who
know and those who do not, or those who have something to say
and those who are seeking information.

I would like to make it clear that the
technologies we are promoting when
we talk about CMC are all manage
ment tools. They are not ends in them
selves and we are not promoting the
creation of infrastructure.

TECHNOLOGIES AND TOOLS USED FOR COMPUTER
MEDIATED COMMUNICATIONS
CMC is the use of telecommunications media to allow comput
ers to communicate with one another. Through CMC, and the
technologies discussed below, it is estimated that over 35 million
people communicate with one another over the Internet, using over
3 million host computers (Internet Society, 1994).
Various technologies are used for CMC. The following are ex
amples of relevant communications technologies for those working
toward sustainable development:
• Store and forward computer messaging systems based on the
Unix to Unix Copy Program (UUCP) or FidoNet
technologies

  

      
• Bulletin Board Systems (BBS)
• The Internet
• Commercial online services such as CompuServe, America
Online, and others
The most important technologies for point-to-point communi
cation — electronic mail (e-mail) in a fashion compatible with the
Internet — are FidoNet and the Unix to Unix Copy Program
(UUCP). With a computer, a modem and, most importantly, a
telephone line that can be linked to the local urban grid, you can
access the Internet for electronic mail purposes. You can run this
with local expertise, assuming you’re using just one telephone line.
Unix systems, which have interactive capabilities, require a systems
engineer. There is a significant jump in building the capacity to run
and maintain this type of operation.
Also important are satellite radio systems other than the com
mercial satellite systems. These are low-earth orbiting satellites that
permit full use of packet radio technology and allow users to cir
cumvent the telephone network, which can be extremely useful. You
may be familiar with HealthNet, for example, a network that links
medical practitioners around the world under circumstances where
telephone communications are virtually impossible.
FIDONET
FidoNet is a computer communications software that permits e
mail to be bundled and sent over telephone lines. Compression and
optimization technologies are used to speed transmission so that
300 to 500 pages of messages can be sent in 5 or 6 minutes using
high speed modems. FidoNet nodes are usually linked to a Bulletin
Board System (BBS) and some FidoNet nodes are also linked to the
Internet via UUCP. FidoNet is well established —many NGOs use it
and USAID uses it for the Famine Early Warning System — and
there are over 14,000 FidoNet nodes around the world (Mikelsons
1992).
UNIX TO UNIX COPY PROGRAM (UUCP)
UUCP is a part of the Unix operating system, although UUCP
can operate alone and is not UNIX dependent. UUCP can also run
on non-UNIX computers. UUCP uses file transfer protocols that are
becoming as efficient as FidoNet. Hardware requirements are mini
mal: only a computer and a modem are required to provide connec
tivity (UNDP/IDRC 1993). UUCP supports direct connections to
the Internet, through about 20,000 nodes around the world. Like
FidoNet, most UUCP nodes are connected to a BBS, in this case

 

With a computer, a modem and, most
importantly, a telephone line that can
be linked to the local urban grid, you
can access the Internet.

 
USENET, a public domain BBS also accessible through the Internet.
There are over 7,000 conferences in the USENET BBS.
BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS (BBS)
BBSs are computer files that are available by telephoning a re
mote computer (logging in) using telecommunications software. E
mail is also a feature of BBSs, allowing BBS users to contribute to the
conferences and also to send messages to one another and to others
using FidoNet, UUCP or the Internet. An estimated 30,000 to
100,000 BBSs exist in North America alone, and a growing number
are directly linked to the Internet. They are important sources of
local information.
BBSs are an important supplement to the Internet because they
provide free and local access to local news and information. This
applies in North America as well as in other parts of the world.
Linked to the FidoNet and UUCP technologies, they can also pro
vide global connectivity.
THE INTERNET
The Internet is a family of networks using the TCP/IP protocol
to exchange data (Krol 1993). The Internet is important because it is
ubiquitous and because of its large and rapidly growing number of
users: over 1 million new hosts or computers were added to the
Internet in the first six months of 1994, an increase of 81% over the
previous year (Internet Society 1994). The Internet has been pre
dominantly non-commercial, but this is changing rapidly as com
mercial applications emerge (Taylor 1994; Resnick and Taylor
1994).
Internet applications include e-mail, remote login to other CPUs
over the network (telnet), file transfer between computers (FTP),
and various browsing and search tools such as gopher, Wide-Area
Information Servers (WAIS), and the World Wide Web (WWW).
There are several networks that are relevant in the family of
networks we call the Internet. We will go into more detail in consid
ering one family of networks, the Association of Progressive Com
munications, in a moment. When the Internet Society talks about
the number of countries connected, they’re really talking about this
type of access — high-end, interactive access to the Internet. In fact,
anyone who has a phone, no matter where they may be, has access to
the Internet, unless security services have set up systems to capture
and prevent transmission of fax or modem messages, as is the case in
some countries.

The Internet is important because it is
ubiquitous and because of its large
and rapidly growing number of users:
over 1 million new hosts or computers
were added to the Internet in the first
six months of 1994 (Internet Society,
1994).

  

      
COMMERCIAL ONLINE SERVICES
CompuServe, America Online, Prodigy Services, GEnie, Delphi,
and others are commercial providers of computerized information
services available for a subscription and usage fee. These commercial
online services provide BBS services and access to a wide array of
databases, but at a price. CompuServe offers access to over 1,700
databases. The average household income of the predominantly
male (80%) users of CompuServe in the USA is $92,200 (Resnick
and Taylor 1994). The commercial services could be relevant to local
and traditional users as outlets for products and services for a very
well-heeled, leisure-oriented and increasingly international clientele.
There could also be a significant market opportunity for ecotourism
and for a variety of cultural and learning exchanges.
These databases are extremely useful and they are very profitable
to their producers because Commercial America uses them to main
tain competitive advantage and to remain aware. They are very good
sources of information.

Figure 1: Internet Global Infrastructure Diffusion
(Rutkowski, 1994)

 

 
Unfortunately, these services are not, generally speaking, avail
able in the developing world, although I have seen some exceptions.
Interestingly enough, access to Dialog, which is expensive, was sup
ported in Tehran by the Islamic Republic of Iran to assist the re
search community. They had a host of computers with modems
linked to the AT&T network to gain access to Dialog in order to
answer queries that their scientists could not deal with because they
had limited access to information, for reasons we all know.
THE INFORMATION GAP
Figure 1 is a measure of the data or information gap separating
developing from so-called developed countries. The line shows a
direct relationship between Gross National Product and connectiv
ity, as measured by the number of hosts in a country. Countries are
identified by their two-letter ISO codes. The country at the top right
is the USA. The general tendency is that none of the African coun
tries have any hosts at all, with the exception of Tunisia, Egypt, and
South Africa. Also very few of the Muslim countries have interactive
access. The country at the bottom of the graph at the $100 billion
GNP level is Saudi Arabia. People there do have access, but on a per
capita basis it is not very well distributed.
Out of about 3.2 million Internet hosts, there are over 10,000
hosts per country in the West, including Japan, and over 1.2 million
in the USA alone. Countries with more than 1,000 hosts are still
predominantly in the industrialized world, but countries of Latin
America and Central and Eastern Europe are also represented. Ma
laysia and Thailand also have over 1,000 hosts each.
In a very few countries of the developing world, the Internet is
openly accessible and not too expensive. The Philippines have re
cently developed PhilNet, a locally accessible Internet backbone. In
Indonesia, on the other hand, access is prohibitively expensive. Even
the University of Jakarta relies on international direct dialing to an
Internet service provider in the USA using the UUCP protocol.
Pakistan does not have direct access, but several BBS-type services
exist, with UUCP links to the USA. One of these is the Sustainable
Development Networking Program (SDNP) Pakistan, a project
funded by UNDP as a follow-up to UNCED (Daudpota 1994).
THE ASSOCIATION OF PROGRESSIVE
COMMUNICATIONS
Within the family of networks that are in the Internet, and that
provide gateways that are compatible with the Internet protocol, one
of the more relevant is the family of networks known as the Associa

  

      
tion of Progressive Communications (APC). The APC is an advo
cacy network that operates on a not-for-profit basis, but that pro
motes the creation of these networks on a business planning basis. If
you want to set up an APC node in a country, you must have a
business plan that demonstrates cost recovery and charges your
clients. On top of that, you have to participate in the global APC and
provide, at least at the time this information was obtained, about a
year and a half ago, a minimum of $5,000 a year in subscription fees,
up to $25,000 depending on the number of users you have (APC
1993).
NGOs use CMC throughout the developing world, often at a
local level. The APC has been in the forefront of efforts to help local

Figure 2: The Association for Progressive Communications (APC) Nodes and Connected Systems, as of April 1992
(International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1993)

 

 
users develop the capacity to use CMC. Associates of APC and na
tional affiliates have developed FidoNet or UUCP-based messaging
systems for Africa (GreenNet), Asia and the Pacific (Pactok), and
Cuba (Web).
There are two major nodes in the APC family of networks. The
first, the Institute for Global Communications (IGC), is the hub for
many other networks around the Americas, with direct connections
to the Internet. In Canada, we have the Web, which provides access
via UUCP to the whole of Cuba. Cuban electronic mail goes through
the Web and then through the Web to the Internet. IGC is the gate
way for a variety of different networks, including, for the South
Pacific/Oceania region, Pegasus from Australia; Equinex in Ecuador;
Huracan in Costa Rica; Nicarao in Nicaragua; Chasque in Uruguay;
BolNet in Bolivia; and Alternex in Brazil with IBASE, a social-action
NGO based in Rio de Janeiro which has promoted the use of these
technologies heavily. I presume, given the discussions concerning
Brazil at this conference, that those of you who work in the Amazon
are all using Alternex. They are extremely proactive and I believe
Alternex has a national network system set up.
GreenNet in the UK serves as a hub for many different countries.
A hub in this particular instance means that they use the UUCP/
FidoNet protocol to do the following: they keep their computers on
all night, and when it is cheapest to do so, in London, New York, or
San Francisco, they phone the receiving node’s computer and, using
telecommunications protocols to crunch up information so that the
transmission is fast and cheap, they make transmissions originate
from where the telecommunication costs are least (the US in par
ticular and to some extent the UK). When you are spending five
dollars a minute to transmit from the South in some countries, you
do not stay on line for very long. In fact, you are never really on line
— you’re exchanging files.
GreenNet provides access to Africa south of the Sahara, to all of
those countries which did not figure in the Internet connectivity list.
It provides e-mail and a subset of conferences to a whole variety of
these networks, including, for example, the Environmental Liaison
Center International (ELCI), in Nairobi, which serves as a link to a
variety of other NGOs and related organizations in and around
Kenya.
Pegasus, in Australia, provides UUCP/FidoNet connectivity
through Pactok to the South Pacific and to many other countries in
the region. In many countries, this technology is the only way activ
ists are hooked into what is happening. It is the only way they stay
aware — assuming, again, that the security services have not blocked

  

      
off transmissions, because many of them have sophisticated tools to
detect modem communications.
OTHER NETWORKS FOR LOCAL AND TRADITIONAL
RESOURCE USERS
Local and traditional resource users, including Indigenous
peoples and marginalized groups in general, have mobilized. Some
are using CMC. Thanks to computer networking advocates such as
the APC, GeoNet and others (see IISD 1992), there are fora in which
to exchange experiences and organizations from which to seek help.
APC maintains over 20 electronic conference topics related to Indig
enous people, for example. USENET newsgroups and Internet mail
ing lists also focus on Indigenous people and, by extension, on local
and traditional resource users. In addition to the APC networks
discussed previously, a number of other initiatives are currently
operational around the world.
In Pakistan, the national branch of the World Conservation
Union (IUCN), is hosting the UNDP Sustainable Development
Networking Program (SDNP). The SDNP has established a BBS and
is linking this to local libraries. SDNP is also developing local nodes
in several cities and is promoting the creation of a national telecom
munications infrastructure to support CMC. SDNP is active in over
20 countries around the world (Lankester 1994).
In Africa, Environment and Development Action in the Third
World (ENDA) operates a CMC node in Senegal. EL Taller operates
a small node in Tunis. ELCI operates a BBS linked to FidoNet. The
initiatives of the International Development Research Center
(IDRC) include efforts to encourage use of CMC. IDRC collaborates
with the Pan-African Development Information System (PADIS) of
the Economic Commission for Africa in the Capacity Building for
Electronic Communications for Africa (CABECA) project (PADIS
1993).
In most countries of Latin America, Internet access is available
through universities. UNDP SDNP also operates in several coun
tries, including Nicaragua, Chile, Bolivia, Honduras and Costa Rica.
The South Pacific has one of the most interesting networks.
Peacesat is a satellite supported by the USA and made available to
the 22 Small Island Developing States and territories of the region to
improve telecommunications. Thirty-four ground stations allow
voice level communications and full Internet access at 9.6 Kilobits
per second. The Peacesat satellite complements the Pactok FidoNet
network as well as an Internet connection through the University of
Fiji in Suva.
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In the South Pacific, distance and the small size and isolation of
the countries means that traditional and local concerns predomi
nate. Peacesat voice sessions are in local languages and dialects as
well as in English. In the South Pacific, there is a real opportunity to
use CMC at the local community level.
TRENDS IN CMC USE AND DIFFUSION
The present tendency in North America and Western Europe is
for individuals using BBS technology or the Internet, and especially
the World Wide Web (WWW) Internet application, to become
globally accessible and highly specialized centers of information and
expertise — traders in a variety of goods and services.
Agenda 21 puts special groups in the forefront of action for
sustainable development. In order to seize the opportunity, these
groups need to collaborate and communicate. Networking with
individuals around the world is now possible for most any interest
group, and many are doing so.
The technology is not an impediment, as experience using CMC
in Africa and in many other parts of the developing world has dem
onstrated (Mikelsons 1992).
Factors promoting CMC diffusion include (modified from
Rutkowski 1994):

The present tendency ... is for indi
viduals ... to become globally acces
sible and highly specialized centers of
information and expertise — traders
in a variety of goods and services.

• minimal or nonexistent regulatory constraints
• availability of leased lines and local access lines on a cost basis
• availability of reasonably priced computers
• competition from facility providers
• local expertise
• demand — a strong human network
The most important of these, in our experience, are the first two
and the last one.
AVAILABILITY
One of the main constraints that separates the level of service we
enjoy in North America from the reality in many developing coun
tries is that in many cases access to the Internet is provided by a
monopoly. Many of us in the North were familiarized with the
Internet as students; we got it through our university computer
centers, as part of the registration process. That is not the case in
many of the developing countries. In fact there has been resistance
at two levels: political, for some of the reasons I have indicated, and
economic. The pulse and telecommunications authorities are the

  

      
ones that maintain the leased-line link through which everything
electronic, whether privileged (bank and corporate networks) or
public flows. The Internet flows using packet switching technologies,
and the authorities do not like sharing what they have and they
charge a premium for it.
For example, $60,000 a year to get a leased-line connection is a
good price, for maybe 9.6 kilobaud to perhaps a 64 KBPS (kilobauds
per second) pipe, for Internet connectivity. It costs $200,000 a
month for the Polish Academic Research Network, which has 50,000
users, to get a 2.1 megabit per second line. In Fiji, to get a 2400 baud
dedicated line from Australia, it costs the department of Computer
Studies at the University of the South Pacific $33,000 a year. 2.4
kilobaud doesn’t allow for very much interactive access, so all the
high-end technology really does not exist under those circum
stances.
You might as well sign onto CompuServe in these countries,
because with the commercial services there is more competition and
there are more users. Though their rates will be expensive, you will
get access to the Internet. In some countries, the service provider in
the US will establish a reverse charge account. But the other point,
of course, is that in many countries, charging is based on not just
your annual subscription fee, but it is a per usage time fee and a per
unit packet fee. You pay for every packet that goes down the line or
that you receive, so it becomes very expensive.
Under these conditions, store and forward systems become costeffective. Where these impediments exist, NGOs and others have
developed local BBSs. International access is based on UUCP and
FidoNet. In Latin America, UUCP and direct access to the Internet
is becoming the norm. In Asia and the Pacific, the Pactok network
uses FidoNet (Pactok Project 1993), but many other users also rely
on UUCP.
Availability of computers is also a concern — most of you will be
familiar with this if you work at the local community level. It is
certainly a concern in many of the developing countries. In this
regard, and in the area of establishing local expertise, the NGO
community is an invaluable partner.

 

 
THE HUMAN NETWORK, OFFICIAL SUPPORT, AND NGOS
The existence of a strong human network, in which groups
sharing common concerns are prepared to collaborate to meet
shared objectives, is critical. This requires leadership, entrepreneur
ship and good management. In the end, people make a network, and
technology facilitates its operation. Today more than ever, these
technologies can and are having a major impact. Successful net
working of various stakeholder groups during and since the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development has shown
that open sharing of information and the use of CMC can have a
beneficial influence on people, policies, plans, and actions for sus
tainable development.
We are working through the UN, which had worked exclusively
through official agencies and organizations but is now changing.
The UN is now making it perfectly clear that if governments do not
want to involve their counterparts in the NGO community, then
their initiatives will not be funded by the UN. For example, in Tuni
sia, there are 6000 NGOs, but the government did not want them to
join us at the table due to security issues related to the fact that the
country happens to be next to Algeria. We could understand their
point of view, but we were a little concerned about making an in
vestment where we would not have stakeholder participation. Offi
cial support is important and we can’t really work around it, but we
can try negotiating. Bearing in mind that these countries did sign the
Rio accords, and those accords are specific about multi-stakeholder
processes and access to information, we are trying to leverage par
ticipation through the UNDP resident representatives. Sometimes
we have to prod to get this to happen. Eventually, some Tunisian
NGOs gained access to the national Internet network, Le Réseau
National de la Recherche et de la Technologie, because of UNDP
SDNP pressure.
To have local information and exchanges, there has to be some
thing to exchange. Generally speaking, there is a great interest in
making networks available. This is a market for the service — people
are there to subscribe. In our feasibility studies, we spend a fair
amount of time looking for spark plugs, often from the NGO com
munity. Individuals and organizations can take over this initiative
and make it happen. We know that if we give a project to the gov
ernment, it is going to die. Better still is an existing initiative that we
can build and enhance through this effort. We do not want to start
creating things anew if we can build on what already exists.

In the end, people make a network,
and technology facilitates its operation.

  

      
THE INFORMATION CULTURE
The Internet is a Western phenomenon. During the negotiations
that took place on the Information Chapter of Agenda 21 at
PrepCom IV in New York, several developing countries objected to
the first sentence proposed at the time: “Everyone is a decision
maker for sustainable development.” The representative of one
country stated that the government is the only decision-maker. The
language was changed, and now it reads: “Everyone is a user and
provider of information considered in the broad sense.”
Many countries have reservations about the freedom of access to
information that individuals and non-governmental organizations
enjoy on the Internet. Some USENET newsgroups deal with issues
not openly discussed in many societies. Alt.sex and alt.sex.stories are
two of the most popular newsgroups on the Internet (DEC Network
Systems Laboratory 1993). In the newly refurbished, modern, and
well-equipped computer science department in one Muslim coun
try, USENET Newsgroups are kept offline for this reason. USENET
News is not available as a result, and the university does not have
direct Internet access.
In Africa, the UNDP Resident Representative in one West Afri
can country had his own doubts about promoting the use of CMC
and charging users: “The oral tradition will never allow a place for
such technologies. Getting people to pay for information will never
be possible in Africa.”
In China, a Hong Kong-based journalist and a Chinese bureau
crat were imprisoned because they reported on the country’s gold
reserves, a state secret. They are serving sentences of several years in
prison as a result. Information that would be in the public domain
in the West is privileged in some countries.
The Information Culture in the West clashes with the value
systems prevalent in many parts of the world. However, even in
these situations, access to the Internet is now becoming an issue as
countries jockey for advantage and markets around the world open
up. The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will lead
to more competition. Using the Internet and related technologies is
essential for competitive advantage.
LESSONS LEARNED
In summary, the SDNP has been operating for over two and a
half years with help from UNDP, IDRC of Canada, and others. The
SDNP experience has revealed several factors that need to be taken
into consideration when establishing CMC activities that link differ
ent stakeholder groups:
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• local capacity to develop a node
• official support and incentive
• willingness of different stakeholder groups to work together
• a need to have local information and exchanges
• a market for the service
• an active NGO community to promote and run the service
• existing initiatives
• donor and/or government interest in catalyzing action
• suitability to local languages and dialects
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS
For sustainable development to become a reality, there will be a
need to agree on plans and policies, and, more importantly, a need
to bring about attitudinal and behavioral changes. CMC and related
information technologies are tools that can help stakeholders inter
act and collaborate so that all of this can take place. These technolo
gies may have a role in enhancing the capacity of traditional and
local resource users to become self-sufficient by helping them mar
ket products and services and acquire resources and support to help
them meet their own needs and voice their views. For instance,
ecotourism, negotiating agreements with commercial interests,
direct marketing, developing and acquiring “Indigenous” or local
knowledge resources and developing a strong presence and advocacy
using CMC are options that local and traditional resource users may
wish to consider.
Local and traditional resource users have particular characteris
tics. They are usually poor, without access to significant financial
resources. Some are beyond even the cash economy, let alone tele
communications. With fewer rights than others, they are more open
to exploitation, and in some cases, are disenfranchised or persecuted
in one way or another.
Local and traditional resource users need help to establish their
rights over property and other resources that contributed in the past
to their survival. Among these are the knowledge resources that they
have developed.
The year 1995 marks the beginning of the “Decade of the
World’s Indigenous People 1995-2005.” This is an opportunity to
review ongoing activities, consolidate efforts and collaborate in
creating a global network to support and inform local and tradi
tional resource users and their allies. This could be done with cata
lytic support from the international community.
The blueprint already exists: a recent conference on Small Island
Developing States (SIDS) sponsored by the United Nations, led to
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the proposal of SIDSNet, a global information sharing network for
SIDS (UN, 1994). The SIDSNet proposal could be adapted to the
special needs of local and traditional resources users. SIDSNet could
be the basis of a funding proposal for such a global network.
I’d like to thank you very much for this opportunity. Thank you.
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Richard Labelle Working Group
Participants in this session discussed the introduction and use of
computer-mediated communications in developing countries. Key
issues that arose during the talk were cooperation, limitations to
applicability in rural areas, and access.
COOPERATION
Working through CMC technologies, more can be accomplished
in less time with the help of people around the world who have
information needed to resolve particular problems. According to
Richard Labelle, cooperation should be the main reason for becom
ing part of the world communications network. He gave as an ex
ample the success in dealing quickly with a toxic waste spill in
Pakistan. Through e-mail with the international community, work
ers were able to deal effectively with containment, cleanup, and
environmental and health issues associated with the spill.
LIMITATIONS TO APPLICABILITY IN RURAL AREAS
Many participants questioned the usefulness of CMCs for rural
community groups because of considerable barriers to implementa
tion, including infrastructure, training, and cost. One option Labelle
suggested for rural areas was packet radio. The lack of money,
power, and technical capacity in rural communities, however, raised
questions about the practicality of even this technology. One ex
ample of this technology working under these conditions is
HealthNet in Zambia, which links rural areas to each other and to
an urban hospital where doctors are able to help with prescriptions
and diagnoses. People are saved agonizing trips to the city, and
doctors and nurses in rural areas are learning from their colleagues
in Lusaka.
ACCESS
Access to this level of communications is difficult in developing
countries because the internal communications infrastructure is
lacking or poorly maintained, governments are particular about who
their citizens are talking to and what information they have access
to, and because high technology is expensive.
The usual pattern to date has been for a large NGO or interna
tional development agency (such as CARE or USAID) to sponsor a
community or local NGO. Often, computers and communications
technology are kept in urban areas, where phone lines are better

 

 
maintained and access to maintenance is better.
Language is also a barrier to access. The general rule has been
that to communicate on the global Internet, one must speak English.
Electronic translators have a poor track record, yet CMCs are useful
only if what is communicated can be assimilated. While local lan
guages are being used on some BBSs, global connectivity requires
some conduit into English.
The following excerpts expand on some of these topics.
In rural areas, access is practically nonexistent. Where
there is access, it is usually associated with the presence of NGOs
that have outside help. For example, CARE has had a history of
supporting various groups in conserving environmental and
agricultural knowledge. While the groups that they work with in
the countryside don’t have direct access to these technologies,
the regional offices of CARE have computers with global linkages
through their office in Nairobi. So the end user — the small scale
farmer — is not online. Nowhere.
There is hardly any direct use of computer technology by
people living at the “local” level, whatever that means, and it’s
not likely to happen for some time.
In the Philippines, which has a more open approach to the
use of information, the government has funded an Internet
network, and instead of charging the exorbitant rates that are the
norm in the rest of South East Asia, the Filipinos have agreed
that this is a good thing for development and that they will en
courage access to the Internet at a subsidized rate. This network
is now being used by the School of Forestry at the University of
Los Baños to link villages using agroforestry so as to be able to
share experiences and coordinate research.
Sebastián Poot: What can a group such as Yum Balam do to become a
part of a network such as the APC? We are beginning to think
about setting up a node for the Yucatán, but we are not certain
about the steps that are involved in doing this — information
technologies are something new for us.
RL: I would suggest talking to other NGOs and initiatives in the
Yucatán and Mexico City, including La Neta, an electronic net
work in Mexico City.
Rachel Byard, Yale F&ES: What are the options if there aren’t any phone
lines?
RL: Access is still not out of the question. The options are satellite
systems, and the most cost-effective is using a technology known
as packet radio. Packet radio uses a micromodem and a radio
Richard Labelle:
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transmitter — $600 will pay for this setup. There is one satellite
(so far) owned by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at
the University of Sussex, in the UK. IDS, with the assistance of
Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), based in Arlington,
uses this technology to link every point on the earth. They do
this in the following fashion: the satellite flies between 100 and
300 km above the surface of the earth, so unlike the geostation
ary commercial satellites, this satellite is moving very fast and
covers every part of the world 6 to 10 times a day, but only for 15
to 20 minute windows, which can be extended with a directional
antenna. During these times, you can transmit to this satellite at
9.6 Kbps. There is not only no need for a telephone, but if you
have solar panels, there is also no need for outside electricity.
What does this permit access to? Well, it can carry your
information and download it to the IDS in the UK or elsewhere,
and then your information goes through a server and is on the
Internet. When you get a response, these are uploaded to the
satellite and then downloaded to you when the satellite is in your
area again. In the field, this means a delay of one or two days
between sending a message and getting an answer.
James Jiler, Moderator, Yale F&ES: Since we have to end in about two
minutes, I’d just like to ask you to recommend a single, compre
hensive source of information on this technology and its use as it
is related to development concerns.
RL: I would suggest the upcoming second edition of the Sourcebook
on Sustainable Development, which will update the 1992 edition.
You can get it from the International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD).
The IISD can be contacted at:
The International Institute for
Sustainable Development
161 Portage Avenue East,
6th floor
Winnipeg, Manitoba,
Canada R3B 0Y4
Tel: 1-204-958-7700
Fax: 1-204-958-7710
E-mail: reception@iisdpost.iisd.ca
WWW: http://iisd1.iisd.ca/

The Sourcebook on Sustainable
Development, 1992:
ISBN 1-895536-04-9

 

 

Indigenous Land Use Mapping in Central America
Mac Chapin
Center for the Support of Native Lands
ABSTRACT
Projects undertaken by Native Lands to assist Central American Indigenous groups in mapping their land use have
resulted in very accurate maps based on the work of Indigenous surveyors and their communities. These maps serve as
an important tool in the struggle to secure Indigenous land rights in areas that were previously seen as empty. As well,
the mapping effort itself has served to foster community organization and cooperation in seeking to press claims.
Continued Indigenous management of these areas is critical in conserving the last remaining forested areas in Central
America.

INTRODUCTION
In 1987, I began working with Cultural Survival on a program to
assist the Indigenous peoples of Central America. We concentrated
our efforts along the Caribbean coastal slope, for this has tradition
ally been the neglected region of Central America.
The first thing we found out about the situation of the Indig
enous people of the lowland areas, where the last remaining forests
are found, is that the people are not well known. In Central America
as a whole, there are approximately 30 million people. Of these, 6 to
6.5 million are Indigenous, spread out among 43 distinct ethnic and
linguistic groups, yet, even within their own countries, they are not
well known. Several years ago, someone from a publishing house
phoned me and asked how to spell the word “Pech.” The Pech are
an Indigenous group with a population of about 2,000 people living
in northern Honduras. He was editing a book about Honduras and
before calling me he had contacted the Honduran embassy to ask
them. No one in the embassy had ever even heard of the Pech.
This situation is generally true throughout the Caribbean region
of Central America, even among groups that are known by name,
such as the Miskito of Honduras and Nicaragua, and the Kuna of
Panama. While we know what they look like — Kuna women in
particular are quite visible with their mola blouses — and have
heard some stories about them, it must be said that we know virtu
ally nothing about what they think, and consequently we have little
idea of who they really are or how they go about organizing their
lives. For this reason, we began visiting them and spending some
time among them to find out what issues they were concerned with.
In 1991, we began working on a map of the region with the
National Geographic Society, and the following year we published
The Coexistence of Indigenous Peoples and the Natural Environment
in Central America, a map supplement to the journal Research and
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Exploration. This map shows in considerable detail the relative dis
tributions of remaining forests and Indigenous peoples.
We can see that the majority of Central America’s Indians live in
two discrete and difficult-to-reach areas: the volcanic highlands of
Guatemala and the densely forested Caribbean coastal plain, which
stretches from Belize down through Panama to the Colombian
border. During the time of Conquest and after, the Indians fled into
these refuge areas to maintain their autonomy and ways of life. Over
the centuries, they were gradually pushed back and displaced, forced
into ever-tighter circles across the densely populated highlands or
still deeper into the humid rainforests of the Caribbean littoral.
These hideouts had remained relatively inviolate to outside incur
sion until only recently, when the forces set loose by national and
international market economies combined with the impact of new
technologies to mount an assault against the region’s remaining base
of untouched natural resources
Now the last stands of tropical forest, and the lives of the Indians
living inside them, are threatened by advancing loggers, cattle
ranchers, and landless peasants. And the pace of destruction has
accelerated during the last 50 years. It is estimated that fully two
thirds of the original forest cover has been cut back and burned off
since 1940.
Clearly, the most pressing problem facing Indigenous peoples of
this region is the invasion and destruction of their land and natural
resources. But while this became clear to us, it was difficult to figure
out what to do about it or where to start. In one area, the Mosquitia
of Honduras and Nicaragua, we realized that while the local inhabit
ants had a fairly clear idea of what was happening to them, this
understanding was atomized at the level of the community. People
in one community knew the names of non-Indian peasants who had
moved into their lands; they had business deals — generally illegal
— with loggers, and some worked as peons for large cattle ranchers
who had recently arrived. By contrast, they had only a fragmentary
understanding of what was occurring in other villages, and they had
little interest in their problems: “If they have problems, that’s their
business.”
At the time, we had three priority areas in which we were work
ing: the Mosquitia region of Honduras and Nicaragua, inhabited by
the Garífuna, Miskito, Pech, and Tawahka peoples; the Talamanca/
La Amistad area along the Atlantic coast of Costa Rica and Panama,
with the Cabécar, Bribri and Teribe peoples; and eastern Panama,
including the Kuna areas of Kuna Yala, Madungandi, Wargandi, and
Púcuru and Paya, and the Emberá and Wounaan region of the
Darién. All three of these areas are threatened; all needed help.
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Our difficulties resided in the fact that the inhabitants of these
areas did not have a global vision of what was occurring, and it was
consequently impossible to devise initiatives covering an entire
region. This was when we hit on the notion of carrying out a map
ping project.
DEVISING A STRATEGY
The first area we worked in was the Mosquitia of Honduras. We
had been talking with several Honduran organizations about what
was at the time an undefined project that would serve to focus
peoples’ attention on the land issue. These discussions went on for
more than a year. Finally, in 1992 the support group MOPAWI
(Moskitia Pawisa — Development of the Mosquitia) and the
Miskito federation MASTA (Moskitia Asla Takanka — Unity of the
Mosquitia) combined forces to carry out a participatory land use
mapping project in which the Indigenous peoples would gather the
bulk of the information (see Tierras lndígenas de la Mosquitia
Hondureña 1992: Zonas de Subsisténcia, MOPAWI and MASTA).
The following year, in 1993, we supported a similar project in
the Darién of Panama. This was a collaborative effort of the Indig
enous General Congresses of the Emberá, Wounaan, and Kuna
Peoples and the Panamanian support group the Centro de Estudios
y Acción Social Panameño (CEASPA). The result was Tierras
lndígenas del Darién 1993: Zonas de Subsisténcia (Emberá,
Wounaan, and Kuna General Congresses and CEASPA).
In this talk I would like to use examples from the mapping
project in Panama as a way of illuminating the general lines of the
methodology used.
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THE DARIÉN
The Darién region of Panama, with a total land area of 16,803
square kilometers and approximately 45,000 people, is the most
sparsely populated and least known area of the country. It contains
the largest remaining chunk of intact forest and serves as a natural
barrier separating Central from South America. Indeed, since the
1970s, it has been designated a buffer zone protecting North
America from the spread of hoof-and-mouth disease from Colom
bia, where it has been endemic for decades. The only uncompleted
stretch of the Pan-American Highway running from Alaska down to
southern Argentina is found between the Panamanian town of
Yaviza and the Colombian border, a distance of just over 100 kilo
meters.
Thirty years ago, all of eastern Panama — containing Darién

  

      
and part of Panamá Provinces — was a region of largely intact tropi
cal rainforest inhabited almost exclusively by three Indigenous
groups: the Emberá, the Wounaan, and the Kuna, as well as small
colonies of darienitas, the descendents of escaped African slaves.
Today, it has become a battleground on which the native inhabitants
are struggling to stem the incursion of loggers, cattle ranchers, land
speculators, and landless colonists from Panama’s overcrowded
interior provinces. Since the opening up of the region in the mid
1970s through the construction of the Bayano Hydroelectric Dam
and the extension of the Pan American Highway as far as Yaviza, the
lush forests have been rapidly disappearing, together with the subsis
tence base of the local people. Now the region is faced with a new
menace as plans are made to complete the final link in the Highway,
joining the North and South American continents for the first time.
LAND USE MAPPING
We held discussions with Indian leaders over a period of more
than a year before the mapping proper was begun. We discussed the
purpose of the project, potential benefits to the local communities,
and the methodology to be used in the field. Over the years, the
Indian groups have heard considerable talk about projects in their
region but they have been invariably disappointed. We had long
talks; they returned to their people and talked some more; we talked
again, answering their questions. We had joint meetings with
CEASPA. Finally their suspicions were overcome and we all decided
to move forward.
In May 1993, we initiated work in the field. We assembled a
team of cartographers and 22 Indigenous “surveyors” from commu
nities in the region to compile maps detailing the physical features as
well as the land use patterns of the local communities. Each surveyor
had responsibility for a zone encompassing between three and six
communities, which amounted to a manageable range for a single
person to cover. In this way, all of the territory inhabited and ex
ploited by the Indigenous peoples of the Darién was covered.
The mapping was carried out through a series of three work
shops. The first was held in the Emberá community of Arimae,
where Andrew Leake (the coordinator of the mapping project in the
Mosquitia), Nícanor Gonzalez of Native Lands, and three Indig
enous coordinators — Genaro Pacheco and Facundo Sanapí, both
Emberás, and Geraldes Hernández, a Kuna — met with the survey
ors, who had been selected by the Indigenous leaders of their respec
tive groups. Together, they prepared two questionnaires, one dealing
with the use of natural resources and the other to ascertain the
population of the region. The surveyors tested their questionnaires

 

It has become a battleground on which
the native inhabitants are struggling
to stem the incursion of loggers, cattle
ranchers, land speculators, and land
less colonists from Panama’s over
crowded interior provinces.

 
in the community during the evenings so they would be adjusted to
the realities of the region. In similar fashion, they roleplayed the
explanations they would give to villagers about the mapping project.
Another important component of the first workshop was train
ing in creating hand-drawn maps with the community. Nícanor
Gonzalez, who is an architect by training and a skilled cartographer,
gave them elementary lessons in representing spatial relations, ex
plained what they should put in and what they should leave out, and
discussed orientation according to the four cardinal points. To keep
track of information that would not fit on the maps or in the land
use questionnaires, the surveyors were given notebooks.
After a week of preparation, the surveyors set off into the field,
where they worked on census counts, questioned villagers exten
sively, filled out their land use questionnaires, and began putting
together careful cartographic records of their zone with community
members. This was rugged work, and for this reason all of the sur
veyors were men. They travelled by bus and by canoe, and made
their way on foot along muddy trails through the forest. They car
ried with them a green plastic folder with a sheath of loose-leaf bond
paper, pencils, pencil sharpeners, and ball-point pens. The most
essential materials were three 60 cm x 80 cm sheets of blank manila
paper, which were used to draw the maps. Official government base
maps were not utilized, since the idea was to stimulate the surveyors
and villagers to create their own maps with their own symbols. In
the field, the manila sheets with the drawings were carried in sec
tions of plastic tubing with rubber stoppers.
In collaboration with villagers, especially the elders, the survey
ors made meticulous drawings of the river systems and the areas
where they hunt, fish, cut firewood, and gather materials for con
struction, medicines, and fruit. In this fashion, the maps were built
out of the accumulated geographical knowledge of the Indians, a
type of “ethnocartography.” It must be said that some surveyors
produced better maps than others, but the best among them, crafted
with copious detail and admirable artistic talent, are works of art of
great scientific value.
There were problems of course. Some communities initially
refused to give out information; several wanted payment; a number
of the surveyors, in the beginning, were too shy to ask for complete
information and their work was spotty. Project coordinators inter
vened in most of these cases and things were set straight. In the end,
all of the 22 surveyors worked through to the end of the project, and
all completed their jobs satisfactorily.
At the end of the fieldwork period, the surveyors returned to a
second workshop, where they worked with Peter Herlihy, a University
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of Kansas geographer who had worked on the mapping project in
Honduras and who had spent many years in the Darién, and several
cartographers from the National Geographic Institute “Tommy
Guardia” and the University of Panama. They worked together in
intensive sessions to construct composite maps from government
base maps, existing aerial photographs, and the new, communitydrawn maps. The surveyors utilized the information from their
questionnaires, notebooks, and the hand-drawn maps; the cartogra
phers worked with government base maps, topographical sheets,
and aerial photographs. They combined all of this information,
correcting errors in the government maps, adding Indigenous
names to rivers and other landforms, and plotting the extent of
Indigenous land use.
After this extremely compact three week session, the surveyors
journeyed back to their zones to consult community members with
the draft maps, fill in gaps, confirm boundary lines, and correct
errors. They then came together again for a third workshop, where
they put the final touches on the maps. At the end of the process, the
team of Indians and cartographers managed to produce a 1:250,000
master map of all the Indigenous territory of the Darién together
with twenty-two 1:50,000 zonal maps that detail the river systems
and the land use patterns.
The government and university cartographers who participated
estimate that the maps produced by this process are far more accu
rate and detailed than anything that has ever been done in the
Darién. For years, the ever-present cloud cover had impeded aerial
photography of the Darién, a circumstance that made official maps
of the region no more than approximations. Confidence in the
Indigenous maps, however, is so high that the lnstituto Geográfico
recently utilized the new information, including Indigenous place
names, to update the official map of the Republic of Panama.
RESULTS
The most important outcome of the maps, however, is the depic
tion of Indigenous land use. For the first time, it gives a clear indica
tion of the extent of the territory utilized by the Indigenous peoples
and provides a basis for understanding the way they manage their
natural resources.
The maps, of course, are a good deal more than academic exer
cises. Beyond their scientific worth, they have an important practical
value as tools to protect Indigenous lands and conserve the region’s
biodiversity. Before the project began, individual Indian villagers
had little sense of how loggers, cattle ranchers, and landless peasant
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farmers were affecting the resources within the region as a whole. In
this sense, working together on the maps provided a thorough edu
cation: it has raised their awareness of the numerous threats to their
well-being and motivated them to seek collective strategies to curb
the invasion of their lands. Conservationists, at the same time, can
see from the maps that the areas of Indigenous land use are also
areas of relatively intact forest. The implication of this is that per
haps the best way to preserve what is left is to strengthen Indigenous
control over the land and work toward common conservationist
goals.
One of the most important achievements of the process was the
refinement of the mapping methodology, which manages to com
bine maximum participation of the local people with the generation
of products of truly scientific value. In a wider context, the method
ology is presently being adapted for work in other areas of Central
America. At the present time, the Center for the Support of Native
Lands is collaborating with the Indian Law Resource Center, Uni
versity of California-Berkeley geographer Bernard Nietschmann,
and Indigenous groups on similar mapping projects along the
Miskito Coast in Nicaragua and in Toledo District of southern
Belize. Because of the simplicity of the mapping methodology, it can
be utilized by Indigenous people throughout the world to map their
own territories.
Thank you very much.

Working together on the maps pro
vided a thorough education: it has raised
their awareness of the numerous threats
to their well being and motivated them
to seek collective strategies to curb
the invasion of their lands.

QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION
Q:
When you make maps as a means of legitimizing claims, you
are also showing what exists in these territories. Might these
same maps not be used against these people as a tool to aid in
the theft of their resources or in helping to suppress their
activities?
MC:
That is a very good question. It reminds me of some of those
anthropological studies that were done in Vietnam which
were picked up by the CIA and used to infiltrate and under
mine all of the groups out there, in the Highlands especially.
One thing that the Indigenous people did not want to do was
map where the gold, minerals, or sacred sites were; they said
“that’s out.” With this mapping process, they can map any
thing they want. That’s the beauty of the system — you can
use it for any purpose you want. Of course, it’s still sensitive
information; what we did was find out where the resources
are. We found out where they cut their timber for dugouts,
and they know where the areas of mahogany are, for example.
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They are telling us where their medicines are, where the game
is, and so forth.
I think a hundred years ago Indians would have been crazy
to produce a map like this. Today, things have changed con
siderably. They are trying to work within the political system
and through the courts of law, and they need this kind of
information to make a case. They are less afraid of revealing
where their resources are so the CIA can take them than they
are anxious to make a claim for legitimizing this land. And I
will say that this thing was presented as a simple land use
mapping project, a very technical exercise, but the Indians
were interested from the beginning in using it as an aid to
getting claims to the land.
Since the surveyors were all male, was there a difficulty in
eliciting information about land uses that are the provinces of
the female members of these societies?
We had men as surveyors simply because it was judged too
dangerous for the women to be traveling between communi
ties, but they had communal meetings where the women were
certainly involved in discussing all of this stuff and they drew
the maps together.
How did you standardize the various maps produced by the
surveyors; did they have compasses, for example?
No, we didn’t use compasses. On the maps they didn’t put
down North and South. They put down where the sun came
up and where it went down. They oriented themselves idio
syncratically, according to each surveyor. A lot of them used
“behind the village” and “in front of the village,” so as soon as
they located it on the river, it straightened itself out. As far as
distance goes, they had a certain measure they calculated,
which was how long it took to walk a kilometer — they would
keep these in the notebooks. It took two and a half hours to
walk to X place and that’s how they figured out distances.
They also wrote down exactly where in the bend of the river it
was, so they used both physical and temporal determinants.
When you are dealing with a territory that is a composite of
communities, what happens when one group doesn’t agree
with its neighbor about a boundary?
In the Mosquitia and in the Darién there was an awful lot of
overlap when it was the same Indigenous group. There are

 

I think a hundred years ago Indians
would have been crazy to produce a
map like this. Today, things have
changed considerably.

 
Emberá villages that were all wrapped around each other, but
where Emberá and Kuna communities abutted, they came up
to a river and that was it. It was very different — there was no
argument at all. There are definitely lots of situations in Latin
America and around the world where this would be an issue,
and it would have to be worked out in the mapping process.
M AC C HAPIN
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Mac Chapin Working Group
Mapping of Indian areas is designed to help Indigenous groups
make claims to their land and natural resources. These maps have
shown that Indigenous areas are generally sustainably managed, as
evidenced by high levels of green in satellite imagery. Indigenous
groups can utilize maps to prove to the government they have a legal
right to the area. By using Indian names for areas and features such
as rivers, these maps strengthen their claims. As a result of the Indig
enous mapping process, governments now use Indian names for
these resources, further cementing their claims. In addition, govern
ments have a better knowledge of where local Indigenous groups
live, which reduces their ability to lease the Indian land for develop
ment projects or waste sites. This mapping process does not purport
to determine topography, identify land tenure, or demarcate Indig
enous territories. It is merely a tool to empower local populations
and educate them about their resources and land area.
The role Mac Chapin and Native Lands take in the mapping
process is to initiate the idea, offer technical training, and help local
groups achieve their goals. The point of training is to teach repre
sentation of spatial structure — it is not to alter the views of the
Indians towards their environment. When initiating a new project
and subsequent survey, it is necessary to work with the group’s
leaders. It is the responsibility of the leaders to determine who will
survey the area — those most knowledgeable about local resources.
Women are not currently included in the surveying process, since in
those Indigenous cultures in which mapping has been done, it is not
acceptable for women to travel between communities. This raises
the question of whether women’s resources are excluded from the
maps. Women are, however, included in the community analysis of
the maps and often give input at this stage. After the initial success
in Honduras, it was possible to show other Indigenous groups what
has worked, which can give them ideas to help them to achieve their
goals. Because mapping is designed to help Indigenous groups make
claims to their land and resources, they must be the ones who ulti
mately decide how their project will proceed.
The following excerpts expand on some of these themes:
By way of introduction, we are working on a case study
and methodology manual of what happened in Nicaragua and
Panama. There is a lot of interest from around the world about
using these methodological tools. Those interested include

Mac Chapin:

 

 
groups from Vietnam, Indonesia, and Africa. Many groups want
to map their homelands in order to get the land from the gov
ernment, but there exist many political problems. Conservation
groups are becoming too involved. Mapping methodology could
be adapted to just about anything — game animals or habitat
types for natural resource management, for example. With local
knowledge, you can do this mapping because Indigenous people
already know where these resources exist.
Problems arise with political dimensions. The whole process
must be managed by groups within the country and must be
done through local groups. This mapping serves to empower
local groups, and educate them; the maps belong to the commu
nity. They are having workshops to discuss land issues — map
ping gets them focussed on these issues. With maps, they are able
to know what is going on in nearby communities and share
information.
Julie Greenberg, Yale F&ES: If the knowledge is already in peoples’ heads,
what does it mean to “train” mappers? Does it alter the way they
see things? What does the training include?
MC: No, it does not alter their views. It is technical cartographic
training — how to represent space. It takes their knowledge (in
time traveled, for instance) and teaches them how to represent
scale — just technical stuff. They are very good artists, they just
need to learn how to make maps. We did not want to give them
base maps to fill in, since the product would not be their own
map. Some maps are messed up on distance, but they use aerial
photographs to correct them.
Jane Dixon: To what extent is map making traditional for Indigenous
groups?
MC: The Kuna Indians have mapped sacred sites for years — for their
own protected information. They love to list the names of places
along a river. They understood the idea of mapping immediately.
Some groups do not, and that is another problem.
Brian Guse, Indiana University School of Public & Environmental Affairs: Do you
have intergenerational teams work as surveyors to give a histori
cal view of the depletion of natural resources and the emergence
of outside influences?
MC: No, but it is true that elders know the region the best. We go into
a community and talk with the leadership, who then appoint a
team of surveyors. They choose the most knowledgeable people
to work on a survey. A lot of discussion takes place. Continual
checking of maps with the community also takes place. The
material is then presented to the community. This facilitates
discussions of resources and so on.

The whole process must be managed
by groups within the country and must
be done through local groups. This
mapping serves to empower local
groups, and educate them; the maps
belong to the community.

  

      
Who designed
the original questions?
MC: It was a collaborative effort between MOPAWI, a development
organization, and MASTA, a local Indian organization. There is
a difference between academic and applied research. Applied
research is a group effort, whereas academic research has a prin
cipal researcher and assistants. Advisors from the outside should
be considered as just technical assistance. The information be
longs to Indigenous people.
George Appell, Borneo Research Council: If you were to apply the technique
to Borneo, you would get two different ethnic groups with two
different land tenure policies, but the maps would look the same.
Land tenure is critical, but maps do not include this information.
MC: Mapping is simply land use. There are several reasons for doing
this: the goal for Honduras was for the Mosquitia to show the
government they owned or occupied land. Government at times
thinks no one lives somewhere. The goal was to document that
the area could not be used as a waste site because it was occupied
by Indigenous people. They used government geographic maps
to show vegetation patterns. This way the government could not
deny their claims because it was the government’s own map.
These maps also showed that areas used by Indigenous people
were used sustainably, that is, the areas were still verdant.
Jake Kosek, Yale F&ES: How would you compare the accuracy of your
maps to government maps — how different are they in terms of
what they are mapping? Are there different priorities or ideologies?
MC: Our maps did not include topography, some government maps
do. Government maps are just physical features. One difference
is Indian names for all the rivers, which legitimizes their claim to
the land. After this, the government began to put the Indian
names of rivers on their maps.
Henry Kernan, Forestry Consultant: What happened to the pulp and paper
mill project in Honduras?
MC: Initially, the project was opposed by conservationists. Many
conservation groups went there to stop the plan. After the plan
was stopped, the Indians took over to block the Stone Container
Corporation’s plans to develop the area.
John Friede, Worldview Ltd.: Through The Nature Conservancy, the
Earth Foundation is planning on purchasing land in the Darién
Gap. Will this stand the test of time? Will it contribute to the
maps, and will the maps be useful? Is debt purchasing of land
helping, or are there conflicting agendas?
MC: Yes, The Nature Conservancy is associated with ANCon, a local
NGO that owns large ranches and farms. They are involved in
Carlos Ramirez, Department of Biology, Lehman College, CUNY:
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conflict with Indian lands because they buy up large parcels of
land. Right now they have one parcel of land that actually has an
Indian village inside it. They have had some tremendous con
flicts with Indians. They keep trying to tell Indians how to be
have. Indians do not appreciate these programs because they are
not sensitive towards Indigenous needs or desires. They need to
find a middle ground where they can work together. The strategy
is to find a common interest.
The Kuna are coming out with a book with Jorge Ventosillo,
Plants and Animals in the Life of the Kuna People. It includes
articles and essays on Kuna life. It mixes western knowledge of
animals with Kuna ideas of these animals. There is a section on
medicinal plants, and essays on how resources in their area are
disappearing. They blame capitalism, but also blame themselves
for playing into capitalism. Currently, organizations are trying to
work with local Indigenous groups to manage their resources
together.
Susan Place, Department of Geology, California State University, Chico: Are
women’s resources excluded from these male-made maps?
Would women’s teams show different resources in their maps?
MC: Men tend to manage things in Latin America. Women do have a
say, but men tend to be in charge. Indigenous women’s groups
are becoming more popular. When working with Indigenous
people, men tend to come forward, making it more plausible to
work with them.
Ted Macdonald: It is the communities themselves who do not put the
women forward to work on designing maps. Culturally, it is
against the women’s roles to go from community to community.
They are looked down upon if they do this.
JG: Do women play a role when maps are being reviewed? Are
women able to state what has been left out of a map?
MC: Maps are presented to the community as a whole, so at that time
they do have an ability to say something. Often women are ex
tremely vocal.
TM: Men travel farthest from the community and experience most
areas while hunting. Also, they maintain culturally modified
trees to mark boundaries between villages. How are you able to
map these areas?
MC: The farthest area away from the village was the most difficult
part to delineate and map, and a lot of vagueness remains. You
have to make sure they do not exaggerate their area, which could
have negative effects in future land claims.
TM: What do they use as justification of outermost limits?
MC: You accept it or you don’t. Mapping was done and accepted by

[In] essays on how resources in their
area are disappearing [the Kuna] blame
capitalism, but [they ] also blame them
selves for playing into capitalism.

  

      
the entire tribe. It was also legitimized by the government. It is
the best you can do.
Michael Dyssel, International Development Program, Clark University: How
applicable is this mapping in semi-arid regions where resources
are not well defined?
MC: They do have markers in these regions. They know a specific
place, and can use a visual marker. Aerial photographs are much
easier in these regions because there are no clouds or canopy to
obstruct photos.
Bronson Griscom, NYU/NY Botanical Garden: What was the initiation process
of the project? You went to the groups to see whether they were
interested?
MC: Discussions began and solidified. When we went to Panama, we
already had something to show. We asked if local groups would
be interested. After many meetings with Indian leaders, they
discussed their priorities, and found the project would benefit
them. You must explain what is going on, offer something, and
then allow them to determine what they need from it. Mapping
is not the most difficult aspect, but, rather, the social organiza
tion of the project is the complex part. How you select surveyors,
how they are trained, and how they interact with the community
is the part that is difficult to implement.
JG: How essential are maps to formalize claims? Do you think maps
are essential?
MC: At some point during the process, maps are essential for land
claims.
JK: How do you deal with people being afraid of mapping because it
will codify today’s resource use patterns, while resources change
over time? How do you deal with demarcation and enforcement?
MC: We made it very clear that this is just land use — it has nothing
to do with demarcation. We do not say we are going to demar
cate Indian lands because governments will oppose it. Govern
ments support these projects because the local Indian groups
went to the ministries to gain their support and collaboration.
They billed it as a technical exercise, which gained further gov
ernment support. About fixing resources, yes it is a problem. It is
always a problem, but it is important for these groups to hold on
to what they have.
JF: While there may be a genuine value to mapping for the Indig
enous cultures to know where their resources exist, isn’t there a
threat that developers and investors can use this information to
better exploit these resources? Do you have a system to make
information available to local groups but keep it from large
developers?

 

Mapping is not the most difficult as
pect, but, rather, the social organiza
tion of the project is the complex part.
How you select surveyors, how they
are trained, and how they interact with
the community is the part that is diffi
cult to implement.

 
Because of satellite imagery, these big groups already
know what is there without going into the area. They can, how
ever, hide some valuable resources, such as gold mines. It is
always hard to know how knowledge will be used by different
groups.
It is nice to see there are countries where resource use is nego
tiable by the people, and not just by the government deciding
how the resources will be used.

Janis Alcorn:

GA:

  

